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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the relationship between business cycle correlation 
and trade intensity for a group of 24 countries over the period 1959 to 2003. 
Previous studies have not accounted for the possibility that the business 
cycle correlation may be influenced by unobservable country pair specific 
effects. Our estimates are produced using both fixed and random effects 
procedures and allow for the possibility that trade intensity could be 
endogenous. Both methodologies suggest that the greater economic 
convergence is strongly influenced by rises in bilateral trade intensity. A 
couple of sensitivity analyses prove that the relationship is robust, such as 
sub-period analysis or adding potential omitted variables. 
However, the magnitude and significance of the estimated relationship is 
not the same for all countries. Our evidence indicates that trade amongst 
the European countries has had the most beneficial effect on business cycle 
co-movements which, from optimum currency area (OCA) theory, would 
support the decision of most of these economies to join European Monetary 
Union (EMU). But all non-European countries (except China) have not 
shown positive or significant relationships.  
In addition, the determinants of business cycle co-movements are extended 
to trade intensity, industry specialisation and financial integration for a 
sample of 15 OECD countries from 1984 to 2003. We still find the positive 
and statistically significant impact from trade intensity on business cycle 
synchronisation. Moreover, economic regions with strong financial links are 
significantly less synchronised and more similar industry structure results in 
highly correlated business cycle.1 
 
                                                 
1 The paper was published in Scandinavian Journal of Economics and was presented at: European Trade 
Study Group (ETSG) 9th Annual Conference; International Network for Economic Research (INFER) 9th 
Annual Conference; Scottish Economic Society 2006 Annual Conference; VIth Doctoral Meetings in 
International Trade and International Finance (CEPII); and ESDS International Annual Conference. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
On 1st January 1999 when eleven European Union (EU) countries completed the final 
stage of European Monetary unification (Greece became the 12th member of the Euro 
zone in 2001) irrevocably fixed exchange rate established the conversion rates between 
the respective national currencies and the Euro, after which a full monetary union was 
established, when individual national currencies were replaced with a single currency, 
giving birth to the Euro. Euro banknotes and coins have been in circulation since 1st 
January 2002. Now member countries are Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia and Finland. 
With the expansion of the European Union to include 12 more countries, 1 other member 
countries will have to decide whether they abolish national currencies and adopt the Euro 
in a few years like the 13 European Monetary Union (EMU) countries or still keep the 
national currencies like Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 2  Thus this is 
becoming a hot topic: should one currency only for just 13 counties of the present EMU 
or for the EU as a whole, or for the whole of Europe, or maybe for the whole world? In 
                                                 
1 Ten countries joined the EU in 2004: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia; and two more joined in 2007: Bulgaria and Romania. 
2 Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom were the only old EU member states outside the monetary 
union. The situation for the three older member states also looks different from that of the newer EU 
members. Demark is a member of ERM II. On September 25-27, 1998 the ministers of economic affairs 
and finance and the central-bank governors of the EU member states concluded an agreement concerning 
Danish and Greek participation in the new exchange-rate mechanism, ERM II, as from January 1, 1999. 
Furthermore, in September 1998 an agreement was concluded between the central banks of the EU member 
states not participating in the third stage of EMU, and the ECB, on the technical guidelines and procedures 
for ERM II (Demarks Nationalbank, 1998). Sweden had a referendum. In Sweden, the parliamentary 
parties agreed that EMU participation would not be possible without the broad approval of the Swedish 
people. In March 2003, following talks between the party leaders, the Riksdag decided that a national 
referendum was to be held on Swedish participation in EMU, on 14 September 2003. At the referendum, 
the Swedish people rejected participation, with 56 per cent voting against and 42 per cent for (Government 
Offices of Sweden, 2006). The United Kingdom has an opt-out clause. When the Maastricht Treaty was 
concluded in 1992, the United Kingdom was granted an opt-out clause, meaning that it was not required to 
participate in the third stage of EMU and consequently introduce the Euro. The United Kingdom is still in 
the second stage of EMU. The opt-out clause was a condition for the United Kingdom to approve the 
Treaty as a whole. (EUROPA, 2006) 
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deciding whether to join a currency union policy makers need to compare the benefits 
and costs of membership (Mundell, 1961; McKinnon, 1963; Kenen, 1969). 
The aim of this chapter is to highlight the motivation for this thesis through reviewing 
existing research on optimum currency area theory and the relationship between the trade 
intensity and the business cycle correlation. This chapter also lists the main contributions 
of this thesis. The last part outlines the structure of following chapters. 
 
1.2 Background and Theory 
Considering the optimum currency area (OCA) theory, the main advantage of a single 
currency is the potential gains to trade and international investment that could arise from 
eliminating currency conversion costs and removing the uncertainty arising from 
unexpected exchange rate movements. However, in a currency union, countries lose 
monetary independence thus limiting their ability to stabilise the business cycle. 
Therefore the costs depend upon the degree of the business cycle synchronization 
between member countries. The gains from monetary autonomy are minimized if 
member countries are exposed to symmetric shocks or if asymmetric shocks can be 
absorbed for example, by having flexible labour markets. 
Since Mundell (1961) first developed the concept of an optimum currency area, a vast 
literature has developed, including classic contributions by McKinnon (1963) and Kenen 
(1969). Recent surveys are available in Tavlas (1992) Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996) 
and De Grauwe (2005). Mundell (1961) focussed on the cost side of cost-benefit analysis 
of monetary integration. From Mundell’s theory we find that if wages are rigid and if 
labour mobility is limited, countries that form a monetary union will find it harder to 
adjust to demand shifts than countries that have maintained their own national monies, 
who can devalue (revalue) their currency when participating in a fixed exchange rate 
agreement. McKinnon (1963) adds the degree of openness to trade (the ratio of tradable 
to non-tradable goods) to be taken into account. Economists typically cite four criteria, 
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often called the OCA criteria, to evaluate the value of switching to a single currency. 
There are three economic criteria: the degree of trade between countries who adopt a 
common currency; the extent to which different countries experience similar shocks and 
the degree of labour market mobility in each region. One political criterion is the amount 
of fiscal transfers between regions. These four characteristics measure the ability of the 
economy to smooth local economic movements in the absence of monetary policy. They 
are all analysed empirically by lots of papers, such as Chow and Kim (2003) for East 
Asia countries, Karras (2005) for Asia and Pacific countries, Sorensen (2005) for OECD 
countries and so on.  
Frankel and Rose (1998) argue that the optimum currency criteria are endogenous; in 
particular the level of economic integration depends upon the trade intensity between two 
countries. Using pooled instrumental variable estimation they identify a positive 
relationship between cross-country correlations of de-trended output and the level of 
bi-lateral trade intensity, for a group of 21 industrialised countries from 1959 to 1993. 
They explain this result by a larger amount of intra-industry bi-lateral trade, so as both 
countries trade more within the same industries the pattern of the business cycles 
becomes more similar. Greater economic integration from trade could also arise from 
demand spillovers, in that a demand shock in one country leads to a rise in imports from 
one or more other economies (Shin and Wang, 2005). Also, as two economies become 
more economically dependent upon one another, higher trade intensity may create the 
need for more coordinated fiscal and monetary policy, leading to synchronization of 
policy shocks. We would expect a negative relationship if there is a greater degree of 
greater specialization in those goods and services, for which a country has a comparative 
advantage (Eichengreen, 1992; Krugman, 1993). This leads both countries to be more 
exposed to industry specific shocks generating more idiosyncratic business cycles. 
Kose and Yi (2002) report similar empirical estimates to Frankel and Rose (1998) using 
the same group of countries but a sample period of 1970 to 2000. However, they question 
the magnitude of their estimates since they cannot be replicated using a standard 
international business cycle model. A positive estimate is also provided by Otto et al. 
(2001). Imbs (2004) finds that a doubling of trade intensity would increase the business 
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cycle correlation by 0.048 using cross-section data for 24 OECD countries.3 While most 
of the literature has focused on developed countries, Baxter and Kourparitsas (2005) also 
find the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) criteria are endogenous for 100 developing and 
industrialised countries from 1970 to 1992. Calderòn et al (2007) find a rise in trade 
intensity to have a larger impact on the output correlation for developed countries than 
for less developed country pairs. Further support for the Frankel and Rose hypothesis is 
provided by Babetskii (2005), who investigated the determinants of economic integration 
for ten Central and Eastern European countries. 
The literature (such as Shin and Wang, 2005 and Calderón et al., 2007) also points out 
that other variables result in the cross-country synchronisation of the business cycle. In 
theory trade both in goods and in financial assets may affect the business cycle 
correlation. Moreover, closer industrial specialisation is also likely to result in 
synchronised business cycle cross countries and trade intensity possibly affects the 
business cycle through specialisation. Imbs (2004, 2006) estimates the effects of trade in 
goods and in financial assets as well as specialisation on the business cycle 
synchronisation for a group of 24 industrialised countries. However, the interactions 
between the trade in goods, financial integration, specialisation and the business cycle 
synchronisation are complex and they impact each other. 4  Three-stage least squares 
estimation is used for this system of simultaneous equations. He explains the same result 
that more bilateral trade results in closer business cycle correlation. In addition, a variety 
of measures of financial integration suggest that economic regions with strong financial 
links are significantly more synchronised; and specialisation have a sizable effect on the 
business cycles.  
 
                                                 
3 See also Imbs (2006) for similar findings. 
4 Otto et al. (2001) and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001) present the effect of specialisation on cycle correlation. 
Keheo and Perri (2002) and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001) find the effect of financial integration on business 
cycle correlation. Also Baxter and Crucini (1995) and Harrigan (2001) present the indirect effects between 
trade, finance and specialisation.  
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1.3 Trade Intensity and the Business Cycle Correlation 
In theory, closer international trade could result in either tighter or looser correlations of 
the business cycles. Closer bilateral trade could result in countries becoming more 
specialised in the goods in which they have comparative advantage. The countries might 
then be more sensitive to industry-specific shocks, resulting in more idiosyncratic 
business cycles. However, if intra-industry trade accounts for most trade, then the 
business cycles may become more similar across countries when countries trade more. 
Therefore, this relationship is ambiguous in theory. 
Our evidence shows that economic convergence has increased among the world’s major 
economies and the volume of international trade has risen. Particularly, European 
countries trade with each other obviously more than in the past, and this trend may 
continue. It is driven in part by regional trade policy, such as the completion of the single 
market in 1992, free trade agreements in Europe and expansion of the EU from 6 
founding members in 1957 to 15 in 1995 and to 27 in 2007. EMU itself may promote 
intra-European trade, if the effects of the exchange rate risk and transactions are 
important, as EMU proponents claim. Thus the business cycle is endogenous with respect 
to the trade integration, while the trade integration is also affected by policy.  
If the intra-industry trade accounts for a large proportion of bilateral trade then increased 
the intra-industry trade results in less specialisation which results in a positive cross-
industry correlation. Our hypothesis is that more international trade will result in more 
highly correlated business cycles. Although many papers have produced estimation 
results stating a positive relationship between trade intensity and the business cycle 
correlation empirically, it is not universally accepted from theory and empirical analysis.5 
We would like to extend the period and select different countries to investigate this 
relationship by a developed model. 
                                                 
5 Authors such as Eichengreen (1992), Kenen (1969) and Krugman (1993) have pointed out from theory 
that as trade becomes more highly integrated, countries specialise more in production then reduce the 
business cycle co-movement since greater trade intensity could reflect a larger amount of inter-industry 
trade and thus, higher risks of idiosyncratic shocks. Trade integration which occurs as a result of economies 
of scale also leads to regional concentration of industrial activities. Kose and Yi (2001, 2006) did not find 
any positive relationship empirically. 
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This thesis estimates the relationship between the business cycle correlation and trade 
intensity empirically. A panel data set consist of 24 countries: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium-Luxembourg, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hong Kong, Republic of Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA across 40 years 
from 1959 to 2003 which is split into 5 periods. Bilateral trade intensity is measured 
using total bilateral trade divided by joint nominal GDP or total trade. The business cycle 
correlations are measured using real GDP data (expressed in US dollars), converted to 
natural logarithms and de-trended with a Hodrick-Prescott filter.  
As theory indicates trade intensity affects industry structure which in turn can change the 
business cycle co-movement. And also both trade in goods and financial assets may 
affect the cross-country synchronisation of the business cycles. We would like to bring 
two additional variables, specialisation and financial integration, into the investigation 
and estimate their direct and indirect impacts on the business cycle correlation 
simultaneously. Our further hypothesis is that the total impact from trade on the business 
cycle correlation remains significant and both specialisation and financial integration 
affects the business cycle correlation significantly as well. 
 
1.4 Contributions of the Study 
We add to the previous literature in three respects. Firstly, we estimate our model using 
both fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) models. In doing so we can account for 
differences in the business cycle correlation across country pairs through the level of 
trade intensity and potentially important unobservable factors. For example, similar 
industrial structures or a high degree of financial integration could explain a rise in the 
level of bi-lateral economic integration. Proxies can be used to measure these factors but 
they are likely to be measured with error. Fixed effects can control for all of the country 
pair specific effects even if they are correlated with trade intensity. The random effects 
approach treats the unobservable individual effects as randomly distributed although, 
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unlike fixed effects, they are assumed to be independent of trade intensity. Previous 
literature has typically used either pooled data (Frankel and Rose, 1998; Kose and Yi, 
2002) or cross-section observations based on a mean of times series observations (Baxter 
and Kouparitsas, 2005; Imbs, 2004, 2006). Shin and Wang (2005) use only fixed effects 
estimation but unlike this study, they do not control for the possibility that trade intensity 
is endogenous. As noted earlier, there is a tendency for countries to peg the value of their 
currency to the currencies of their most important trading partners (Devereux and Lane, 
2002; Frankel and Rose, 1998). This could result in greater monetary policy 
co-ordination, which in itself maybe a determinant of the business cycle correlation. 
Therefore any relationship identified between trade intensity and the correlation of two 
countries business cycles could be spurious without instrumenting for trade intensity. The 
instruments chosen for this study are taken from the gravity model of trade and we test 
for the endogeneity of trade intensity. The main finding of this analysis is that trade 
intensity and the business cycle comovement are positively related to one another. 
Our second contribution is to estimate separate panel regressions for each country. We 
test whether the positive relationship between trade intensity and the correlation of de-
trended output found from our aggregate dataset exists for each country. Our results 
suggest that trade is an important factor determining the economic convergence of the 17 
European countries in the sample but not for the remaining countries. We offer two 
explanations for this result. Firstly, institutional arrangements such as EU membership or 
joining a fixed exchange rate agreement will facilitate trade, which indirectly raises the 
level of economic convergence.6 Estimates from the instrumented equation suggest that 
free trade agreements and fixed exchange rate agreements are important determinants of 
trade intensity and therefore of the business cycle correlation indirectly since most 
European countries have free trade agreements and fixed exchange rate agreements with 
each other. Secondly, third country effects become more important for the European 
economies due to similarities in trade patterns. Thus the EU country pairs are more likely 
to be affected by regional effects. Due to geographical proximity the business cycle 
                                                 
6 Most of the European countries are members of the EU, Norway is within the European Economic Area 
and Switzerland has a free trade agreement with the EU. Also many of the European economies joined the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism prior to adopting the Euro as their national currency. 
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correlation of an EU country pair is more likely to be affected by a demand shock from a 
third country that is an important trading partner for both countries.  
Trade intensity, specialisation, financial integration and the business cycle correlation 
impact simultaneously, papers such as Imbs (2004) estimate their relationship by three-
stage least-squares. Again, he did not account for differences in the business cycle 
correlation across country pairs through the level of three determinants, and those 
unobservable factors could be important as we explained above. Following by Imbs 
(2004, 2006), we adopt a new methodology panel 3SLS estimation, which not only 
considers the potentially important unobservable country pair specific effects, but also 
disentangles the direct and indirect impact between them, through the estimation of a 
system of equations. Also different instrumental variables are used for three determinants 
to eliminate the endogenous problem.  
One more contribution is that bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) position is selected 
as a proxy for financial integration. In the literature, gross capital flows or portfolio 
stocks are usually selected to measure financial integration. We find movements in the 
bilateral foreign direct investment position data are very close to gross capital flows, 
gross capital stock and portfolio investment. Furthermore, the main advantage of FDI 
data is that we can access bilateral FDI data cross most OECD countries over more than 
20 years, and these data can be consistent with our other variables. 
 
1.5 Chapter Outline 
Next chapter presents the OCA theory and literature reviews on analysis of the 
relationship between the trade intensity and the business cycle. In deciding whether to 
join the currency union, a country would compare the benefits and costs of membership 
suggested by OCA theory. The major benefit of joining a currency union is that 
irrevocably fixed exchange rate reduces the risk of foreign trade and investment, as well 
as reduces international transactions costs, improving market transparency and greater 
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liquidity of financial markets. However, joining a currency union also brings costs. The 
costs are mainly from the giving up monetary independence thus limiting their ability to 
stabilise the business cycle. Much of this literature focuses on four OCA criteria to 
evaluate the value of switching to a single currency: the extent of trade; the similarity of 
the business cycles; the degree of labour mobility and the system of risk-sharing. Frankel 
and Rose (1998) argue that the costs of currency union membership depend upon the 
benefits i.e. the optimum currency criteria are endogenous. After the work of Frankel and 
Rose (1998), numerous papers have investigated the relationship between the trade 
intensity and the business cycle in various sample groups.  Baxter and Kourparitsas 
(2005), Calderòn et al (2007) and Babetskii (2005) all find a positive relationship 
between the trade intensity and the business cycle correlation in different sample 
countries.  
We focus on two important variables, the bilateral trade intensity and the business cycle 
correlation. Chapter 3 describes the data and variables’ measurement. The business cycle 
correlations are measured using real GDP data, converted to natural logarithms and de-
trended with a Hodrick-Prescott filter. The bilateral trade intensity is measured using total 
bilateral trade divided by either joint nominal GDP or total trade with the world. It is 
apparent that convergence has increased over time, particularly for the European 
countries, a factor that could potentially be explained by higher trade intensity between 
two countries. We also find the trade intensity increase over time.  
We estimate relationship between trade intensity and the business cycle correlation using 
a panel data set consisting of 24 countries and 5 sub-periods observations. Chapter 4 
presents the econometric models begin by a simple OLS estimation. However, the pooled 
OLS is not feasible for two reasons. Firstly, there are strong arguments for instrumenting 
trade intensity, since a large body of literature shows that bilateral trade flows are 
endogenous.7  We therefore instrument trade intensity using 6 instrumental variables: 
language, distance, adjacency, free trade agreement, product of GDP per capita and fixed 
exchange rate. Secondly, pooled OLS also ignores potential unobservable country-pair 
                                                 
7 See Frankel and Rose (1998), Frankel and Romer (1999), Clark and van Wincoop (2001), Calderon et al. 
(2007) and so on. 
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specific effects. We therefore use both a fixed and random effects estimators that allow 
for endogenous regressors.   
The empirical results are presented in chapter 5. The OLS, fixed and random effects 
estimation show a significant and positive relationship between trade intensity and the 
business cycle correlation. Each of the slope estimates has a magnitude around 0.10, (the 
variety of magnitude changes by de-trending methods and normalisation) suggesting that 
the business cycle correlation would rise by 0.069 following a doubling of trade intensity 
for all de-trending methods and normalisations. The overall significance of the model is 
established by the F- or Wald-statistics and the country pair specific effects are 
statistically significant, thus justifying the use of panel methods. In a two-stage panel data 
model, the first step identifies that all instruments are important determinants of trade 
intensity. All six estimates are correctly signed and have reasonable magnitudes, though 
there is some variation across trade normalisation for the variables of fixed exchange rate 
and free trade agreement. The second step results show a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between trade intensity and the real GDP correlation for all de-
trending methods and trade normalisations. The fixed effects estimates present higher 
magnitude than random effects estimates. Hausman specification test compare the fixed 
effects estimates with the random effects estimates using only time-variant instruments to 
select an ‘optimal’ estimator.  
A couple of sensitivity analyses are implemented here to prove the robustness of the 
relationship. We use industrial production, total employment and unemployment rate 
instead of real GDP to measure the business cycle correlations and find very consistent 
results. In sub-period analysis we find that the β  estimate is not statistically significant 
for the first time period, but the magnitude increases progressively over time up until the 
1986-94 period, when the maximum marginal effect occurs. We also include time 
dummies in our 2-stage fixed effects estimation, split the sample into 2 periods, and add 
control variables in the business cycle equation, such as financial integration, 
specification, time trend and dummy variable of third trade partners. None of these 
change our main result and trade intensity remains statistically significant and positive 
effects on the business cycles. 
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Variation in the sign and magnitude of relationship could also take place across countries 
or geographical regions, particularly given the importance of gravity variables in the 
determination of trade intensity. Chapter 6 presents individual country regressions using 
both fixed and random effects. In line with the aggregate results nearly all of the slope 
estimates are positive and statistically significant. To enable us to choose between fixed 
or random effects estimates for inferences, a Hausman test was computed to compare the 
fixed effects estimates with the random effects estimates (using only time-variant 
instruments). For 15 countries random effects was found to be the “optimal” estimator. In 
all but 4 cases the slope estimate was found to be positive however, it is only statistically 
significant for the 17 European countries in the sample plus China, where the t-ratio for 
the slope estimate just exceeds the 5% critical value. The average slope estimate for the 
European countries is 0.495, with a standard deviation of 0.34. Seven of the estimates are 
in the range 0.15 to 0.30.  
Chapter 7 extends the determinants of the business cycles to trade intensity, specialisation 
and financial integration and estimate a system of simultaneous equations to disentangle 
the complex interactions between these variables and the business cycle synchronisation. 
The sample countries decrease to 15 from 1984 to 2003 since the data limitation. To 
consider both the unobservable country-pair specific effects and the simultaneous 
equations, three-stage panel data estimation is implemented. We find that the overall 
effect of trade on the business cycle synchronisation remains strong. Patterns of industry 
specialisation have a sizeable direct effect on the business cycle correlation and the 
business cycles in financial integrated economies are significantly more asymmetric. In 
individual countries analysis, most countries indicate the consistent results with aggregate 
results, particular for European countries, however, a few of them, such as non-European 
countries, change the magnitude and significant of coefficients. 
The last chapter provides concluding remarks and further researches.  
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Chapter 2 Optimum Currency Area Theory: A 
Review of the Literature 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter compares the costs and benefits of having one currency based on the 
Optimum Currency Areas theory. A single currency eliminates the costs from currency 
conversion and exchange rate uncertainty thus facilitating cross-border trade and 
investment. However, in a currency union countries lose monetary independence thus 
limiting their ability to stabilise the business cycle. According to the classical Optimum 
Currency Area criteria, two countries or regions would benefit from forming a monetary 
union if  they are characterized by high similarity of business cycles, have strong trade 
links, and if they possess an efficient adjustment mechanism that can mitigate the adverse 
effects of asymmetric shocks.  
While these OCA criteria are endogenous, in particular the level of economic integration 
depends upon the trade intensity between two countries. Frankel and Rose (1998) opened 
a large debate on the endogeneity of OCA criteria fulfilment. They argue that closer trade 
links could lead to business cycle synchronisation or, equivalently increase the symmetry 
of shocks.8 However, this relationship is ambiguous from Optimum Currency Area (OCA) 
theory. According to the alternative viewpoint e.g., Krugman (1993), the opposite effect 
should prevail: closer trade ties could result in countries becoming more specialised in the 
goods in which they have comparative advantage. The countries might then be more 
sensitive to industry-specific shocks resulting in more idiosyncratic business cycles. 
Moreover, trade intensity can also be endogenous as it is explained by geographical 
variables, country size and currency union which are from the gravity model. 
Section 2.2 discusses the theory of Optimum Currency Areas; Section 2.3 review the of 
definition and measurement of the business cycles following by literature review; section 
                                                 
8 Also see Kose et al (2003), Babetskii (2005) and Calderòn et al (2007). 
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2.4 discusses the literature review of the relationship between the trade intensity and the 
business cycle theoretically and empirically; Section 2.5 presents the gravity model for 
trade intensity. The final section provides concluding remarks. 
 
2.2 The Theory of Optimum Currency Area 
 
2.2.1 Defining a Monetary Union?  
A Monetary Union is different from a fixed exchange rate, a currency board and all the 
other exchange rate regimes. Fixed exchange rate is a type of exchange rate regime where 
in a currency's value is matched to the value of another single currency or to a basket of 
other currencies, or to another measure of value, such as gold. As the reference value 
rises and falls, so does the currency pegged to it. A currency board is a monetary 
authority which is required to maintain an exchange rate with a foreign currency. This 
policy objective requires the conventional objectives of a central bank to be subordinated 
to the exchange rate target. Some other exchange rate regimes will be discussed in the 
following chapters. 
In economics, a monetary union is a situation where several countries have agreed to 
share a single currency (or common currency) among them, for example, the East 
Caribbean dollar. A fixed exchange rate is different with Monetary Union. Gros and 
Thygesen (1998) define a monetary union as ‘the complete liberalisation of capital 
transactions and full integration of banking and other financial markets together with the 
elimination of margins of currency fluctuation and the irrevocable locking of exchange 
rate parities.’  
European Monetary Union (EMU) is the best example for a monetary union which has 
been widely researched and involving issues that are largely familiar. The Treaty of 
Maastricht made provision for the single currency to be introduced in the European 
Union in three stages. (Bordo and Jonung, 2000) The first stage, starting on 1st July 1990, 
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entailed the liberalisation of capital movements and the beginning of the convergence 
process. Then from 1st January 1994 to 31st December 1998, European Council 
implements all secondary legislation on EMU for the Member States and on the 
introduction of Euro bank notes and coins. Finally, the currency was introduced in non-
physical form (travellers’ cheques, electronic transfers, banking, etc.) at midnight on 1st 
January 1999 when the national currencies of the initial eleven participating countries9 
ceased to exist independently in that their exchange rates were locked at fixed rates 
against each other, effectively making them mere non-decimal subdivisions of the Euro. 
The Euro thus became the successor to the European Currency Unit (ECU). The notes 
and coins for the old currencies, however, continued to be used as legal tender until new 
notes and coins were introduced on 1st January 2002. Greece joined the Euro zone in 
2001 and on 1st January 2007, Slovenia joined Euro zone as well. After 1st January 2002, 
EMU lead to a full monetary union.  
During the intermediate phase between 1999 and 2002, the Euro was mainly used among 
banks and for marketable government debt held in financial markets but national 
currencies and Euro were perfect substitutes at the wholesale level, since banks 
redenominated accounts and made transfers at ‘par’ (without any bid-ask spreads for non-
cash transactions). The key to this is that the Euro and other national currencies were 
declared ‘legally equivalent’ at the conversion rates fixed on 1st January, 1999. Therefore, 
Gros and Thygesen (1998) argue that the period between 1999 and 2002 is more than just 
an irrevocable fixing of exchange rates, but it represents a full monetary union yet. 
There are also a number of other monetary unions that have been established in the 20th 
century and are still in operation today. One example is the CFA Franc Zone, formed in 
1959 by former French colonies in west and central Africa. The members of the CFA 
Franc Zone are listed in Table 2-1. The East Caribbean Currency Area formed in 1965 
which comprises several small countries in the Caribbean Ocean that were previously 
British colonies. In the 19th century, a lot of monetary unions were created in many 
                                                 
9  The Euro countries are Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland. Greece joined the EMU in 2001. Denmark, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom decide to stay out for the time being. 
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colonies, in particular in British colonies. However, they were destroyed a couple of 
years later or in the 20th century for different reasons such as political developments.  
For example the Scandinavian Monetary Union was created in 1873 between Sweden and 
Table 2-1 
Existing Monetary Unions 
Currency Members Issued by 
the CFA 
franc 
BEAC  
Cameroon, the Central African Republic, 
Chad, the Republic of the Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon 
Communauté Économique et 
Monétaire de l'Afrique 
Centrale (CEMAC) 
(the Economic and Monetary 
Community of Central Africa)
the CFA 
franc 
BCEAO  
Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-
Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo 
the Union Économique et 
Monétaire Ouest Africaine 
(UEMOA) 
(the West African Economic 
and Monetary Union) 
the CFP 
franc  
French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and 
Wallis and Futuna  
the Institut d'émission d'outre-
mer (IEOM), (the Overseas 
Issuing Institute) 
the East 
Caribbean 
dollar  
Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, 
Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines  
the Eastern Caribbean 
Currency Union of the 
Organisation of Eastern 
Caribbean States (OECS) 
the Euro  
thirteen European Union member states: 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Slovenia and Spain and is also used in 
Monaco, San Marino, and the Vatican City 
which are licensed to issue and use the 
Euro. Two other countries and a subnational 
entity use the Euro but are not licensed to 
issue any Euro coins or notes, montenegro 
and kosovo. 
Economic and Monetary 
Union of the European Union 
Notes: The CFA franc is a currency used in 12 formerly French-ruled African countries, as well 
as in Guinea-Bissau and in Equatorial Guinea. 
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Denmark and Norway joined the union in 1875. After the First World War the monetary 
union was terminated in 1914.  
De facto monetary unions are not listed in this table. For example the United States dollar 
is used by the United States and its possessions, Palau, Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, 
Panama, Ecuador, El Salvador, East Timor, the British Virgin Islands and the Turks and 
Caicos Islands. 
 
2.2.2 Optimum Currency Area Theory 
The articles by Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963) are two of the early but seminal 
contributions on monetary unions and OCA theory. They provide a highly perceptive 
analysis of the factors that could make a currency area optimum. Mundell emphasises the 
significance of convergence between the economic structures of the regions or countries 
within a currency area. Given that a currency area involves relinquishing the exchange 
rate as an instrument that can be used for correcting external imbalances, an OCA 
requires structural convergence so that the risk of asymmetric shocks is minimised. 
McKinnon does not question the relevance of the convergence requirement, but adds 
another factor to be taken into account: the degree of openness to trade (the ratio of 
tradable to non-tradable goods). Greater trade leads to greater savings in the transactions 
costs and risks associated with different currencies. A higher the degree of openness leads 
to lower cost of establishing a currency area because devaluations in highly open 
economies would be quickly translated into higher domestic prices and would 
consequently lead to an upward revision in nominal wages. Therefore, devaluations are 
less likely to be effective in securing improvement in competitiveness and correcting 
external imbalances.  
The convergence and openness criteria together with factor mobility between OCA 
members have constituted the core of the debate in the OCA literature. Yet, there are two 
further points that Mundell and McKinnon raised. The one raised by Mundell is that 
currency unions within single countries do not necessarily constitute OCAs. Regional 
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divergence within one country may well expose the regions in that country to asymmetric 
shocks. Therefore, there is no guarantee that national monetary unions are necessarily 
optimal. This conclusion suggests that the choice between national and multinational 
OCAs is essentially a choice between two second-best arrangements rather than between 
first-best and second-best options. The other point raised by McKinnon and relates to 
destabilising effects of the flexible exchange rate regime as the alternative to monetary 
unions. In small open economies, flexible exchange rates may generate excessive demand 
for foreign currency as a substitute for domestic currency. This would be the case when 
the usefulness of domestic currency as a unit of account and medium of exchange is 
impaired by inflationary tendencies. Then, flexible exchange rates can be a source of 
external imbalance rather than a mechanism ensuring external balance. 
In deciding how large of an OCA or whether to join an OCA policy makers need to 
compare the benefits and costs of membership. A single currency eliminates the costs 
from currency conversion and exchange rate uncertainty thus facilitating cross border 
trade and investment. However, in a currency union countries lose monetary 
independence thus limiting their ability to stabilise the business cycle.  
The costs of a monetary union derive from the fact that when a country relinquishes its 
national currency it also relinquishes an instrument of economic policy i.e. it loses the 
ability to conduct a national monetary policy. Mundell (1961) first developed the theory 
of OCA and focussed on the cost side of cost-benefit analysis of monetary integration. 
From Mundell’s theory we find that if wages are rigid and if labour mobility is limited, 
countries that form a monetary union will find it harder to adjust to demand shifts than 
countries that have maintained their own national monies, who can devalue (revalue) 
their currency when participating in a fixed exchange rate agreement. 
Whereas the costs of a common currency have much to do with the macroeconomic 
management of the economy, the benefits are mostly situated at the microeconomic level. 
The most visible gain from a monetary union is the potential gains to trade and 
international investment that could arise from eliminating currency conversion costs. 
These costs disappear when countries move to a common currency, such as Euro zone. 
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The EC Commission has estimated these gains, and arrives at a number between 13 and 
20 billion ECUs per year. (De Grauwe, 2005) This represents one-quarter to one-half of 
one per cent of EU GDP. Therefore countries with close international trade links would 
benefit from a common currency and are more like to be members of an OCA. For 
example, Norway might approach the decision of whether to join the Euro zone. The gain 
will be higher if Norway trades a lot with the Euro zone countries since it avoids the 
exchange rate risk after joining the Euro zone and has no transaction costs. If Norway’s 
trade with the Euro zone amounts to 60 percent of its GNP while its trade with the United 
States amounts to only 5 percent of GNP, then other things equal, joining Euro zone 
clearly yields a greater monetary efficiency gain to Norway traders than joining the 
Dollar zone. The elimination of transaction costs will also have an indirect gain. It will 
reduce the scope for price discrimination between national markets. 
Another main advantage of a common currency is removing the uncertainty arising from 
unexpected exchange rate movements. Firstly, the uncertainty about future exchange rate 
changes introduces uncertainty about future revenues of firms which leads to a loss of 
welfare in countries. Most trade contracts are not for immediate delivery of goods; and 
since they are denominated in terms of the currency of either the importer or the exporter, 
unanticipated fluctuations in exchange rate affect realized profits and hence the volume 
of trade. Risk-averse individuals always prefer a future return that is more certain than 
one that is less so, at least if the expected value of these returns is the same. Hence 
removing the uncertainty of exchange rate raises economic welfare. Also exchange rate 
uncertainty reduces uncertainty about the future prices of goods and services. Individuals 
and economic agents base their decisions concerning production, investment and 
consumption on the information that the price system provides for them. If these prices 
become more uncertain the quality of these decisions will decline. Therefore adopting a 
common currency will eliminate nominal exchange rate risk, and thereby will lead to a 
more efficient working of price mechanism. 
Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978) is the first study to analyze systematically the effects of 
exchange rate uncertainty on trade flows in the context of the theory of the firm under 
risk. They conclude that if traders are generally risk averse, an increase in exchange risk 
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will unambiguously reduce the value of trade. Doroodian (1999) applies the GARCH 
technique for three developing countries India, South Korea, and Malaysia and find that 
exchange rate uncertainty has a negative and significant effect on trade flows. However, 
McKenzie (1999) supports that exchange rate volatility may exert a positive or negative 
impact on trade.  
There are some other benefits to form a monetary union. For example the new currency 
that comes out of a monetary union is likely to weigh more in international monetary 
relations than the sum of the individual currencies prior to the union. As a result, the new 
common currency can create additional benefits of the monetary union.  
 
2.2.3 Comparing Costs and Benefits 
Combining benefits and costs above, the theory of OCA can be summarized using Figure 
2-1. The diagram illustrates a country’s total costs and benefits relative to GDP of 
moving from a flexible to a common currency with its major trading partners. The 
horizontal axis measures the ratio of international trade and to GDP. The ‘Benefits’ curve 
indicates the benefits from exchange rate stability. As we know the greater the volume of 
international trade relative to the size of the economy, the larger are the benefits from a 
stable exchange rate or a common currency relative to GDP. Several of the benefits 
mentions above can be reaped by adopting a common currency, the position and positive 
slope of the ‘Benefit’ curve will be higher when the fixed exchange rate is achieved by 
entering a monetary union. 
The ‘Costs’ curve in Figure 2-1 indicates the costs of switching from a flexible to a fully 
fixed exchange rate, measured as a percentage of GDP. The fact that this curve lies above 
the horizontal axis reflects the assumption of OCA theory that the short-run volatility of 
output and inflation will tend to be lower under flexible than under fixed exchange rates. 
The assumption of positive costs of fixing the exchange rate is based on the idea that the 
ability to pursue an independent monetary policy under flexible exchange rates makes it 
easier to stabilize the economy. But as indicated in the diagram, these costs will be 
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smaller relative to GDP the more the domestic economy is integrated with the economies 
of its trading partners. The reason for the negative slop of the ‘Cost’ curve is that a 
country with flexible exchange rate requires a significant adjustment of its real exchange 
rate to reach symmetric shocks. As Sorensen (2005) explained that when a shock hits the 
domestic country and its trading partners symmetrically, there is no need for a real 
exchange rate adjustment. Moreover, in the case of symmetric shocks a common interest 
rate policy will be equally appropriate for the domestic and for foreign economy if we 
assume that the two countries have roughly the same social preferences for output 
stability relative to inflation stability, so there is no need for nominal exchange rate 
flexibility to allow for different national monetary policies. As the domestic and foreign 
economies become more integrated, it is more likely that they will be exposed to the 
same type of shocks. Hence they have less need for exchange rate flexibility as the degree 
of international economic integration increases. For this reason the costs of moving to a 
fixed exchange rate will fall as we move to the right along the horizontal axis in this 
figure. 
If the domestic country allows its nominal exchange rate to depreciate in order to absorb 
a negative asymmetric shock to its export demand, the increase in import prices 
stemming from the depreciation will be transmitted more quickly to the domestic wage 
and price level the larger the ratio of imports to GDP. The gain in competitiveness 
obtained through a flexible exchange rate will, therefore, be more short-lived and 
consequently the cost of giving up exchange rate flexibility will be smaller the more the 
domestic economy depends on international trade. Also, as the domestic and foreign 
economies become more integrated in terms of trade and investment, the international 
mobility of labour is also likely to increase, since cross-border economic transactions 
tend to reduce the information barriers and cultural barriers to migration. If a country is 
hit by a negative asymmetric shock which creates unemployment, some domestic 
workers will emigrate to look for jobs abroad. Therefore it is unnecessary to deal with the 
unemployment problem through a depreciation of the domestic currency immediately. 
Then the cost of giving up exchange rate flexibility falls to the extent that increased 
economic integration implies increased labour mobility. 
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At the intersection point A of the benefit and cost lines in Figure 2-1, the benefits from a 
fixed exchange rate or common currency are just offset by the costs. At a higher degree 
of trade integration, the domestic country would benefit in economic terms from entering 
a currency union with its trading partners since the position of the benefits curve will be 
higher and its slope steeper in the latter case. At lower degrees of integration, the costs of 
exchange rate fixity exceed the benefits. OCA theory does not offer a quantitative method 
for estimating whether a particular country is to the right or to the left of the critical point 
A in Figure 2-1. But the theory does help us to focus on the factors which are important 
for evaluating whether fixing the exchange rate or joining a currency union is a good or 
bad idea. The theory also explains that if international trade integration continues to 
deepen in currency area, then we will find that more countries are willing to form or join 
a currency union with their most important trading partners. Thus the theory suggests that 
more European countries will want to adopt the Euro as time goes by. 
The cost-benefit of a monetary union is also very much influenced by the degree of wage 
 
Figure 2-1. Costs and Benefits of a Monetary Union 
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rigidities and the mobility of labour. A decline in wage rigidities has the effect of shifting 
the cost line in Figure 2-1 downwards. As a result, the critical point at which it becomes 
advantageous for a country to relinquish its national currency is lowered. More countries 
become candidates for a monetary union. In a similar way, an increase in the degree of 
mobility of labour shifts the cost curve to the left and makes a monetary union more 
attractive. In other words, if labour mobility increases, the single market will make 
monetary union more attractive for members. Also the size and the frequency of 
asymmetric shocks determine whether a monetary union will be attractive to countries. 
Countries that experience very different demand and supply shocks will find it more 
costly to form a monetary union. In Figure 2-1, the cost line shifts to the right.  
The analysis in Figure 2-1 is static and we also add some dynamics to this analysis so as 
to obtain a better insight into the question of how these costs and benefits of monetary 
union may evolve over time. Figure 2-2 discusses the relationship between the degree of 
trade integration among members of a potential common currency and the correlation of 
the business cycle.  
 
Figure 2-2. Business Cycle Symmetry, Trade Integration and the Monetary Regime 
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In long-run period, from the above discussion, we know that as trade integration increases, 
the net gains of a monetary union increase. At the same time, when economic divergence 
increases, i.e. low correlation of the business cycles, the costs of a monetary union 
increase. The ‘OCA’ curve combines the two phenomena together: the higher trade 
integration and closer business cycles, the more benefits and the less costs forming a 
monetary union. All points on the OCA line are then combinations of the business cycle 
correlations and integration for which the monetary union has a zero net gain. Points high 
up and to the right represent groupings of countries that should share a common currency; 
the benefits outweigh the costs of lost monetary independence. 
Drawing from costs and benefits discussions, particularly with respect to the costs effects 
highlighted by Mundell (1961), much of literature concludes four OCA criteria:  
• The degree of trade between countries who adopt a common currency 
• The extent to which different countries experience similar shocks 
• The degree of labour market mobility in each region 
• The amount of fiscal transfers between regions 
As we mentioned that the higher degree of trade between countries, the more gains these 
countries achieve and the more suitable to be members in OCA. A single currency 
requires a one size fits all monetary policy and if the loss of an independent monetary 
policy is not to be costly, countries must experience similar shocks. High labour mobility 
between the countries can overcome the problem from a single interest rate. For example, 
in the same currency area, one economy, A, is expanding and another, B, is contracting, 
but both have the same interest rate. If the labour is mobile and market flexible, economy 
B with high unemployment rate will seek employment in the economy A to eliminate the 
unemployment pressure. However, if fiscal transfers exist, income differences also can be 
reduced. The extending economy A can pay higher taxes that are transferred to the 
contracting economy B. Therefore the greater any of the four criteria between the 
countries, the more suitable a common currency. 
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2.2.4 Empirical Evidence on OCA 
The theory of OCA and four criteria have been applied extensively in lots of empirical 
analysis, such as Frankel and Rose (1998), De Grauwe (2005) and Baxter and 
Kouparitsas (2005). They examine the four criteria or some subset using Asia and 
European countries data, frequently using the USA as a benchmark for comparison. A 
couple of papers discuss the feasibility of creating a currency union in Asia or East Asia. 
Some of them have a negative attitude since the lack of political commitment and 
experience with political cooperation results in asymmetric shocks. Chow and Kim (2003) 
apply the OCA criteria to investigate whether pegging to a common currency is a 
desirable option in East Asia including nine countries and the estimates of the EU are 
used as a benchmark. They find that East Asian countries are structurally different from 
each other and more likely to be subject to asymmetric shocks. Based on the second 
criteria, the less similarity of the business cycles, the more cost for a common currency 
peg in East Asia and it is difficult to sustain a common currency. Zhang et al. (2004) do 
very similar empirical analysis for East Asia economies. They compare the size of 
underlying shocks and the speed of adjustment to shocks in East Asia with the EU and 
the result is also similar with Chow and Kim (2003). Empirical results do not display 
strong support for forming an OCA in the East Asia region. However, some small sub-
regions are potential candidates for OCAs, such as the Asian NIEs and the ASEAN.10 
Recently Tang (2006) examines the possibility of forming an Asian Monetary Union 
(AMU) for a group of 12 Asian countries again based on the OCA criteria.11 He does not 
find any support for the formation of a full-fledged AMU either. Karras (2005) extend the 
sample countries to 18 Asian and Pacific countries across 40 years to examine a Yen 
OCA.12 He compares the cost which is asymmetric business cycles and benefits which is 
price stability for those countries. His empirical results indicate that the estimated cost 
                                                 
10 Zhang et al. (2004) selected 10 East Asia countries: Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines and China, in which Asian NIEs are Hong Kong, Singapore and 
Taiwan, and ASEAN, are Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 
11 Countries are Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Tai Wan. 
12 18 Asian and Pacific countries are Australia, Bangladesh, China, Hong-Kong, Indonesia, India, Japan, 
Korea, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Taiwan. 
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and benefit measures exhibit substantial variability across the countries and are positively 
correlated. This makes the evaluation of net benefits particularly difficult because 
countries for which the costs are likely to be high are also those countries for which the 
member will be particularly beneficial and only net benefit can be compared for 
individual countries, for example Korea is a better candidate for adopting the Yen than 
Pakistan or Malaysia.  
However, some papers support that forming a single currency region in East Asia is 
desirable. Cheung and Yuen (2004) use China, Japan and Korea’s output to evaluate the 
prospect of creating a currency union between them. Followed by the OCA theory, they 
find that the three countries have synchronous output movements at both long-run and 
short run horizons and have considerably intensified their trade and investment 
interactions since 1990s. Furthermore, the estimated output loss is likely to be less than 
the potential benefit from forming a currency union. Therefore, their conclusion is that 
“China, Japan and Korea should form a currency union and promote their common 
economic interests” (p.24). Huang and Guo (2006) examine nine East Asia countries, 
with nine EMU countries adopted as benchmarks. They only find a part of countries can 
join in a common currency zone. 
As mentioned, the creation of a common currency area may be expected to stimulate 
trade among the members of the currency union because the adoption of a common 
currency reduces the transaction costs and riskiness of international trade. Thus we would 
expect that, after the introduction of the Euro, trade within the Euro area has increased by 
more than trade between EMU and non-EMU countries. Sorensen (2005) finds that the 
bilateral trade between EMU countries are more than that between Demark, Sweden and 
the UK with EMU countries. Hence the potential benefits from EMU membership for 
three outsider countries appear to be less than the benefits for those EU countries which 
have already adopted the Euro. Sorensen also finds that the Euro (and the greater 
exchange rate stability in the few years before the adoption of Euro from the start of 1999) 
has tended to boost trade among EMU countries compared to the trade among non-EMU 
countries from 1993 to 2002, which is the period before and after European Monetary 
Unions. The Euro may so far have increased bilateral trade within the EMU by between 9 
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per cent and 37 per cent, depending on the estimation method used. All of these confirm 
that the benefits from a common currency are significant. With regard to the costs of 
monetary union Sorensen finds that all of the three outsider countries (Demark, Sweden 
and UK) have lower output co-movement13 with the EMU area that output co-movement 
within the EMU, suggesting that Demark, Sweden and the UK have tended to be more 
exposed to asymmetric shocks than the countries in the EMU. Therefore the three 
outsider countries would tend to face higher costs of giving up their national currencies 
according to OCA theory. 
Furceri and Karras (2006) compare the 10 new EU member countries with older members 
from the costs and benefits to decide whether they are suit to join Euro zone. The results 
show that the position of benefits which is price stability of the new members is overall 
better than some EMU countries; however, countries with high benefit also have high 
costs. Therefore the net benefits can be compared for them and some of them are more 
suitable to adopt Euro such as Poland.  
 
2.2.5 The Endogeneity of the OCA Criteria 
Figure 2-2 indicates that higher bilateral trade integration or closer business cycles 
represent groupings of countries that should share a common currency. Nevertheless, the 
degree of integration between potential members of a common currency area cannot be 
considered independently of income correlation since the correlation of the business 
cycles across countries depends on trade integration. For example, European countries 
trade with each other more than in the past and this trend may continue. It depends partly 
on regional trade policy: such initiatives as the completion of the single market in 1992 
and the expansion of the EU to 15 members. EMU itself may promote bilateral trade, if 
the effects of the exchange rate risk and transactions costs are important, as EMU 
proponents claim. Thus cyclic correlation is endogenous with respect to trade integration, 
                                                 
13 Lower degree of output co-movement indicates a lower degree of synchronization of national business 
cycles. 
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while integration is also affected by policy. Frankel and Rose (1998) open a large debate 
that OCA criteria are jointly endogenous, in particular the level of economic integration 
depends upon the trade intensity between two countries.  
As such, the endogeneity of the OCA criteria is an application of the Lucas critique: 
currency union affects the underlying OCA criteria in such a way that they are more 
likely to be satisfied ex post, as both monetary and trade integration deepen.  
 
2.3 The Business Cycle 
2.3.1 Defining and Measuring the Business Cycle 
Parkin (2005) defines that “a business cycle is the periodic but irregular up-and-down 
movement in production” (p.741). It is measured by fluctuations in real GDP around 
potential GDP. 14  When real GDP is less than potential GDP some resources are 
underused. For example, firms can always produce less output if they do not work at full 
capacity utilisation or if they do not work their labour force at full efficiency during its 
working shift. When real GDP is greater than potential GDP, resources are being 
overused. Many people work longer hours than they are willing to put up with in the long 
run, or machines can be utilised at more than full capacity during intense periods of 
production and capital is worked so intensively.  
Business cycles are not regular, predictable, or repeating. Their timing changes 
unpredictably, but they have the same characteristics. Every business cycle has two 
phases: a recession and an expansion; and two tuning points: a peak and a trough. A 
recession is a period during which real GDP decreases (its growth rate is negative) for at 
least two successive quarters. An expansion is a period during which real GDP increases. 
(Parkin, 2005) When an expansion ends and a recession begins, the turning point is called 
a peak. When a recession ends and a recovery begins, the turning point is called a through.  
                                                 
14 When all the economy’s labour, capital, land and entrepreneurial ability are fully employed, the value of 
production is called potential GDP. (Parkin, 2005) 
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Therefore, business cycles are only temporary, whether in an expansion or in a recession, 
output is eventually expected to return to its trend level. The economy can remain above 
or below its trend level for several years. In other words, expansions last for several years 
and then are replaced by recessions which are also persistent. The business cycle involves 
shifts over time between periods of relatively rapid growth of output (recovery and 
prosperity), alternating with periods of relative stagnation or decline (contraction or 
recession) and then again experiencing these oscillations, also tries to document how 
persistent each stage of the business cycle is.  
All countries experience economic growth, but the growth rate varies both over time and 
across countries. The fluctuations in economic growth rates over time tend to be 
correlated across countries. The literature indicates that the world economy has become 
more closely integrated in recent years due to many reasons such as globalisation, 
bilateral trade and financial flows across countries. The co-movement of macroeconomic 
aggregates across different countries has become a topic of increasing interest in both 
academic and policy circles. A number of studies focus on measuring the degree of shock 
asymmetry across countries.  
Economic indicators are economic statistics reflecting the general direction of the 
economy. Some indicators are termed leading indicators because they tend to lead or 
forecast the direction of the economy or the business cycle; real GDP is known as a 
leading indicator. Other examples include industrial production, total employment, 
unemployment rate, balance of trade and interest rates.  
It is essential for applied business cycle researchers to identify the business cycle 
component of macroeconomic time series since macroeconomic time series could be 
better characterised by stochastic trends rather than by linear trends and methods for 
stochastic detrending have been developed. (Nelson and Plosser, 1982)  There are many 
different methods that can be used to decompose time series into their trend and cyclical 
components. Canova (1998) provides a good discussion of the many aspects of the 
detrending debate and finds that both quantitatively and qualitatively stylised facts of US 
business cycles vary widely across detrending methods and alternative detrending filters 
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extract different types of information from the data. The most popular filter-based method 
is probably that proposed by Hodrick and Prescott (1980) and it is widely used in 
empirical work.15 The use of the HP filter has already been criticized. King and Rebelo 
(1993) provide examples of how it alters measures of persistence, variability, and 
comovement when it is applied to observed time series and series simulated with real 
business-cycle models. Harvey and Jaeger (1993) and Cogley and Nason (1995) show 
that spurious cyclicality is induced when the HP filter is applied to the level of a random 
walk process. More recently, Baxter and King (1999) propose a finite moving average 
approximation of an ideal band-pass filter based on Burns and Mitchell’s (1946) 
definition of the business cycle, the BP filter is designed to pass through components of 
time series with fluctuations between 6 and 32 quarters while removing higher and lower 
frequencies. It has been used in empirical studies as well.16 There are also other methods 
used in empirically work, such as first order differencing (or fourth order differencing for 
quarterly data), Kalman filter (Kalman 1960), Beveridge and Nelson’s procedure (1981) 
and so on. 
 
2.3.2 Literature Review on the Business Cycle Co-movement 
In early research, the judgement about shocks was based on cross-country correlation of 
real output, industrial production, or real exchange rate cycles, such as Cohen and 
Wyplosz (1989) and De Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke (1993). Backus et al. (1995) report 
that business cycles measured by pair-wise correlations in the major industrialised 
economies are similar. Highly synchronized European business cycles are found by 
Bergman (2004). Artis and Zhang (1997) find that the world business cycle became more 
group specific after 1979, with the German business cycle linking countries participating 
in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) group and these countries’ business cycles 
became more synchronized to the German and less synchronized with the USA business 
cycle. Artis et al. (1997) find a strong business cycle association between the USA and 
                                                 
15 See Frankel and Rose (1998), Crosby (2003), Clark and van Wincoop (2001) and Calderon et al. (2007).  
16 For example Baxter (1994), and King et al. (1995). Other types of band-pass filters have also been 
proposed. For example, see Hasler et al. (1994). 
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Canada and also identify a group of core European countries with highly synchronized 
business cycles. Rose and Engel (2002) report that members of currency unions tend to 
have more highly synchronized business cycles compared to countries with national 
monies.  
Blanchard and Quah (1989) propose a bi-variate vector autoregressive (VAR) procedure 
in order to separate shocks from responses. Moreover, this method makes it possible to 
identify the origins of shocks, for example, supply and demand. They define shocks as 
linear combinations of the residuals from a bi-variate VAR representation of real output 
growth and inflation. By construction, one type shock, demand, has only a transitory 
impact on the level of output, while another type of shock, supply, might have a long-
term impact on the level of output. Babetskii (2005) adopts the structural VAR 
identification methodology developed by Blanchard and Quah (1989) and finds a 
synchronized business cycle in ten Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). 
And furthermore they find that an increase in trade intensity leads to higher symmetry of 
demand shocks and a decrease in exchange rate volatility has a positive effect on demand 
shock convergence. 
Gregory et al. (1997) use time-series analysis and adopt Kalman filtering and dynamic 
factor analysis to find the common fluctuations across macroeconomic aggregates in G7 
countries. Clark and Shin (1998) focus on European countries and study the effect of 
country-specific shocks in industrial production by a VAR factor model. They find 
synchronized business cycles in European countries as well. Recently, Lumsdaine and 
Prasad (2003) developed a weighted aggregation procedure and provided evidence to 
prove a world business cycle and a European business cycle by the output correlations for 
17 OECD countries.  
Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman (2003) extend the sample of countries to sixty and employ a 
Bayesian dynamic latent factor model to study the dynamic co-movement of the business 
cycles. They also find a statistically significant common world business cycle in almost 
all sixty countries. In addition, world factor explains most economic fluctuations in 
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developed countries, while the country-specific factor accounts for more volatility in 
developing countries. 
A couple of studies analyse the business cycle correlations of European countries 
compared with the business cycle of the USA. Clark and van Wincoop (2001) compare 
the business cycles in 9 US census regions and 14 European Union countries and find that 
correlations among US regions are significantly higher than among European countries. 
These differences can be related to the border effect which can be explained by the lower 
trade among European countries compared to the trade between US Census regions. 
Wynne and Koo (2000) study all 15 EU countries and the 12 Federal Reserve districts in 
the US. They also report much higher correlations between the US districts than those 
between the European countries. While the long-standing members of the EU have highly 
synchronized cycles and large EU countries’ business cycles tend to be more correlated to 
the US in particular the business cycle in the UK.  
However, some empirical evidence does not support this point of view. Massmann and 
Mitchell (2003) propose that the synchronization of European business cycles is not clear 
and switched between convergence and divergence over the last 40 years. Using monthly 
data on industrial production, they find an upward trend in synchronization until the mid 
1970s, a period of divergence until the mid to later 1980s, a short-lived period of 
convergence until the German unification in the early 1990s where synchronization fell 
sharply and finally a period of convergence. These results suggest that the degree of 
synchronization is not constant over time and that the particular sub-periods used in the 
analysis can affect the results. Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003) focus on the comparison 
of developing countries and developed countries and find little evidence that business 
cycle co-movements on average become more synchronized at global level during the 
most recent period of globalization. The statistic of the correlations of output indicate that 
on average, developed countries have stronger correlations with world output than do 
developing countries. Industrialised countries increase their correlations sharply in the 
1970’s and further rise in the 1990’s, however, developing countries’ correlations are 
much lower than industrialised countries and there is a decline in the 1990’s. Heathcote 
and Perri (2003) measure the change in the business cycle correlation between two 
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regions, the United States and the rest of the world and find that over the last 40 years the 
U.S. business cycle has become less synchronized with the cycle in the rest of the world 
because U.S. change the nature of real shocks and increase the financial integration with 
others. 
Studies of the business cycle have flourished and we have discussed a lot of different 
approaches to measure the business cycles. Some of them focus on main economic 
indicators correlations such as real GDP, industrial production or unemployment by 
different filters. Some of them use different methods to measure, such as VAR model and 
Bayesian dynamic latent factor model. Most studies find evidence that the business cycle 
co-movement becomes more synchronised across countries. What determines this closer 
business cycle across countries? Trade is the leading potential explanation.  
 
2.4 The Relationship between Trade Intensity and Business 
Cycles 
Fluctuations in export demand might cause cycles. One country’s exports are another 
country’s imports, and these imports will fluctuate only if foreign income fluctuates. 
International trade helps explain how cycles get transmitted from one country to another, 
and lots of studies have been done from theory and empirical analysis to investigate the 
relationship between bilateral trade intensity and the business cycle correlation. 
 
2.4.1 The European Commission View versus the Krugman View 
There are two opposite views on the relationship between trade integration and shock 
asymmetry, ‘The European Commission View’ and the ‘Krugman View’. According to 
the European Commission (1990), closer integration leads to less frequent asymmetric 
shocks and to more synchronised business cycles between countries. They support the 
view that bilateral trade between countries is to a large degree intra-industry trade. The 
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trade is based on the existence of economies of scale and imperfect competition (product 
differentiation). It leads to a structure of trade in which countries buy and sell to each 
other the same categories of products. Thus, France sells cars to and buys cars from UK, 
and vice versa. This structure of trade leads to a situation where most demand shocks will 
affect these countries in a similar way. For example, when consumers reduce their 
demand for cars, they will buy fewer French and UK cars. Thus, both countries' 
aggregate demand will be affected in similar ways. The removal of barriers with the 
completion of the single market will reinforce these tendencies. As a result, most demand 
shocks will tend to have similar effects. Instead of being asymmetric, these shocks will 
tend to be more symmetric. 
On the other hand, for Krugman (1993), closer integration implies higher specialization 
since greater trade intensity could reflect a larger amount of inter-industry trade (trade 
which involves exports and imports of different goods, for example one country exports 
cotton and imports wines) and thus, higher risks of idiosyncratic shocks. Trade 
integration which occurs as a result of economies of scale also leads to regional 
concentration of industrial activities. The basic argument here is that when impediments 
to trade decline this has two opposing effects on the localisation of industries. It makes it 
possible to produce closer to the final markets, but it also makes it possible to concentrate 
production so as to profit from economies of scale (both static and dynamic). This 
explains why trade integration in fact may lead to more concentration of regional 
activities rather than less. 
 
2.4.2 Review of the Empirical Literature on the Relationship between the 
Trade Integration and the Business Cycles 
Frankel and Rose (1998) opened a large debate on the endogeneity of OCA criteria 
fulfilment. In the spirit of the European Commission (1990), Frankel and Rose (1998) put 
forward an argument that closer trade links could lead to the business cycle 
synchronization or, equivalently, increase the symmetry of shocks. 21 industrialised 
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countries are selected and the sample period is quarterly from 1959 to 1993 which is split 
into four periods: 1959Q1 to 1967Q3; 1967Q4 to 1976Q2; 1976Q3 to 1985Q1 and 
1985Q2 to 1993Q4. Only two variables are involved in regressions, bilateral trade 
intensity and the business cycle correlation. The trade intensity is measured by the log of 
bilateral trade between countries i and j over time period t divided either by total trade of 
countries i and j or nominal GDP of country i and country j for the same period. The 
quarterly data on real GDP, an index of industrialised production, total employment, and 
the unemployment rate are used as a proxy for the business cycle. As mentioned earlier, 
to decompose time series into a business cycle trend and cyclical components Frankel and 
Rose use four alternative de-trended filters to approximate the cyclical part of output after 
taking the natural logarithms (except for the unemployment rate): 1.) Fourth differences 
since most variables are in logs, this corresponds to the four-quarter growth rate; 2.) the 
residual from the regression of the original series on a linear time trend, a quadratic time 
trend, and three quarterly dummies; 3.) the original series minus the Hodrick-Precott (HP) 
filter; 4.) the residuals from a regression of the original series on a constant and three 
quarterly dummies, minus the HP trend of the residuals. Totally, they have 16 versions of 
correlations (four variables and four measures of the business cycle per variable) for each 
country pair. A positive and statistically significant relationship is found between trade 
intensity and the business cycle correlation.  
While both of these variables could be jointly endogenous making OLS inappropriate, 
monetary coordination with large trade partners may generate a spurious correlation 
between trade and the business cycle correlation and trade could be correlated with the 
error term. Instrumental Variable (IV) techniques are used here to solve the endogeneity 
problem. Taken from the gravity model of trade, the log of distance; adjacency and 
language dummies are used as instruments since they can explain bilateral trade very well 
and also are uncorrelated with the business cycle correlations. Again they identify a 
positive and significant relationship between the level of bilateral trade intensity and the 
cross-country correlation. When the business cycle correlation is measured by real GDP 
increasing trade intensity (normalised by total trade) by one standard deviation increased 
bilateral business cycle correlation by 0.35 from a pre-trade increase level of 0.22. In 
 35
addition, a series of tests are used for the robustness, such as changing the instrumental 
variables, adding period-specific or country-specific fixed effect, splitting the sample into 
two periods and so on. The results do not appear to be very sensitive to these changes. 
This result is confirmed by Otto et al. (2001) and Gruben et al. (2002) by the same 
methods and similar sample.  
Followed by Frankel and Rose (1998), this relationship is estimated by a couple of other 
papers by extending the sample countries, period or developing methodology. Clark and 
van Wincoop (2001) select 14 European Union countries and 9 U.S. census regions to 
investigate the effect of bilateral trade on the business cycles. The business cycles are 
measured by annual data of both employment and real GDP. Firstly they find that the U.S. 
regions business cycle correlations are significantly higher than among the European 
countries since the European national border decreases the bilateral trade and then impact 
the business cycle correlations. Using pooled instrumental variable estimation they 
identify a positive relationship between the business cycle correlations and the bilateral 
trade for both EU countries and US. They also find that the effect of common border on 
business cycles is destroyed by including trade in regression, i.e. the common border 
explains the business cycles via trade as an instrumental variable. Rose and Engel (2002) 
extend the sample to over 150 countries. The trade intensity firstly estimated by gravity 
model to solve the endogeneity problem and include more instruments such as, the 
product of GDP per capita, trade agreement and so on. They find a consistent result with 
Frankel and Rose that increased international trade induces more tightly synchronized 
business cycles and the trade intensity does not destroy the significance of currency union 
in the business cycle regression.  
Kose, Prasad and Torrones (2003) find an important role for trade in explaining GDP 
correlations alongside financial integration.17 Using a large sample of 21 industrialised 
and 55 developing countries from 1960 to 1999 they find that trade and financial 
integration enhance global spillovers of macroeconomic fluctuations. They also compare 
                                                 
17 Financial integration is also another important determinant of business cycle correlations. It affects 
business cycle directly or indirectly through trade intensity. Therefore we include it into our research in 
chapter 7. 
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industrialised and developing countries and find that the results are not materially 
affected and the effects of the trade and financial linkages on output correlations appeared 
to be stronger for industrialised counties than for the developing countries. Imbs (2004, 
2006) and Hethcote and Perri (2004) also find a positive relationship between the trade 
intensity and the business cycle alongside with financial integration. 
Fidrmuc (2004) questions the magnitude of the Frankel and Rose (1998) estimates and 
argues that “indeed, Frankel and Rose’s hypothesis underlines that bilateral trade is 
mainly intra-industry trade, although this indicator does not directly enter their 
analyses” Fidrmuc (2004, page 5). He uses both bilateral trade and intra-industry trade 
which focus on the differences between import and export for the same industry to 
analyze the degree of the business cycles synchronization across OECD countries. He 
confirms that the endogeneity hypothesis of the OCA criteria and both trade intensity and 
intra-industry trade induce the convergence of the business cycles. Shin and Wang (2004, 
2005) find the same results with Fidrmuc (2004) for a group of Asian and European 
countries. Shin and Wang (2004) find that intra-industry trade is the major channel 
through which the business cycle of Korea becomes synchronized with that of other 
Asian economies using data for 12 Asian countries from 1976 to 1997. They argue that 
increasing trade itself does not necessarily lead to more synchronization of the business 
cycles in Korea case. Business cycle comovements are strengthened only when increased 
trade is accompanied by more intra-industry trade. Shin and Wang (2005) extend the 
research on East Asia countries to European countries from 1977 to 1999. Again, they 
find that intra-industry trade is the major channel by which the European countries 
business cycles become synchronised which is consistent with the case of Korea and 
Frankel and Rose’s results. 
Babetskii (2005) reports similar empirical estimates to Frankel and Rose and investigates 
the determinants of economic integration for ten Central and Eastern European countries 
from 1990 to 2002 by estimated time-varying coefficients of supply and demand shock 
asymmetry with indicators of trade intensity and exchange rates. His result indicates that 
an increase in trade intensity leads to higher symmetry of demand shocks and the effect 
of integration on supply shock asymmetry varies from country to country. Also he finds 
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that a decrease in exchange rate volatility has a positive effect on demand shock 
convergence.  
Baxter and Kourparitsas (2005) focus on the large sample of 100 developing and 
industrialised countries from 1970 to 1992. They investigate the determinants of business 
cycle co-movement, using the approach of Leamer (1983) and potential candidate 
explanations are (i) bilateral trade between countries; (ii) total trade in each country; (iii) 
sectoral structure; (iv) similarity in export and import baskets; (v) factor endowments; 
and (vi) gravity variables. They find a consistent result with literature that higher bilateral 
trade between two countries is robustly correlated with a higher business cycle 
correlation between the countries both with and without the gravity variables. While they 
do not find a robust correlation between similarity in industrial structure and the business 
cycle correlation; countries belonging to a currency union do not have significantly more 
highly correlated business cycles than countries that do not share a common currency; 
total trade, factor endowments are also found not to be robust. Only one ‘‘gravity’’ 
variable, distance between the two countries, is found to be robust and it is negatively 
related to the business cycle correlation. Böwer and Guillemineau (2006) also confirm the 
bilateral trade as a key determinant of business cycle synchronisation in the context of the 
Euro area.  
Recently, further support for the Frankel and Rose hypothesis is provided by Calderòn et 
al. (2007), who find a rise in trade intensity to have a larger impact on the output 
correlation for developed countries than for less developed countries pairs. They extend 
the sample to 147 industrialised and developing countries over 40 years (from 1960 to 
1999) and estimate the relationship between trade intensity and business cycle by a two-
stage fixed effects model which considers the trade endogeneity and accounts for county 
pair specific effects. They adopt standard measurements for both variables: the degree of 
business cycle synchronization between the country pair is measured by real GDP de-
trended by the quadratic trend model; first difference using annual data; Hodrick-Prescott 
filter; and Band-pass filter; and the bilateral trade is measured by bilateral inter-industry 
trade and intra-industry trade. They identify a positive and statistically significant 
relationship in full sample, industrialised countries sample, developing countries sample 
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and mixed sample. In full sample, an increasing in one standard deviation of bilateral 
trade intensity, the business cycle correlations increase from 0.05 to 0.085 which is much 
less than Frankel and Rose. The impact of trade intensity on the business cycle 
correlations among industrialised countries is higher than the impact among developing 
countries and the impact for industrialised-developing country pairs.18  
The opposite view has been defended by Paul Krugman. As theory describes that trade 
intensity affects the business cycle correlations in two ways and Krugman (1993) argues 
that if inter-industry trade which is caused by greater specialization in goods and services 
for which a country has a comparative advantage account for a major share of 
international trade, the business cycle correlations will be more idiosyncratic. This view 
is also supported by Eichengreen (1992). Moreover, Kenen (2000) shows in a framework 
of the Keynesian model that the correlation between two countries’ output changes 
increases unambiguously with the intensity of trade links between these countries. But 
this does not necessarily mean that asymmetric shocks are reduced as well. Kose and Yi 
(2001, 2006) also do not find any positive relationship between the trade intensity and the 
business cycles. 
Kose and Yi (2001, 2006) use the same group of countries as Frankel and Rose (1998) 
but a different sample period (1970 to 2000). However, they question the magnitude of 
their estimates since they cannot be replicated using a standard international business 
cycle model. Kose and Yi update the model of Backus et al. (1994) and employ a three-
country real business cycle model. The transportation costs are considered as way of 
introducing variation in trade since different levels of transportation costs will translate 
into different levels of trade with consequent effects on GDP co-movement. They 
simulate the effects of increased goods market integration under two asset market 
structures, complete markets and international financial autarky. The empirical results 
from the real business cycle model under both asset market structures are far away the 
                                                 
18 Calderon et al (2007) report that a one standard deviation increase in bilateral trade intensity normalised 
by total GDP raises correlations from 0.25 to 0.33 for industrial countries which is the same order of 
magnitude as that reported by Frankel and Rose (1998), but the same increase in trade would lead to a 
negligible increase in correlations from 0.075 to 0.077 for industrial and developing countries and from 
0.031 to 0.052 for developing country pairs. 
 39
magnitude from the empirical results. They explain two reasons for the model’s failure: 1) 
observations that bilateral trade between countries is typically quite small as a share of 
GDP and relative to a country’s total trade will affects the relationship; 2) the feedback 
effects from the country-pair to the world economy and then back also will result in 
model’s failure. Even country-pairs with large absolute changes in their bilateral trade 
share of GDP will not generate large feedback effects if the pair constitutes a small share 
of world GDP.  
Lots of studies analyse OECD countries while a number of studies focus on Asia or Asia-
Pacific economies. Choe (2001) focuses on 10 East Asian countries to discuss economic 
integration through trade. His results are not very consistent with results of OECD 
countries and the significant level of the relationship depends on sample period and a key 
country, Japan. The effect of bilateral trade dependence is weakly significant for the 
period 1981-1990, however, in the period 1986-1995, the effect is more robust. The 
reason to explain it is that the change of the intraregional production structure, beginning 
in the late 1980s, led to the strong relationships between co-movement of business cycles 
and bilateral trade, through the deepened intraregional economic linkages in the early 
1990s. When they only consider the developing East Asian countries (exclude Japan) the 
statistical robustness of trade significantly declined in both periods. This implies that 
Japan is a very important part in the synchronization of business cycles in this region, but 
the role of the developing East Asian countries themselves became important after the 
late 1980s.  
In contrast, Crosby (2003) examines the evidence on GDP correlations in 13 Asia-Pacific 
countries and does not find high correlations between these countries, and does not find a 
significant relationship between trade and GDP correlations either. His sample includes 
countries that are very open to trade, such as Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia who 
all have trade-to-GDP ratios of over 100 percent and countries that are very closely 
synchronised with the USA such as Australia and Singapore. Recently Kumakura (2006) 
also selects very similar 13 Asia-Pacific countries to examine the empirical relationship 
between the trade and the business cycle correlations. Again, he does not find a 
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statistically significant relationship either; instead, the economies relying on the 
electronics industry appear to be the key determinant of international income correlations.  
 
2.5 The Gravity Model of Trade 
There are strong arguments for instrumenting trade intensity, since a large body of 
literature shows that bi-lateral trade flows are endogenous. From theory, as Frankel and 
Rose (1998) suggested, the OCA criteria are endogenous. To capture gains from 
exchange rate stability countries are willing to link their currencies deliberately to those 
of their most important trading partners. Therefore they lose an important stability tool, 
monetary policy, and their monetary policy will be closely tied to that of their neighbours. 
This monetary policy coordination could result in an observed positive association 
between trade links and income links. That means exchange rate stability causes high 
trade and close business cycles, rather than high trade result in close business cycle. 
Therefore to identify the effect of bilateral trade patterns on income correlations, 
exogenous determinants of bilateral trade patterns need to be used as instruments. 
However, it is hard to find good instrumental variables which are correlated with bilateral 
trade intensity but uncorrelated with the residuals of the business cycle correlation 
equation. Fortunately, the gravity model provides a very good solution. This model is one 
of the most empirically successful in economics (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). The 
Gravity model is a popular formulation for statistical analysis of bilateral trade flows 
between different geographical entities. The regressors in the model can explain trade 
very well but are not correlated with the business cycle correlation. In the next section we 
review the model. 
 
2.5.1 The Gravity Model of Trade Theory 
The gravity model of trade in international economics predicts bilateral trade flows based 
on economic mass, the economic sizes calculated from GDP and distance between two 
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units. The model was first used by Jan Tinbergen in 1962. The basic theoretical model for 
trade between two countries i and j takes the form of: 
ij
ji
ij DIS
MM
GT
××=      (2-1) 
where Tij is the bilateral trade flow from origin i to destination j, M is the economic size 
of each country, DIS is the distance and G is a constant. Using logarithms, the equation 
can be converted to a linear form for econometric analysis and constant G becomes part 
of α. The economic sizes of the exporting and importing countries, Mi and Mj, are usually 
measured with gross domestic product. The basic model for such a test results in the 
following equation: 
ijij3jiij )ln(DIS-)ln(GDP)ln(GDP  )ln(T εβββα +++= 21   (2-2) 
The model often includes variables to account for income level (GDP), language 
relationships, contiguity, and colonial history (whether Country1 ever colonized 
Country2 or vice versa). The model has also been used in international relations to 
evaluate the impact of treaties and alliances on trade, and it has been used to test the 
effectiveness of trade agreements and organizations such as NAFTA and the WTO. 
The basic Gravity model does a pretty good job at explaining trade with just the size of 
the economies and their distances. However, there is a huge amount of variation in trade 
they cannot explain. Most authors, such as Anderson (1979) add other variables with less 
theoretical justification, usually because empirical analysis has shown that they “work.” 
We discuss the most commonly included variables as follows. 
Many studies estimate the gravity model with the log of per-capita income 
(ln(GDP/POP)) of the exporting and importing countries included as well as the log of 
aggregate incomes (lnGDP). The idea behind this appears to be that higher income 
countries trade more in general. One cause might be superior transportation infrastructure 
(roads to the interior, container ports, airports, etc.). High income countries probably have 
lower tariffs as well.  
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One explanation for the trade impeding effects of distance was transaction costs caused 
by inability to communicate and cultural differences. Therefore countries that speak the 
same language would trade more. Part of the reason for this common language effect is 
probably the shared history that caused the two countries to share a language. Indeed, 
measures of colonial links also are positively correlated with trade. Adjacent countries 
that share a border are also proved to trade more. 
There are numerous studies that have tested the gravity model. Deardorff (1998), Evenett 
and Keller (1998) and Feenstra et al. (1998) provide the theoretical model which best 
underpins the empirical findings of the gravity model. Versions of the gravity model also 
have been used to investigate the bilateral trade empirically, such as Frankel and Romer 
(1999) Frankel and Rose (2002) and Rose (2000, 2001).  
 
2.5.2 Review of the Empirical Literature on the Gravity Model for Trade 
Endogeneity  
McCallun (1995) and Clark and van Wincoop (2001) prove empirically that common 
border affects bilateral trade very much and affects the business cycle indirectly through 
bilateral trade intensity. McCallum’s examination of the trade patterns of Canadian 
provinces counter that borders must matter very much because the typical Canadian 
province trades 20 times more with other provinces than with American states of a given 
size and distance.  
Clark and van Wincoop (2001) argue that Europe countries are gradually becoming more 
integrated as barriers to cross-border flows of goods, capital and labour are being 
removed. Particularly, after the adoption of a single currency, their monetary and fiscal 
policies are becoming more coordinated. They investigate the importance of European 
national borders from a direct comparison of U.S. and European business cycle 
synchronization using 14 European Union countries and 9 U.S. Census regions. Firstly, 
they measure the business cycle correlation by employment and GDP data and compare 
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correlations between 9 U.S. regions with cross European Union countries and also 
compare regions within France and Germany with regions between these countries. They 
find that the average within country business cycle correlation is larger than the cross 
country correlation and the difference is statistically significant that prove that the 
national border does play an important role. Does the border effect explain the business 
cycle correlation directly or via some explanations? Clark and van Wincoop add some 
potential explanations into the business cycle regression. From the empirical result they 
find that adding trade to the correlation regression causes the border effect to fall by an 
amount approximately equal to the coefficient on trade times the corresponding border 
effect for trade which is from the gravity model. In addition, the large coefficients on 
trade are not the result of collinearity between trade and the common border since they 
are identical when omitting the common border. Therefore they conclude that the trade 
can account for most of the observed border effect on correlations and the variable of 
common border is an important variable in gravity model.  
Recently, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) developed a consistent and efficient 
theoretical gravity model to solve the border puzzle and implement the theory in a two-
country model which consist of the United States and Canada and a multi-country model 
that includes 22 industrialised countries. They focus on the effect of border on bilateral 
trade intensity and find that borders reduce trade between industrialised countries by 
moderate amounts of 20-50 percent which confirm Clark and van Wincoop’s conclusion 
form empirical analysis.  
These geographic characteristics are not affected by the income correlations or by 
government policies and we can believe that countries’ geographic characteristics have 
no effects on their business cycle except through their impact on trade. Therefore, it is a 
good instrumental variable of trade on correlations. Frankel and Romer (1999) create a 
gravity equation as instrumental variables for bilateral trade which consider both the 
geography factors and other potential variables.  
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where bilateral trade ( )/ln( iij GDPT ) measured by log of the ratio of bilateral trade 
between country i and county j to country i’s GDP. Dij is the distance between the 
country pair; N is population; A is area; L is a dummy for landlocked countries, and B is a 
dummy for common border between two countries. The empirical results from 63 
countries across 10 years are generally as expected and confirm that geographic variables 
are major determinants of bilateral trade. Distance has a large and significant negative 
impact on bilateral trade; country j’s size is positive correlated with bilateral trade; the 
common border has a considerable effect on trade; if the country-pair share the same 
language, the bilateral trade is higher; and if one of the countries is landlocked, trade falls 
by about a third. The fitness of the regression also is quite high which is 0.36. One more 
question may appear that all variables used in finding the geographic component of 
countries’ trade might have some endogenous component that is correlated with the error 
term in the income equation. To check that no single variable that could be endogenous is 
driving the results, Frankel and Romer omit each variable every time but none of these 
changes has a major effect on the results and all IV results remains much larger than the 
OLS estimates.   
Most studies show a similar format of the gravity model with that of Frankel and Romer 
(1999) and include both basic and other potential variables. Nevertheless, there are 
another two important variables which should be considered regarding to evaluating 
trade-creating policies: free trade agreements (FTA) and monetary union. 
Regional trade liberalizing agreements like Europe’s common market and North 
America’s free trade agreements have proliferated in the last 20 years and one of the 
primary uses of gravity model has been to evaluate them. A study by Frankel and Rose 
(2002) finds that FTAs lead to a tripling of trade between partners. 
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Another important variable for trade is monetary union. Twelve European countries have 
formally abandoned their national currencies and adopted a new currency, the Euro. In 
2000 Ecuador abandoned its national currency as well and dollarised. A number of 
countries also adopted monetary regimes without abandoning the domestic currencies. In 
1984 Hong Kong peg its currency with US dollar through currency board schemes and in 
1991 Argentina did the same. From these evidences, lots of studies find that the effect of 
a common currency on international trade is large. As Rose (2000) noted that two 
countries with the same currency trade more than comparable countries with their own 
currencies, perhaps over three times as much. Substituting a single currency for several 
national currencies reduces the transactions costs of trade within that group of countries 
and also eliminates the exchange rate risk then promotes trade. Therefore, the currency 
union play an important role in gravity model. Frankel and Rose (2002), Rose (2000, 
2001) and Rose and Engel (2002) all investigate the effect of currency union in 
promoting trade empirically.  
Frankel and Rose (2002) use over 180 countries, almost 8000 country-pair observations, 
at five years intervals to investigate the implications of common currencies for trade and 
income. Firstly they investigate the effect of common currency on trade by gravity model. 
Compared with Frankel and Romer (1999), Frankel and Rose (2002) include not only the 
standard gravity regressors, but also other controls to demonstrate the robustness of the 
results. The geographic characteristics are the log of distance, a dummy for common 
border, common language dummy and a dummy for landlocked countries. They use log 
of product real GDP and log of product of land area instead of area and population for 
both country i and j to measure the size. The other controls include log of product real 
GDP per capita, common colonizer dummy, political union dummy and common free 
trade agreement dummy. The ‘Currency Union’ variable is unity if the two countries 
belonged to a common currency area, such as Panama and the United States, and zero 
otherwise. ‘Currency Board’ is unity if one of the countries uses the currency of the other 
in a currency board arrangement, such as Hong Kong and the United States. The 
regressions are estimated by ordinary least square and they find gravity model fits well, 
explaining over 60 percent of the variation in the data. The coefficients for the traditional 
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gravity determinants are highly significant statistically and economically sensible. The 
negative coefficient of distance indicates the falling trade between county pairs when 
increase the distance. Trade rises with size (log of real GDP) and large countries are more 
self-sufficient. The positive coefficient of income per capita show that rich countries 
trade more than poor. Two countries that speak the same language trade more, as do 
countries that share a common land border. Belonging to a regional, common colonial 
heritage and a historical link to a mother country, areas in political union all have positive 
effects to trade. Then they focus on the currency union and currency board coefficients 
and the coefficients for each are positive, significant and large. Their coefficients are also 
similar in size and statistically significant no different. And also the coefficient of 
currency union are not affect by country size since after drop very small countries and the 
small product of sizes observations, the currency union coefficient remained highly 
significant and positive.  
Secondly, to prove the relationship between currency union and income, Frankel and 
Rose (2002) estimate a regression of trade and income by two-step least square. Here 
trade is estimated by 6 instrumental variables: log distance, log population of county j, 
common language dummy, common border dummy, log product of area and landlocked 
which should follow the IV estimation assumption that they are correlated with trade but 
uncorrelated with income. The positive and significant coefficient of trade indicates that 
the currency union effect on income is through effect on trade. To prove this effect does 
only come from trade, they did some robust tests. They look for possible non trade effects 
by including measures of currency union directly in the income equation but they fail to 
find significant evidences. Then they put the effect of currency union on trade and the 
effect of trade on income together and find the effect of currency union on income comes 
through the trade route. After dropping small and poor countries or considering the time 
lags, the results are still significant. Another question will be asked that the common 
currency could be endogenous and the currency union and trade could be determined by 
some third factor. Hence a couple of potential third factors are included in the first step, 
trade equation, such as common language, colonial history, political union and so on. The 
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currency union effect remains almost as strong as ever. Therefore the variable of currency 
union can be viewed as good instrumental variable from literature.   
The significant effect from currency union on trade also is achieved by Rose (2000) and 
Rose (2001). Again using larger observations (33,903 bilateral observations spanning five 
years), Rose (2000) adopts the gravity model to estimate the relationship between 
currency union and bilateral trade. The determinants of bilateral trade include log of 
product of GDP; log of product of GDP per capita; log of distance; contiguity dummy; 
common language dummy; regional trade agreement dummy; common border dummy; 
colonies dummy; common currency dummy and volatility of bilateral exchange rate. All 
the coefficients seem reasonable and are statistically significant. These traditional gravity 
effects are intuitively reasonable, and have the similar magnitude with literature and the t-
statistics often exceed 50 in absolute value. Both higher income per capita and larger 
country size increase trade. The greater the distance between two countries, the lower 
their trade. Sharing a land border, a language or a regional trade agreement also increases 
trade by economically and statistically significant amounts. Ex-colonies and their 
colonizers, countries with the same colonizer, and geographically disparate areas of the 
same state all have more intense trade. All equations fit the data relatively well, 
explaining over half of the variation in bilateral trade. Coefficients of currency union are 
all positive and significant in equations and the effect is economically large even holding 
all other factors constant. Rose’s point estimate is that ‘countries with the same currency 
trade over three times as much with each other as countries with different currencies.’ 
Again, like other literatures, Rose (2000) also did a couple of sensitivity analyses: he 
drops the developing country pair observations to test the effect of purely developing 
country phenomenon; changes the measurement of monetary regime and the distance; 
searches for omitted variables that may be responsible for the results; adds to the default 
specification eleven different sets of additional regressors and also he adopts different 
estimation techniques, Tobit, to estimate the gravity equation. The key results do not 
appear sensitive either to the exact specification of the gravity equation, or to the 
particular estimation technique. Rose (2001) did the similar analysis for gravity model 
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but considers the county-pair specific effects. He finds that currency union has an 
economically and statistically significant positive effect on trade in the large data set. 
Although lower inflation has many benefits, these regimes also have their costs in terms 
of macroeconomic stability. These costs may be large if a country is poorly correlated 
with other countries that are in the same currency union. Rose and Engel (2002) follow 
the Rose’s (2000) gravity model of international trade and find a strong and significant 
effect of currency union on trade again. However, they also find that the business cycles 
are more tightly synchronized for members of a currency union. Even they change a 
couple of control variables the results do not change much. When the natural of log of 
bilateral trade between country i and country j is used as the sole control regressor, which 
is estimated by gravity model IV estimation, increased international trade induces more 
tightly synchronized business cycles and controlling for trade does not destroy the 
significant of currency union. It is important test since Clark and van Wincoop (2001) 
find that inclusion of trade as a control destroys the border effect. Therefore members of 
international currency unions tend to experience more trade and at the same time more 
synchronized business cycles than do countries with their own currencies. Based on their 
empirically, the variable of currency union can not be an instrumental variable in bilateral 
trade equation since it is correlated with both the trade and the business cycle correlations.  
From these empirical studies we find that currency union does play an important role in 
gravity model and the effect on trade is large. However, whether this effect of currency 
union on the business cycles is directly or via trade is not clear. Papers such as Frankel 
and Rose (2002) and Shambaugh (2004) support that the effects of currency union on 
income come through the promotion of trade. However papers such as those by Rose 
(2001) and Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005) support that the effect of a currency union to 
business cycle is direct. One of this thesis’s tasks is test whether the currency union affect 
business cycle correlations directly or this effect comes through trade and currency union 
should be an instrumental variable for bilateral trade. 
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2.6 Conclusions 
The theory of optimum currency areas sees the choice of exchange rate regime as a trade-
off between the benefits and costs of joining a monetary union. One major benefit is that 
credibly fixed exchange rate reduces the risk of foreign trade and investment. Further 
benefits are gained if exchange rate stability is achieved by entering a currency union 
where adoption of a common currency reduces international transactions costs, improves 
market transparency and increases the liquidity of financial markets. The costs arise from 
the fact that a fixed exchange rate or common currency excludes the possibility of an 
independent national monetary policy to stabilize the domestic economy (Mundell, 1961). 
The benefits of common currency increase with the degree of international economic 
integration whereas the costs decrease with economic integration. When integration 
proceeds beyond a certain point, it therefore becomes optimal to switch from a flexible 
exchange rate to a common currency.  
OCA theory suggests that the costs of giving up exchange rate flexibility within a group 
of trading partners will be relative small if there is a low frequency of asymmetric shocks, 
a high degree of labour mobility across countries, and an international transfer 
mechanism securing a transfer of resources from countries hit by positive shocks to those 
hit by negative shocks. OCA theory also implies that the benefits of a common currency 
will be greater the greater the volume of trade and investment across borders. The 
literature indicates that those EU countries which have so far chosen to opt out of the 
EMU do indeed tend to be more exposed to asymmetric shocks and to trade less with EU 
partners than those countries which have already joined the EMU. 
The world economy has become more closely integrated in recent years due to many 
different reasons and bilateral trade intensity is a very important determination. From a 
theoretical viewpoint, closer international trade could result in either tighter or looser 
correlations of national business cycles. As Krugman points out (1993), closer bilateral 
trade could result in countries becoming more specialised in the goods in which they have 
comparative advantage if inter-industry trade accounts for major share of international 
trade. The countries might then be more sensitive to industry-specific shocks, resulting in 
 50
more idiosyncratic business cycles. However, if intra-industry trade accounts for most 
trade, then the business cycles may become more similar across countries when countries 
trade more. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to claim that a presumption exist in favour of 
the latter view. A lot of studies prove this point of view empirically by different data or 
different models, for instance Frankel and Rose (1998), Kose et al (2003), Babetskii 
(2005), Baxter and Kourparitsas(2005), Calderòn et al (2007) and so on. 
When estimating the relationship between trade intensity and the business cycle, trade 
intensity could be endogenous. The gravity model provides a good solution for the 
endogeneity problem. Lots of studies have proved that variables from the gravity model, 
such as common border, distance, country size, common official language and country 
size, are good instrumental variables since they explain bilateral trade intensity very well 
but are uncorrelated with the business cycle correlation. While whether the variable of 
currency union which explains the countries’ exchange rate floating level is a good 
instrumental variable or not is unclear as the effect from it on the business cycle could be 
either direct or indirect via trade intensity. 
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Chapter 3 Measurement of Variables and Data 
Descriptions 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In theory, closer international trade could result in either tighter or looser correlations of 
the business cycles. Closer bilateral trade could result in countries becoming more 
specialised in the goods for which they have a comparative advantage. The countries 
might then be more sensitive to industry-specific shocks, resulting in more idiosyncratic 
business cycles. However, if intra-industry trade accounts for most trade, then the 
business cycles may become more similar across countries when countries trade more. 
Following the literature we focus on these two variables: the bilateral trade intensity and 
the business cycle correlation to do empirical analysis. Actual data on both of these 
variables are not available, therefore we must rely on constructed proxies. This chapter 
introduces definitions for these two variables and investigates them over time and across 
country pairs.  
We follow Frankel and Rose (1998) to select 21 OECD countries plus China, Hong Kong 
and Mexico since those three countries are important trade partners to the 21 OECD 
countries. The sample period is from 1959 to 2003 and is split equally into five periods20. 
Our sample length is the same with Frankel and Rose’s (1998) but extend one extra 
period. The business cycles are widely known to be irregular, varying in frequency, 
magnitude and duration. Baxter and King (1999) propose a Band-Pass filter that isolates 
the components of the time series with fluctuations between six and 32 quarters. Vallee 
(2002) finds the duration of the business cycle is about 9.25 years. Joseph Schumpeter 
thought there were three cycles within the economy: a long, 60-year cycle, a moderately 
                                                 
20 Australia; Austria; Belgium-Luxembourg; Canada; China; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; 
Hong Kong; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Mexico; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Portugal; Spain; Sweden; 
Switzerland; United Kingdom and United States. Five periods are: 1959-67, 1968-76, 1977-85, 1986-94, 
and 1995-2003. 
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long, 10-year cycle, and a short, 40-month cycle. Therefore we believe that nine years is a 
good length for the cyclical period. 
The reminder of this chapter is as follows: section 3.2 presents the sample selection; 
section 3.3 defines the measurements of the bilateral trade intensity and the business 
cycle correlation; section 3.4 and 3.5 presents a statistical analysis of the both variables 
over time and across country pairs, respectively. The summary of this chapter is 
presented in section 3.6. 
 
3.2 Sample Selection 
Not only developed countries but also developing countries or both developed and 
developing countries have been selected to investigate the relationship between the trade 
intensity and the business cycles empirically. 21 In this thesis, we focus on industrialised 
countries and follow the Frankel and Rose (1998) to select the 21 OECD countries: 
Australia; Austria; Belgium-Luxembourg 22 ; Canada; Denmark; Finland; France; 
Germany; Greece; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Portugal; 
Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; United Kingdom and United States. Most European 
countries’ important trading partners have been included since the bilateral trade of 
European countries mostly is from European countries. However, a couple of countries 
trade not only with European countries, but also with some countries which are in their 
own regions. For example the U.S.A. has a high trade volume with Germany and the U.K. 
and also trades a lot with Mexico and China. Japan also has a lot of trade with Asian 
countries. Therefore it is necessary to check whether our 21 OECD countries’ most 
important trading partners are included in our sample. 
The top twenty trading partners for each of the 21 OECD countries are shown in 
appendix I. All countries’ top 3 trading partners are included in our sample except Japan 
                                                 
21 See Frankel and Rose (1998), Babetskii (2004), Clark and van Wincoop (2001), Haan et al. (2002)， 
Calderon et al. (2007), Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005) 
22 We view Belgium and Luxembourg as one economic country. 
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and the USA. 23  Most of the European countries’ important trading partners are 
themselves already included in our sample. Nevertheless, we find that there is a 
significant amount of trade between China, Hong Kong and the 21 OECD countries24, 
particularly for the Asia-Pacific economies, i.e. Australia, Japan and New Zealand. 
Mexico is also an important trading partner to U.S.A. and Canada. The trade expenditure 
between the U.S.A. and Mexico represents 9.21% of the USA total trade with the rest of 
the world. The bilateral trade between Canada and Mexico is 2.08% of Canada’s total 
trade. Hence, China, Hong Kong and Mexico should be included in our sample to cover 
most countries’ important trading partners.  
The first column of Table 3-1 is the percentage of total trade accounted for by the top 23 
trading partners, while the second column shows how much trade occurs between each 
country and the 23 countries in our sample. The average percentage of total trade 
accounted for by the 23 sample countries is 77% and some of them are close to or exceed 
90%. The last column reports the difference between the two percentages. Most countries 
show a slight difference with average of 8% except Japan. From appendix I, we find that 
the major trading partners of Japan are the Asian countries such as Korea, Indonesia, 
Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. We will not include these countries in our sample as 
they are not that important to other European counties. We will test the robustness by 
using these countries later. Therefore our sample has included most important trade 
partners for nearly all of the sample countries.  
In addition, in the second column, percentages increase at least 2-3% after adding China, 
Hong Kong and Mexico into our sample, particularly for Australia, Japan, New Zealand 
and the USA.25 Therefore our sample of countries is 22 OECD countries plus China and 
Hong Kong. 
The time period of observations covers 45 years from 1959 to 2003. It is probable that the 
degree of synchronization has changed over time and these changes are related to other 
                                                 
23 China and Korea are Japan’s second and third important trade partners and Mexico is USA’s third 
important partner. 
24 19 of the 21 OECD countries indicate that China is in their top 20 trade partner lists and Hong Kong 
appears in 8 of the 21 OECD countries’ top 20 trade partner lists. 
25 We didn’t report percentages of twenty sample partners in Table 3-1. 
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developments than the timing of EU membership, for example the exchange rate regime. 
Therefore we divide our sample into five periods, and each period is 9 years in length, i.e. 
1959-1967, 1968-1976, 1977-1985, 1986-1994 and 1995-2003. The sub-periods can 
reflect different monetary regimes and different degrees of economic integration and also 
we can calculate the correlations based on 9 years data.  
Our first period is in the Bretton Woods System (1944-68) which is the fixed exchange 
rate period. In 1944 the British and American governments established the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), which was intended to police a system of fixed exchange known 
Table 3-1 
Bilateral Trade Percentage 
Sample Countries Top 23 (%) 23-country from our sample (%) Differences (%) 
Australia 85 69 15 
Austria 87 79 8 
Belgium & Luxembourg 88 86 3 
Canada 93 90 3 
China 81 67 14 
Denmark 87 85 3 
Finland 81 74 7 
France 79 74 5 
Germany 81 76 5 
Greece 82 70 11 
Hong Kong 88 77 11 
Ireland 89 85 4 
Italy 78 73 5 
Japan 81 41 40 
Mexico 95 91 4 
Netherlands 83 79 5 
New Zealand 85 76 8 
Norway 91 88 3 
Portugal 88 83 5 
Spain 82 77 5 
Sweden 85 83 2 
Switzerland 87 84 2 
UK 81 77 4 
USA 81 70 11 
Average 85 77 8 
Source: Trade data come from IMF, Direction of Trade data set denominated by US dollars.  
Notes: The percentage of top 23 is calculated by (Tradei,top23)/(Tradei,world) and the second column is 
calculated by (Tradei,sample)/(Tradei,world). 
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universally as the Bretton Woods system. The Bretton Woods system worked on a 
principle known as the Gold Standard. Under this arrangement the USA pledged to keep 
the dollar price of gold fixed irrevocably at the price of $35 per ounce. Other countries 
then fixed their currencies in terms of dollars, devaluing or revaluing as necessary in 
order to counteract disequilibrium. While the Bretton Woods System broke down in 
1968-73, this is in our second period. On 15 August 1971, the USA announced the 
closing of the Gold Window because of the upward pressure on the deutschmark. After 6 
months, they increased the price of gold from $35 to $38, named Smithsonian Agreement. 
But the Smithsonian System broke down in under 12 months. In the late 1960s, as 
national inflation rates began to diverge and inconsistencies in Bretton Woods became 
increasingly obvious, floating appeared more and more attractive as a possible solution to 
the problems. The period since the beginning of 1973 is the floating rate era and the 
major rates have floated to a more or less managed degree for the whole period, which 
covers our last three periods. From 1979, twelve European countries organized European 
Monetary System (EMS). In this era, from 1987 to 1992 it is the period of 
implementation of single European act period and our fourth period is in this period. The 
years between 1993 and 1998 are the common market and preparations for monetary 
union. In 1999, European Monetary Union (EMU) is organized and many of our sample 
countries adopt Euro after 2002 which covers our last period. 
 
3.3 Measuring the Bilateral Trade Intensity and the Business 
Cycle Correlation 
As we noted in chapter 2, countries with close international trade links would benefit 
from a common currency and are more likely to be members of an optimum currency 
area. If countries join a currency union, they give up a potentially important stabilising 
tool and countries with close business cycles would benefit from a common currency and 
are more likely join the OCA as well. Therefore, the bilateral trade intensity and the 
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business cycle correlation are two criteria for OCA and also are two key variables we 
focus on. 
 
3.3.1 Bilateral Trade Intensity  
We are interested in the bilateral intensity of international trade between two countries, i 
and j at time t. Following previous literature, we use two different proxies for bilateral 
trade intensity. 26  Firstly, we use total bilateral trade divided by joint nominal GDP 
(Yit+Yjt):  
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where Xij,t denotes total export (f.o.b.) from country i to country j during period t; Mij,t 
denotes total import (c.i.f.) from country i to country j during period t and Yi,t and Yj,t are 
level of nominal GDP in country i and j at period t, respectively. 1
,tij
TI  is the bilateral 
trade intensity between country i and country j at period t normalised by total GDP.  
Secondly, total bilateral trade between country i and j divided by the aggregate trade of 
both countries:  
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where Xi,t denotes total global exports from country i, and Mi,t denotes total imports from 
the world. Both of the intensities take the natural log. 
The two normalisations are highly correlated (92%). We implement the t test for means 
and F-test for variances to examine the similarity between the two normalisations. The 
                                                 
26 Frankel and Rose (1998); Clark and van Wincoop (2001); Calderón et al. (2007); Gruben et al., (2002); 
Fidrmuc (2004); and Imbs (2004 and 2006) all adopt one method or both methods to measure the trade 
intensity. 
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null hypothesis of the tests is trade intensity normalised by GDP, which is statistically the 
same with trade intensity normalised by total trade against the alternative hypotheses that 
they are not equally. The p-values reported in Table 3-2 reject both null hypotheses at the 
5 percent significance level and indicate that the trade intensity normalised by GDP and 
the trade intensity normalised by total trade are not equally both from mean and variance. 
The difference between both measures will arise when at least one of the economies has a 
low level of openness. As Frankel and Rose (1998) and other papers mentioned that it is 
difficult to say whether normalising by total trade or total output is more appropriate from 
theory therefore we conduct our regressions with both trade intensities.  
Table 3-2 
Normalisations of Trade Intensity 
 
Mean 
t-test (H0: Mean( 1,tijTI )-Mean(
2
,tijTI )=0)
Variance 
F-test (H0: Var( 1,tijTI )/Var(
2
,tijTI )=1) 
Test-value -64.97  1.13  
p-value (0.00) (0.02) 
Notes: 1,tijTI  is trade intensity normalised by GDP and 2,tijTI  is trade intensity normalised by total trade. 
Table 3-3 
Correlations between Trade Intensities 
 1,tijTI  
1
,tjiTI  
2
,tijTI  
2
,tjiTI  
1
,tijTI  1.00    
1
,tjiTI  0.93 1.00   
2
,tijTI  0.92 0.84 1.00  
2
,tjiTI  0.86 0.91 0.94 1.00 
Notes: 1,tijTI  ( 1 ,tjiTI ) is the trade intensity from country i (j) to country j (i) normalised by GDP and 2,tijTI  
( 2 ,tjiTI ) is the trade intensity from country i (j) to country j (i) normalised by total trade.  
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The trade data are taken from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade data 
set, whereas nominal GDP data are taken from SourceOECD, Economic Outlook.27 All 
data are annual frequency and cover 24 countries from 1959 to 2003. They are all 
expressed by US dollars. As Frankel and Rose (1998) referred, a problem which is typical 
of bilateral trade data is that export flows from country i to country j are not necessarily 
equal to import flows of country j from country i. We did a couple of following tests to 
compare the bilateral trade flows from country i to j and j to i.  
Firstly, we find high correlations between trade intensity from country i to j and that from 
j to i. When the trade intensity normalised by GDP the correlation is 93% and when the 
trade intensity normalised by total trade the correlation is 94% (Table 3-3). Also we find 
that the correlations are consistent over time. Using the same tests, we compare the trade 
intensity from country i to country j with that from country j to country i by mean and 
variance in Table 3-4 and we find that the bilateral trade from i to j is the same as 
bilateral trade from j to i only except the mean of trade intensity when it is normalised by 
GDP. Therefore we would like to follow the literature to drop the repeated observations 
and only consider half of our observations. When we analyze the country i we use 
bilateral trade data from country i to country j. Hence 24 sample countries and 5 periods 
will create 1380 observations including 276 country pairs times 5 periods. 
                                                 
27 Nominal GDP of China, Hong Kong and Mexico are from World Bank World Development Indicators, 
since there are no data in OECD database. 
Table 3-4 
Comparisons of Bilateral Trade Intensity from i to j and from j to i 
  1,tijTI  
2
,tijTI  
t-value 2.76 1.28 Mean (t-test) 
H0: Mean( tijTI , )-(Mean tjiTI , )=0 p-value (0.01) (0.20) 
f-value 0.92 0.94 Variance (F-test) 
H0: Var( tijTI , )/Var( tjiTI , )=1 p-value (0.12) (0.26) 
Notes: 1,tijTI  is trade intensity normalised by GDP and 
2
,tijTI  is trade intensity normalised by total trade. 
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3.3.2 The Business Cycle Correlation 
The other key variable in our study is the degree of the business cycle synchronisation 
between countries i and j. Choosing a proxy for the business cycle is a difficult issue, 
which was addressed in a long series of papers and not yet resolved. Frankel and Rose 
(1998) use simple de-trended and differenced indicators of economic activity. Following 
this literature, we use real GDP to measure the business cycle first:  
 
YYCov
Corr
jtit YY
jtit
tij σσ ×=
),(
,      (3-3) 
where Y is real GDP expressed in US dollars, which are from SourceOECD Economic 
Outlook.28 tijCorr , is the correlation of Yit and Yjt during period t.  
Before estimating correlations, we would like to transform the variables in two different 
ways. Firstly, we take natural logarithms of real GDP and then de-trend it so as to isolate 
cyclical components of economic time series conforming to a certain definition of the 
business cycle. Given the importance of different de-trending procedures, and the lack of 
consensus about optimal de-trending techniques, we employ two difference procedures. 
Firstly we de-trend the variables using the well-known Hodrick-Prescott filter (Hodrick-
Prescott, 1980) 29 with a 7=λ 30. Secondly, we take simple first-differences of logs of the 
                                                 
28 SourceOECD Economics Outlook does not report the real GDP in Dollars, so we use the GDP deflator 
and exchange rate from SourceOECD Economics to calculate the annual real GDP in US Dollars, covering 
the same sample of countries (24 countries) and years (1959-2003) as the trade data.  
 
Currency  National
US
Deflator GDP
GDP Nominal GDP Real $×=  
Real GDP data of China, Hong Kong and Mexico are from World Bank, World Development Indicators, 
since there are no data available in OECD database for those countries. 
29 According to the HP-filter, trends are retrieved by fitting a smooth line to the data points for each 
individual series. This smooth line is derived from minimizing the following loss function, which 
penalizes lack of fit and lack of smoothness:  
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t
T
t
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Y
YYYYYYMin
T
t
Trend
t
λ The first term in the objection 
function is a measure of the goodness of fit. The second term is variations in the growth rate of the 
trend component. The parameter λ  is key since it determines the trade-off between goodness-of-fit 
and the smoothness of the trend component. In the limit as ∞→λ  the trend becomes linear thereby 
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real GDP, multiplying by 100, so that the resulting variable can be interpreted as a growth 
rate.  
These correlations are estimated between two countries over a given span of time. The 
sample contains 1380 observations [ ]5223)231( ×÷×+  as well, 276 country pairs time 5 
periods. Again, we compare the different de-trending methods by correlations’ mean and 
variance. Table 3-5 reports comparison results of t-test for the mean and f-test for the 
                                                                                                                                                 
allowing for large fluctuations in the cyclical component. When 0→λ  the trend component instead 
becomes equal to the data series tY , and the cyclical component approaches zero. 
30 As Harvey and Jaeger’s (1993) show that the use of HP-filter can generate spurious cyclical patterns. 
Hodrick and Prescott take λ  as a fixed parameter, which they set λ  equal to 1600 for US quarterly data. 
Their choice of this value was based upon a prior about the variability of the cyclical part relative to the 
variability of the change in the trend component. In our case we will use the value of 7=λ  for annual real 
GDP 
Table 3-5 
Comparison of de-trending Methods 
 Mean t-test (H0: MeanCorr-HP-MeanCorr-DI=0) 
Variance 
F-test (H0: VarCorr-HP/VarCorr-DI=1) 
Test-value 6.28 0.94 
p-value (0.00) (0.22) 
Note: the subscript Corr-HP is the real GDP correlation de-trended by HP filter, and Corr-DI is the real 
GDP correlation de-trended by first differences.  
Table 3-6 
Comparison of Business Cycle Correlation Proxies 
  HP-filter Difference 
 Mean Variance Mean Variance 
  t-test p-value F-test p-value t-test p-value F-test p-value 
GDP vs. IP 11.36 (0.00) 1.77 (0.00) 8.33 (0.00) 2.02 (0.00) 
GDP vs. EM 22.13 (0.00) 1.07 (0.23) 21.86 (0.00) 1.23 (0.00) 
GDP vs. UN 15.99 (0.00) 1.21 (0.00) 14.87 (0.00) 1.41 (0.00) 
IP vs. EM 12.63 (0.00) 0.60 (0.00) 14.98 (0.00) 0.61 (0.00) 
IP vs. UN 4.54 (0.00) 0.68 (0.00) 6.18 (0.00) 0.70 (0.00) 
EM vs. UN -8.16 (0.00) 1.13 (0.05) -9.76 (0.00) 1.14 (0.03) 
Note: GDP is real GDP correlations, IP is industrial production correlations, EM is total employment 
correlations, and UN is unemployment rate correlations. Both t-test and f-test are the same with Table 3-2.
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variance. We find the real GDP correlations de-trended by HP-filter and first differences 
to have a different mean but the same variance. 
Real GDP is not the only measure of economic achieving that can be used to measure the 
business cycle and from theory we also adopt industrial production, total employment and 
the unemployment rate as good proxies.31 Table 3-6 presents the results of economic 
activities comparisons. Based on p-values, it is very clear that all of the means of four 
economic activities, real GDP, industrial production, total employment and 
unemployment rate, are significantly different, and also nearly all of them have different 
variances. In Table 3-7 we find high correlations between de-trending methods but the 
correlations between different economic activities are much lower. For example, the 
correlation coefficient of different de-trending methods of real GDP is 88%, but real GDP 
correlations have low correlations with industrial production, employment and 
unemployment. It is necessary to select different economic activities to measure the 
business cycle but we do not show all estimation results together. We report results when 
the business cycle is measured by industrial production, total employment and 
unemployment rate in the robustness test section.  
                                                 
31 Davidas and Szapary (2004) discuss various measures of business cycles also from the perspective of the 
acceding countries. Anderson, Kwark and Vahid (1999) use the quarterly indices of industrial production to 
measure the business cycles since GDP data for their countries is only available at an annual frequency and 
Bergman (2004), Fidrmuc (2004) use the industrial production as well. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994), 
Crosby (2003) and Calderon et al. (2007) use annual data on GDP to measure the correlations of business 
cycle. Clark and Van Wincoop (2001) adopt both Employment and GDP. 
Table 3-7 
Correlations for Different Measures of the Business Cycle 
 GDP-HP GDP-DI IP-HP IP-DI EM-HP EM-DI UN-HP
GDP-DI 0.88        
IP-HP 0.23  0.23       
IP-DI 0.17  0.18  0.91      
EM-HP 0.22  0.21  0.39  0.35     
EM-DI 0.22  0.23  0.42  0.38  0.68    
UN-HP 0.26  0.23  0.43  0.37  0.46  0.44   
UN-DI 0.24  0.25  0.45  0.43  0.42  0.46  0.89  
Note: GDP is real GDP correlations, IP is industrial production correlations, EM is total employment 
correlations, and UN is unemployment rate correlations.
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3.4 Bilateral Trade Intensity Analysis – Across Countries and 
Periods 
The bilateral trade intensities are panel data containing 276 country pairs across five 
periods, from 1959 to 2003. Hence we would like to compare them across country pairs 
and over time.  
In Table 3-8 we present the average bilateral trade intensity normalised by nominal GDP 
for each individual countries across five sub-periods and the whole period. The average 
value is calculated from each individual country with its 23 partners. The first five 
columns report the average bilateral trade intensities for each period. It is clear that nearly 
all countries increase their trade intensities over time. The average trade intensities of 24 
counties show a clear upward trend from 0.27% in the first period to 0.56% in the last 
period. The column of ‘change’ shows the difference between the first period (1959 to 
1967) and the last period (1995 to 2003) which is calculated by [(TIPeriod5-TIPeriod1)/ 
TIPeriod1]×100. As we expect that all 24 countries report positive values indicating all 
countries have more bilateral trade over time. Some countries such as China, Hong Kong 
and Mexico have large increases since they become more open to the world recently and 
bilateral trade has increased at a faster rate than GDP. A couple of European countries 
also increase their intensities much, such as Spain, Ireland and Portugal. The last column 
presents the bilateral trade intensity for whole period. Germany, Belgium & Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands report the highest trade intensity and Mexico, New Zealand and 
Greece report the lowest trade intensity. This finding is consistent with the gravity model 
theory and literature. How far a country is from other countries provides considerable 
information about the amount that it trades. New Zealand is far from most other countries 
which reduce its trade, and Greece also is relatively far from other European countries. 
However, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany are close to European countries and 
many of the world’s most populous countries.  
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Table 3-8 
Average Trade Intensity normalised by Nominal GDP 
Periods 
Countries 1959-67 1968-76 1977-85 1986-94 1995-03 
Change 
(%) 1959-03
Australia 0.0022 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0025 14 0.0022 
Austria 0.0018 0.0027 0.0030 0.0033 0.0039 117 0.0029 
Belgium & 
Luxembourg 0.0065 0.0082 0.0097 0.0097 0.0107 65 0.0090 
Canada 0.0024 0.0027 0.0028 0.0029 0.0037 52 0.0029 
China 0.0004 - 0.0025 0.0050 0.0053 1230 0.0033 
Denmark 0.0035 0.0041 0.0043 0.0041 0.0049 42 0.0042 
Finland 0.0019 0.0027 0.0029 0.0029 0.0038 102 0.0028 
France 0.0029 0.0055 0.0067 0.0072 0.0082 179 0.0061 
Germany 0.0065 0.0086 0.0108 0.0106 0.0134 107 0.0100 
Greece 0.0008 0.0010 0.0011 0.0012 0.0014 83 0.0011 
Hong Kong 0.0012 0.0019 0.0030 0.0088 0.0102 762 0.0050 
Ireland 0.0009 0.0013 0.0020 0.0025 0.0038 337 0.0021 
Italy 0.0030 0.0044 0.0055 0.0058 0.0076 148 0.0053 
Japan 0.0015 0.0024 0.0028 0.0026 0.0029 90 0.0025 
Mexico 0.0004 0.0005 0.0008 0.0011 0.0022 480 0.0010 
Netherlands 0.0068 0.0083 0.0097 0.0095 0.0100 47 0.0088 
New Zealand 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0010 0.0011 4 0.0011 
Norway 0.0029 0.0038 0.0042 0.0039 0.0044 54 0.0038 
Portugal 0.0008 0.0012 0.0013 0.0023 0.0027 228 0.0017 
Spain 0.0012 0.0018 0.0023 0.0038 0.0057 376 0.0029 
Sweden 0.0046 0.0062 0.0062 0.0052 0.0071 55 0.0059 
Switzerland 0.0036 0.0042 0.0046 0.0047 0.0066 85 0.0047 
UK 0.0055 0.0070 0.0083 0.0079 0.0080 44 0.0074 
USA 0.0019 0.0028 0.0037 0.0041 0.0053 184 0.0035 
Average 0.0027 0.0037 0.0042 0.0047 0.0056 204 0.0042 
Regions               
European 0.0032 0.0043 0.0049 0.0051 0.0063 98 0.0048 
Asia-Pacific 0.0013 0.0019 0.0023 0.0039 0.0044 243 0.0028 
NAFTA 0.0015 0.0020 0.0024 0.0027 0.0037 140 0.0025 
Source: Trade data are taken from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade data set, nominal 
GDP data are taken from SourceOECD, Economic Outlook. China, Hong Kong and Mexico’s GDP are 
from World Bank. We have no trade data for China from 1968 to 1976.  
Notes: Trade intensity is measured by 
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 and an average value obtained using 
the values from the country pairs. % of changes is calculated by [(TIPeriod5- TIPeriod1)/ TIPeriod1]*100. 
Asia-Pacific region includes Australia, China, Hong Kong, Japan, and New Zealand; NAFTA includes 
Canada, Mexico and USA; all other 16 European countries are in the European region. All data 
reported in this table are without natural log. 
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In the second panel of Table 3-8 we show the average regions’ trade intensities across 
periods. The Asia-Pacific region includes Australia, China, Hong Kong, Japan, and New 
Zealand; NAFTA includes Canada, Mexico and the USA; all other 16 countries are in the 
European region. All these regions and the average 24 countries bilateral trade intensities 
are draw in Figure 3-1. It is clear that the European countries have the highest trade 
intensities across five periods. We also find that European countries increased their trade 
intensity in the last period more than other periods, which probably can be explained by 
the introduction of the Euro in 1999. In the first two periods, Asia pacific and the 
NAFTA regions have similar level of trade intensities, then Asia Pacific region increase 
much faster than NAFTA. Generally, the trade intensity of European countries is nearly 
twice that of the other two regions. 
We report the trade intensity normalised by total trade in Table 3-9. 19 of 24 countries 
have stable or a little decreasing trade intensities in the first three periods and only five of 
them have a clear upward trend, which is a bit different with the trade intensity 
normalised by GDP. Average values of 24 countries indicate that average trade intensities 
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Figure 3-1. Average and Regions Bilateral Trade Intensity normalised by GDP 
Source: Table 3-8. 
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are the same in the first and the third periods which are 1.02% and a little bit higher in the 
second period, 1.05%. In the last two periods, their average trade intensities increase to 
1.14% and 1.19%. We also find that seven countries have negative change percent 
between first and last period. 
Germany, Belgium-Luxembourg and the Netherland still have very high trade intensities 
when they are measured by total trade. The USA and the UK report very high trade 
intensity as well and they are only a little less than Germany. This result can be explained 
by the USA and the UK have large bilateral trade volumes with these industrial countries, 
however, the bilateral trade are relatively low to their GDP. The regions trade intensities 
are reported in the bottom panel in Table 3-9 and Figure 3-2. We find that the European 
countries are not the highest intensity regions any more and they are even lower than the 
average values. While NAFTA presents high trade intensities mainly because of the high 
value from the USA and there are only three members in NAFTA. All three regions have 
stable trade intensities in the first three periods and increase from 1986. Compare with 
trade intensity normalised by GDP, trade intensity normalised by total trade have relative 
high values. 
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Figure 3-2. Average and Regions Bilateral Trade Intensity normalised by Total Trade 
Source: Table 3-9 
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Table 3-9 
Average Trade Intensity normalised by Total Trade 
 Periods 
Countries 1959-67 1968-76 1977-85 1986-94 1995-03 
Change 
(%) 1959-03
Australia 0.0098 0.0083 0.0069 0.0068 0.0067 -32 0.0077 
Austria 0.0058 0.0065 0.0061 0.0070 0.0070 21 0.0065 
Belgium & 
Luxembourg 0.0144 0.0147 0.0142 0.0148 0.0152 5 0.0147 
Canada 0.0123 0.0121 0.0107 0.0108 0.0108 -13 0.0113 
China 0.0076  0.0084 0.0101 0.0116 52 0.0094 
Denmark 0.0093 0.0092 0.0085 0.0087 0.0088 -5 0.0089 
Finland 0.0055 0.0062 0.0059 0.0065 0.0066 20 0.0062 
France 0.0152 0.0172 0.0169 0.0192 0.0187 23 0.0175 
Germany 0.0234 0.0234 0.0235 0.0255 0.0282 20 0.0248 
Greece 0.0027 0.0029 0.0025 0.0029 0.0029 9 0.0027 
Hong Kong 0.0092 0.0081 0.0081 0.0137 0.0139 51 0.0106 
Ireland 0.0026 0.0031 0.0039 0.0049 0.0064 143 0.0042 
Italy 0.0133 0.0133 0.0136 0.0165 0.0177 33 0.0149 
Japan 0.0103 0.0119 0.0123 0.0148 0.0136 32 0.0126 
Mexico 0.0031 0.0026 0.0040 0.0044 0.0070 127 0.0042 
Netherlands 0.0149 0.0151 0.0148 0.0153 0.0147 -1 0.0150 
New Zealand 0.0040 0.0035 0.0029 0.0029 0.0028 -31 0.0032 
Norway 0.0079 0.0087 0.0084 0.0082 0.0080 1 0.0082 
Portugal 0.0026 0.0031 0.0029 0.0051 0.0054 106 0.0038 
Spain 0.0053 0.0063 0.0068 0.0108 0.0128 142 0.0084 
Sweden 0.0136 0.0144 0.0128 0.0117 0.0123 -9 0.0130 
Switzerland 0.0107 0.0102 0.0094 0.0100 0.0117 9 0.0104 
UK 0.0198 0.0187 0.0194 0.0198 0.0183 -8 0.0192 
USA 0.0225 0.0219 0.0215 0.0235 0.0247 10 0.0228 
Average 0.0102 0.0105 0.0102 0.0114 0.0119 29 0.0108 
Regions               
European 0.0098 0.0103 0.0100 0.0111 0.0118 20 0.0106 
Asia-Pacific 0.0082 0.0080 0.0077 0.0097 0.0097 18 0.0087 
NAFTA 0.0126 0.0122 0.0121 0.0129 0.0141 12 0.0128 
Source: Trade data are taken from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade data set. We have 
no data for China from 1968 to 1976.  
Notes: Trade intensity is measured by ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
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 and an average 
value obtained using the values from the country pairs. % of changes is calculated by (TIPeriod5- TIPeriod1)/ 
TIPeriod1*100. Asia-Pacific region includes Australia, China, Hong Kong, Japan, and New Zealand; 
NAFTA includes Canada, Mexico and USA; all other 16 European countries are in European region. 
All data reported in this table are without natural log. 
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Table 3-10 
Bilateral Trade Intensity normalised by GDP across Country Pairs 
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Australia                         
Austria 0.04                        
Belgium & 
Luxembourg 0.16 0.40                       
Canada 0.21 0.06 0.16                      
China 0.34 0.07 0.11 0.28                     
Denmark 0.05 0.26 0.50 0.06 0.06                    
Finland 0.08 0.20 0.46 0.04 0.08 0.75                   
France 0.14 0.23 2.68 0.17 0.14 0.24 0.16                  
Germany 0.21 1.59 2.56 0.25 0.32 0.77 0.38 2.41                 
Greece 0.03 0.15 0.26 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.31                
Hong Kong 0.46 0.11 0.31 0.19 4.02 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.22 0.03               
Ireland 0.06 0.09 0.38 0.07 0.02 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.24 0.07 0.09              
Italy 0.18 0.63 0.88 0.18 0.17 0.25 0.14 1.77 2.10 0.30 0.17 0.12             
Japan 0.66 0.04 0.10 0.42 0.74 0.06 0.04 0.18 0.39 0.05 0.52 0.04 0.12            
Mexico 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.30 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.14 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.14           
Netherlands 0.18 0.49 6.80 0.22 0.23 0.75 0.46 1.33 3.26 0.31 0.41 0.52 1.02 0.19 0.06          
New Zealand 1.07 0.02 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.27 0.05 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.06         
Norway 0.05 0.15 0.42 0.20 0.04 1.44 0.65 0.24 0.54 0.06 0.11 0.19 0.12 0.07 0.01 0.64 0.02        
Portugal 0.02 0.14 0.35 0.03 0.01 0.19 0.14 0.28 0.28 0.05 0.04 0.11 0.19 0.02 0.02 0.31 0.02 0.19       
Spain 0.06 0.15 0.49 0.07 0.11 0.14 0.12 1.07 0.76 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.63 0.07 0.19 0.55 0.01 0.11 0.70      
Sweden 0.16 0.38 0.90 0.13 0.10 2.29 1.76 0.39 0.97 0.13 0.20 0.22 0.33 0.09 0.06 1.00 0.05 2.33 0.24 0.24     
Switzerland 0.13 1.21 0.99 0.13 0.11 0.39 0.25 0.89 1.64 0.12 0.54 0.20 1.00 0.15 0.11 0.75 0.04 0.21 0.23 0.29 0.49    
UK 0.63 0.25 1.35 0.72 0.19 0.73 0.47 1.24 1.58 0.14 0.48 1.51 0.83 0.32 0.07 1.59 0.37 0.93 0.29 0.57 0.99 0.59   
USA 0.19 0.04 0.17 2.58 0.28 0.06 0.04 0.34 0.61 0.02 0.31 0.07 0.28 1.20 0.84 0.22 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.57  
Average 0.22 0.29 0.90 0.29 0.33 0.42 0.28 0.61 1.00 0.11 0.50 0.21 0.53 0.25 0.10 0.88 0.11 0.38 0.17 0.29 0.60 0.47 0.74 0.35
S.D. 0.26 0.39 1.47 0.52 0.82 0.54 0.38 0.68 1.00 0.09 1.23 0.30 0.57 0.29 0.17 1.24 0.21 0.54 0.16 0.27 0.70 0.51 0.49 0.55
Notes: All the data source and measurement are the same with Table 3-8 and they are present as %.  
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Table 3-11 
Bilateral Trade Intensity normalised by Total Trade across Country Pairs 
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Australia                         
Austria 0.12                        
Belgium & 
Luxembourg 0.29 0.50                       
Canada 0.54 0.12 0.29                      
China 1.59 0.25 0.25 0.73                     
Denmark 0.15 0.52 0.62 0.12 0.20                    
Finland 0.24 0.41 0.54 0.09 0.27 1.54                   
France 0.45 0.61 6.12 0.44 0.41 0.67 0.47                  
Germany 0.55 3.75 5.42 0.60 0.75 1.89 0.94 6.61                 
Greece 0.11 0.38 0.33 0.05 0.07 0.28 0.29 0.51 0.78                
Hong Kong 0.92 0.13 0.26 0.30 8.66 0.18 0.10 0.23 0.46 0.03               
Ireland 0.15 0.13 0.37 0.12 0.06 0.29 0.27 0.49 0.52 0.12 0.06              
Italy 0.59 1.81 1.91 0.48 0.51 0.73 0.40 5.41 5.56 0.90 0.35 0.31             
Japan 3.33 0.22 0.42 1.73 3.58 0.30 0.21 0.77 1.47 0.27 2.36 0.21 0.56            
Mexico 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.64 0.17 0.06 0.06 0.29 0.38 0.01 0.11 0.07 0.29 0.74           
Netherlands 0.34 0.68 7.89 0.40 0.43 1.03 0.64 3.13 6.93 0.44 0.38 0.59 2.23 0.76 0.13          
New Zealand 3.58 0.04 0.12 0.16 0.27 0.07 0.06 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.27 0.09 0.14 0.59 0.07 0.09         
Norway 0.14 0.32 0.52 0.42 0.16 2.87 1.33 0.67 1.32 0.15 0.11 0.29 0.37 0.36 0.03 0.87 0.04        
Portugal 0.08 0.31 0.40 0.07 0.04 0.38 0.30 0.78 0.65 0.14 0.04 0.17 0.55 0.11 0.07 0.40 0.05 0.39       
Spain 0.21 0.43 0.91 0.18 0.31 0.43 0.37 3.14 1.93 0.31 0.16 0.35 1.91 0.35 0.77 1.04 0.05 0.37 2.03      
Sweden 0.46 0.80 1.26 0.29 0.28 4.80 3.76 1.16 2.43 0.32 0.25 0.39 0.95 0.41 0.19 1.54 0.12 4.99 0.53 0.71     
Switzerland 0.36 2.39 1.30 0.28 0.32 0.79 0.50 2.62 3.91 0.28 0.67 0.31 2.75 0.70 0.34 1.10 0.09 0.41 0.48 0.85 1.03    
UK 1.90 0.61 2.71 1.85 0.53 1.89 1.21 3.38 3.79 0.37 1.00 3.64 2.27 1.31 0.22 3.21 1.08 2.28 0.75 1.58 2.52 1.42   
USA 1.46 0.27 1.17 16.09 1.45 0.46 0.28 2.13 3.42 0.17 1.81 0.46 1.91 8.30 5.21 1.40 0.34 0.41 0.21 0.96 0.86 0.88 3.55  
Average 0.77 0.65 1.47 1.13 0.93 0.89 0.62 1.75 2.48 0.27 1.06 0.42 1.49 1.26 0.42 1.50 0.32 0.82 0.38 0.84 1.33 1.04 1.92 2.28
S.D. 0.98 0.87 2.11 3.29 1.85 1.11 0.79 1.85 2.32 0.21 2.84 0.72 1.54 1.82 1.06 1.90 0.69 1.13 0.42 0.74 1.46 1.06 1.13 3.47
Notes: All the data source and measurement are the same with Table 3-9 and they are present as %. 
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Bilateral trade intensities also vary across countries and we would like to identify the 
different effects from their partners. Table 3-10 shows the bilateral trade intensity 
normalised by nominal GDP for the whole period (1959-2003). 
The results confirm the gravity model theory again that closer countries or countries 
within the same region have more bilateral trade. We find that Australia and New 
Zealand have 1.07% bilateral trade intensity, 2.58% for US and Canada, 1.51% for the 
UK and Ireland and their intensities are much higher than the average value, 0.42%. The 
Nordic region has high intra bilateral trade intensity. Most of their bilateral values are 
greater than one and some even are greater than two. China and Hong Kong are very 
close and part of China’s import and export are through Hong Kong, therefore their 
bilateral trade intensity (4.02%) is very high. Another finding from Table 3-10 is that the 
bilateral trade intensity between core European countries which include 6 initial 
European Community (EC) members Belgium-Luxembourg, Germany, France, Italy and 
the Netherlands plus UK are very high and most of them are greater than one. This also 
proved that currency union do have an important effect on trade and improve the bilateral 
trade intensity. 
The bilateral trade intensity normalised by total trade in Table 3-11 shows a more 
significant result that closer country-pairs or country pairs in the same region present 
higher values. We find the USA has extremely high trade intensities with Canada, 
Mexico, Japan, which are 16.09%, 5.21%, 8.3% respectively. Amongst the Asia-Pacific 
regions, Australia – New Zealand, Australia – Japan, Japan-China, Japan-Hong Kong and 
China-Hong Kong all have high intensities. The Nordic region, including Denmark, 
Finland, Norway, and Sweden and Core European countries, have high bilateral trade 
intensities as well. However the country pairs that are far from each other or not are in the 
same region, such as Portugal - Greece and Norway and Mexico show very low 
intensities.  
As we said, difference between both bilateral trade measures will arise when at least one 
of the economies has a low level of openness. Therefore we would like to have a look at 
the openness for each individual country across five periods. If traded goods and services 
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constitute a large proportion of the economy, then exchange rate uncertainty is a more 
serious issue for the country in the aggregate. Such an economy may be too small and too 
open to have an independent floating currency. Table 3-12 presents average trade 
openness for 24 countries. The openness is measured by country’s total trade with world 
divided by its nominal GDP as follows: 
Table 3-12 
Average Trade Openness 
 Periods 
Countries 1959-67 1968-76 1977-85 1986-94 1995-03 Change (%) 1959-03
Australia 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.28 0.34 39 0.30 
Austria 0.33 0.44 0.51 0.52 0.66 102 0.57 
Belgium & 
Luxembourg 0.66 0.91 1.11 1.10 1.22 84 1.13 
Canada 0.31 0.40 0.47 0.48 0.68 120 0.55 
China 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.37 0.46 26329 0.36 
Denmark 0.48 0.48 0.53 0.49 0.55 15 0.52 
Finland 0.35 0.44 0.51 0.43 0.58 68 0.50 
France 0.17 0.29 0.37 0.35 0.43 157 0.38 
Germany 0.28 0.37 0.47 0.43 0.49 73 0.46 
Greece 0.21 0.27 0.31 0.32 0.32 54 0.31 
Hong Kong 1.04 1.35 1.53 2.23 2.43 135 2.25 
Ireland 0.55 0.72 0.93 0.97 1.17 113 1.07 
Italy 0.21 0.31 0.39 0.32 0.40 95 0.36 
Japan 0.15 0.22 0.23 0.15 0.17 15 0.17 
Mexico 0.10 0.11 0.18 0.29 0.60 525 0.40 
Netherlands 0.64 0.76 0.87 0.82 0.99 56 0.90 
New Zealand 0.35 0.40 0.48 0.43 0.47 33 0.45 
Norway 0.44 0.51 0.53 0.49 0.51 17 0.50 
Portugal 0.30 0.35 0.47 0.52 0.54 82 0.51 
Spain 0.14 0.21 0.26 0.29 0.40 186 0.33 
Sweden 0.34 0.45 0.48 0.43 0.61 77 0.51 
Switzerland 0.43 0.47 0.55 0.54 0.60 41 0.56 
UK 0.29 0.39 0.43 0.40 0.42 43 0.41 
USA 0.07 0.11 0.15 0.16 0.19 176 0.16 
Average 0.34 0.42 0.51 0.53 0.63 89 0.57 
Regions        
European 0.37 0.46 0.55 0.54 0.63 72.23 0.58 
Asia-Pacific 0.36 0.44 0.54 0.69 0.77 117.19 0.71 
NAFTA 0.16 0.21 0.27 0.31 0.49 210.81 0.37 
Notes: The trade data come from IMF, Direction of Trade data set and nominal GDP come from 
SourceOECD, Economic Outlook. All the data are annually and denoted by US dollars. Bold mark values 
are high openness values which are greater than 1. The openness for each individual country is average 
value in periods. 
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,   (3-4) 
where total trade is import plus export of country i with world during period t. Both trade 
and nominal GDP are annual data and expressed by US dollars.  
All countries show increasing trends openness over time and foreign trade has become 
increasingly important for some countries, such as China, Hong Kong, Mexico and Spain. 
In this case, we find China’s change percentage is very large if we compare the last 
period with the first period. Between 1960 and 1962, China suffered a serious natural 
disaster and a cultural revolution lasted for ten years from 1966 to 1976. Both happened 
in our first two periods. In these years, the international trade of China is nearly zero. 
After 1979, China changed policy and it became more and more open and bilateral trade 
with other countries increased very fast. 
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Figure 3-3. Openness for Average values and three regions 
Source: Table 3-10 
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In January 1994, Canada, the United States and Mexico launched the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and formed the world’s largest free trade area. Mexico 
appears benefited significantly from this. During 1977 to 1985, Mexico’s bilateral trade 
with the world is 29 billion US dollars and it increased to 77 billion US dollars in 1986-
1994 and then jump to 282 billion US dollars in 1995-2003 after joining NAFTA. The 
percentage change increases from 1.65 for 3rd and 4th period to 2.63 for 4th and 5th period. 
However their GDP growth keeps constant. Therefore, Mexico appears to have had a 
sharp increase of its openness from 29% to 60%.  
The last column is the average openness across the whole period. Based on the average 
openness, we divide our sample into two groups, a high openness group and a low 
openness group. 12 out of the 24 countries are found to have a high level of openness, 
defined as 50% or more of nominal GDP accounted for by international trade. We report 
three regions’ average openness in the second panel of Table 3-10 and Figure 3-3 as well. 
The NAFTA has relative low openness to other regions. In the first three periods, both 
Asia-Pacific and European regions have similar openness with the average value. From 
fourth period, Asia-Pacific countries increase their openness since both China and Hong 
Kong increase openness rapidly; however, European countries decrease their openness a 
little bit in the fourth period and then increase in the last period.  
 
3.5 The Business Cycle Correlation Analysis – Across 
Countries and Periods  
Again we investigate the changes of real GDP correlations across time and across country 
pairs. Table 3-13 presents the average bilateral correlation between individual counties 
with their 23 partners for the five sub-periods and the full sample. As can be seen from 
the first five columns, the point estimates of the degree of synchronization change over 
time. Most countries, particularly for those from Europe, show similar trends. They 
synchronised business cycles in the first three periods and correlations decrease in the 
fourth period then increase again in the last period. 
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The sixth column reports the percentage change between last period and first period and 
all European countries have significant increases. Nevertheless, some non-European 
countries, such as Hong Kong, Mexico, and the USA see a fall in their average business 
cycle correlation. This result also is found by Heathcote and Perri (2003)’s that “over the 
Table 3-13 
Average Real GDP Correlations de-trended by HP-filter 
Periods 
Countries  1959-67 1968-76 1977-85 1986-94 1995-03 Change (%) 1959-03
Australia 0.00 0.63 0.42 0.25 0.65 13605 0.39 
Austria 0.34 0.71 0.71 0.59 0.67 97 0.60 
Belgium & 
Luxembourg 0.30 0.70 0.76 0.62 0.68 126 0.61 
Canada 0.23 -0.03 0.36 0.21 0.41 80 0.24 
China 0.20 0.15  0.05 0.01 0.46 128 0.18 
Denmark 0.26 0.69 0.71 0.57 0.68 166 0.58 
Finland 0.34 0.46 0.72 0.54 0.69 104 0.55 
France 0.28 0.58 0.77 0.61 0.68 141 0.58 
Germany 0.16 0.67 0.73 0.50 0.67 329 0.55 
Greece 0.16 0.23 0.74 0.56 0.69 343 0.48 
Hong Kong 0.24 0.30 0.55 0.19 -0.12 -151 0.23 
Ireland 0.19 0.52 0.75 0.59 0.67 256 0.54 
Italy -0.38 0.62 0.76 0.58 0.61 261 0.44 
Japan -0.21 0.46 0.42 0.20 0.32 252 0.24 
Mexico 0.24 0.42 0.27 -0.40 -0.40 -263 0.03 
Netherlands 0.20 0.67 0.72 0.59 0.67 233 0.57 
New Zealand 0.27 0.56 0.66 0.41 0.62 132 0.50 
Norway 0.20 0.54 0.75 0.62 0.62 210 0.54 
Portugal 0.06 0.59 0.60 0.53 0.69 1136 0.49 
Spain 0.16 0.60 0.75 0.54 0.67 317 0.54 
Sweden 0.27 0.50 0.75 0.59 0.68 153 0.56 
Switzerland 0.23 0.69 0.71 0.58 0.59 156 0.56 
UK 0.33 0.61 0.75 0.63 0.46 41 0.56 
USA 0.16 0.37 0.15 0.16 -0.09 -154 0.15 
Average 0.18 0.51 0.61 0.43 0.51 737 0.45 
Regions               
European 0.18 0.58 0.73 0.57 0.66 261 0.55 
Asia-Pacific 0.10 0.42 0.42 0.21 0.39 291 0.31 
NAFTA 0.21 0.26 0.26 -0.01 -0.02 -111 0.14 
Source: SourceOECD Economics Outlook. 
Notes: Average real GDP correlations calculated using the individual correlations from each country vis-à-
vis their 23 partners. Bold marks are the negative correlations. 
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last 40 years the USA business cycle has become less synchronised with the cycle in the 
rest of the world since financial integration has played the major role in producing the 
observed changes in international co-movement” (p.63). The last column is the average 
GDP correlations for the whole period. All European countries present consistent and 
high GDP correlations that are around 50%-60%, and most non-European countries 
relatively low business cycle correlations. 
We report the three regions average business cycle correlations in the second panel of 
Table 3-13 and Figure 3-4. European countries have the highest correlations which start 
from a low correlation, 0.18 and increase rapidly to the highest value, 0.73, in the third 
period then decrease to 0.57 and increase again to 0.66. Asia-Pacific countries have the 
similar trend to the European countries’ but the values are much lower. The NAFTA 
countries’ business cycles are different with others. They start from a high average 
correlation (0.21) in the first period and keep in a consistent level in the following two 
periods and then decrease sharply to negative correlations which mainly because Mexico 
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Figure 3-4. Correlations de-trended by HP-filter for Average Values and Regions 
Source: Table 3-13 
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have -0.40 correlations in the last periods and there are only three members in NAFTA. 
Their average correlation (0.14) also is the lowest values in three regions. 
Table 3-14 reports the real GDP correlations de-trended by first differences. Most 
correlations are still positive and European countries also have relative higher values. 
European countries have consistent and high correlations which are around 40%-60%, 
Table 3-14 
Average Real GDP Correlations de-trended by First Differences 
Periods 
Countries   1959-67 1968-76 1977-85 1986-94 1995-03 Change (%) 1959-03
Australia -0.14 0.61 0.26 0.16 0.59 515 0.30 
Austria 0.29 0.65 0.60 0.63 0.64 126 0.56 
Belgium & 
Luxembourg 0.28 0.68 0.68 0.65 0.66 134 0.59 
Canada 0.17 0.05 -0.01 0.25 0.44 159 0.18 
China 0.05 0.24 0.00 -0.11 0.33 583 0.10 
Denmark 0.18 0.64 0.61 0.63 0.66 270 0.54 
Finland 0.30 0.60 0.56 0.60 0.66 121 0.54 
France 0.41 0.54 0.68 0.64 0.64 56 0.58 
Germany 0.31 0.67 0.64 0.59 0.65 106 0.57 
Greece 0.18 0.21 0.62 0.62 0.64 252 0.45 
Hong Kong 0.24 0.17 0.32 0.37 -0.14 -158 0.19 
Ireland 0.07 0.46 0.66 0.63 0.66 839 0.50 
Italy -0.31 0.50 0.66 0.64 0.59 293 0.42 
Japan -0.01 0.45 0.17 0.45 0.41 3188 0.29 
Mexico 0.25 0.21 0.41 -0.41 -0.55 -317 -0.02 
Netherlands 0.14 0.65 0.63 0.63 0.64 371 0.54 
New Zealand 0.14 0.49 0.55 0.31 0.59 331 0.41 
Norway 0.01 0.51 0.67 0.65 0.60 7134 0.49 
Portugal -0.04 0.63 0.44 0.59 0.66 1619 0.45 
Spain 0.07 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.64 868 0.51 
Sweden 0.31 0.57 0.64 0.64 0.66 117 0.56 
Switzerland 0.09 0.62 0.59 0.63 0.58 582 0.50 
UK 0.29 0.59 0.67 0.67 0.48 68 0.54 
USA 0.04 0.23 0.20 0.20 -0.13 -452 0.11 
Average 0.14 0.48 0.49 0.47 0.48 700 0.41 
 Regions               
European 0.15 0.57 0.62 0.63 0.64 322.15 0.52 
Asia-Pacific 0.05 0.39 0.26 0.24 0.36 567.89 0.26 
NAFTA 0.15 0.16 0.20 0.01 -0.08 -153.25 0.09 
Source: SourceOECD Economics Outlook. 
Notes: Average real GDP correlations calculated using the individual correlations from each country vis-à- 
vis their 23 partners. Bold marks are the negative correlations. 
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however, non-European countries such as China, Mexico and US have very low even 
negative correlations. Regarding to the average countries correlations (Figure 3-5), we 
find that after sharply increase between the first and second period, the correlations 
stabilize (around 48%) for the following periods. European countries are similar with the 
average countries but have higher correlations. Asia-Pacific countries increase 
correlations in the second period and decrease in the third and fourth period, then increase 
again in the last period. NAFTA countries are the same with before, in the first two 
periods, their correlations increase a little bit and then decrease to negative. 
Table 3-13 and Table 3-14 analyze the correlation variations over time, and we also 
should investigate differences of bilateral correlations across country-pairs. Table 3-15 
reports the correlations coefficients matrix of real GDP de-trended by HP filter for our 24 
sample countries over whole period. The bilateral correlations are not like bilateral trade 
intensity which depend on the locations and distance between countries. We find that all 
European countries have high correlations with European partners. Some European 
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Figure 3-5. Correlations de-trended by HP-filter for Average Values and Regions 
Source: Table 3-14. 
 77
country pairs’ correlations are even above 90%. However, non-European countries have 
relative low correlations with European countries and non-European countries and most 
of them are below 50%. For example, Belgium and Luxembourg have very high 
correlations with other 15 European partners and the average value is 89%, however they 
only have 24% correlation with other 8 non-European countries. We only find Australia – 
New Zealand has 76% correlation which is the only high correlation in non-European 
groups. It is probable can be explained by closer countries and higher bilateral trade result 
in closer business cycle which also is the topic we will prove in later chapters. 
Table 3-16 reports the bilateral correlations of real GDP de-trended by first differences 
for the whole period. Their values are less than the correlations in Table 3-15 but still 
indicate the same phenomenon that European countries have obviously higher 
correlations with European countries than non-European countries with European or non-
European countries.  
From both Table 3-15 and Table 3-16, we find that many European country pairs’ 
correlations are very high. “When assessing the significance of these correlations, it is 
desirable to exclude that part accounted for by the international business cycle, for only 
deviations from common movements are important in assessing the suitability of a group 
of countries for monetary unification” (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1994, p.17). Therefore, 
we follow Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) to remove the international business cycles 
and check whether the real business cycles are still positive or not. We select the Group 
of Three (G-3) countries which is the same with Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) – 
Germany, Japan, and the United States – as the basis for our choice of the underlying 
correlation. Based on the Kendall and Stuart (1967)’s method, the correlation coefficients 
between three countries are approximately 0.40, so 0.40 is used as the null hypothesis.  
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Table 3-15 
Correlation Coefficient Matrix for Real GDP de-trended by HP Filter 
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Australia                         
Austria 0.33                        
Belgium & 
Luxembourg 0.38 0.96                       
Canada 0.64 0.09 0.14                      
China 0.28 0.96 0.95 0.07                     
Denmark 0.61 0.72 0.74 0.48 0.71                    
Finland 0.38 0.95 0.97 0.12 0.94 0.73                   
France 0.28 0.96 0.95 0.03 0.94 0.65 0.91                  
Germany 0.51 0.83 0.86 0.27 0.82 0.75 0.85 0.85                 
Greece 0.40 0.86 0.89 0.13 0.84 0.76 0.88 0.86 0.90                
Hong Kong 0.41 0.88 0.90 0.18 0.84 0.72 0.90 0.87 0.87 0.94               
Ireland 0.17 0.50 0.54 -0.09 0.54 0.18 0.49 0.54 0.45 0.34 0.32              
Italy 0.31 0.99 0.98 0.08 0.97 0.70 0.95 0.96 0.84 0.87 0.88 0.52             
Japan 0.76 0.53 0.51 0.42 0.52 0.70 0.48 0.47 0.52 0.53 0.44 0.25 0.50            
Mexico 0.46 0.88 0.90 0.16 0.88 0.78 0.91 0.83 0.79 0.83 0.85 0.32 0.88 0.58           
Netherlands 0.56 0.74 0.75 0.35 0.65 0.74 0.79 0.69 0.70 0.72 0.78 0.24 0.71 0.49 0.80          
New Zealand 0.52 0.83 0.85 0.33 0.79 0.84 0.87 0.80 0.83 0.88 0.90 0.22 0.82 0.57 0.86 0.86         
Norway 0.53 0.79 0.84 0.37 0.79 0.84 0.85 0.77 0.81 0.83 0.88 0.27 0.80 0.47 0.89 0.82 0.90        
Portugal 0.35 0.92 0.92 0.06 0.92 0.71 0.90 0.90 0.80 0.82 0.80 0.53 0.93 0.57 0.82 0.66 0.76 0.71       
Spain 0.52 0.78 0.83 0.29 0.75 0.77 0.82 0.77 0.84 0.92 0.88 0.36 0.77 0.60 0.75 0.73 0.86 0.78 0.75      
Sweden 0.15 0.17 0.25 0.20 0.30 0.05 0.22 0.18 0.23 0.13 0.14 0.50 0.20 0.13 0.11 -0.12 0.08 0.12 0.23 0.21     
Switzerland-0.01 0.12 0.13 -0.06 0.22 0.20 0.07 0.20 0.14 0.16 0.01 0.16 0.11 0.35 0.05 -0.11 0.07 0.04 0.23 0.23 0.16    
UK 0.32 0.28 0.33 0.32 0.29 0.25 0.21 0.34 0.31 0.19 0.17 0.50 0.25 0.42 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.21 0.28 0.32 0.35 0.41   
USA 0.27 -0.13 -0.02 0.14 -0.17 -0.05 0.03 -0.10 -0.01 0.07 0.08 -0.09 -0.14 -0.07 -0.07 0.20 0.15 0.11 -0.13 0.24 0.11 -0.05 0.02  
Average 0.40 0.65 0.68 0.21 0.64 0.59 0.66 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.34 0.65 0.47 0.63 0.56 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.18 0.12 0.28 0.02
s.d. 0.17 0.34 0.32 0.18 0.33 0.27 0.33 0.33 0.28 0.31 0.33 0.19 0.34 0.18 0.33 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.31 0.24 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.13
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Table 3-16 
Correlation coefficient for real GDP de-trended by First Differences 
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Australia                         
Austria 0.15                        
Belgium & 
Luxembourg 0.38 0.85                       
Canada 0.32 0.23 0.12                      
China 0.20 0.07 0.09 0.11                     
Denmark 0.20 0.87 0.86 0.15 0.11                    
Finland 0.27 0.75 0.70 0.32 0.22 0.70                   
France 0.27 0.92 0.93 0.13 0.15 0.93 0.71                  
Germany 0.18 0.90 0.88 0.15 0.19 0.85 0.78 0.87                 
Greece 0.32 0.72 0.64 0.28 0.06 0.58 0.62 0.72 0.72                
Hong Kong 0.24 0.18 0.24 0.39 0.06 0.17 0.30 0.15 0.33 0.16               
Ireland 0.32 0.65 0.79 -0.04 0.07 0.57 0.63 0.72 0.70 0.74 0.16              
Italy 0.26 0.59 0.59 0.02 0.09 0.55 0.48 0.54 0.64 0.67 0.07 0.77             
Japan 0.16 0.49 0.51 0.07 -0.06 0.52 0.18 0.49 0.47 0.41 -0.02 0.33 0.36            
Mexico 0.27 -0.05 0.01 0.12 -0.14 -0.15-0.14 0.10 -0.13 0.03 -0.05 -0.09-0.17-0.12           
Netherlands 0.39 0.76 0.94 0.00 -0.01 0.83 0.60 0.87 0.81 0.52 0.29 0.73 0.58 0.40 -0.12          
New Zealand 0.46 0.56 0.44 0.42 0.11 0.50 0.67 0.42 0.55 0.50 0.13 0.34 0.28 0.19 -0.09 0.38         
Norway 0.26 0.75 0.74 0.10 0.36 0.70 0.63 0.66 0.68 0.66 0.52 0.72 0.61 0.36 -0.01 0.71 0.36        
Portugal 0.52 0.52 0.72 0.11 0.01 0.54 0.52 0.61 0.62 0.58 0.09 0.67 0.59 0.22 -0.07 0.77 0.24 0.66       
Spain 0.24 0.74 0.71 0.14 0.01 0.65 0.83 0.72 0.81 0.67 0.05 0.76 0.76 0.25 0.03 0.64 0.56 0.60 0.57      
Sweden 0.42 0.74 0.86 0.15 -0.01 0.69 0.74 0.86 0.77 0.70 0.19 0.80 0.63 0.40 -0.16 0.76 0.37 0.75 0.69 0.74     
Switzerland 0.30 0.75 0.73 0.11 0.13 0.73 0.67 0.68 0.79 0.65 0.21 0.58 0.50 0.29 0.17 0.78 0.55 0.74 0.69 0.63 0.60    
UK 0.42 0.71 0.73 0.30 0.12 0.61 0.71 0.79 0.67 0.74 0.17 0.75 0.52 0.28 -0.15 0.62 0.59 0.55 0.55 0.67 0.74 0.56   
USA 0.28 0.06 0.11 0.37 0.30 0.22 0.02 0.16 0.04 0.03 0.22 -0.16-0.08 0.23 0.19 0.10 0.29 -0.12-0.06-0.02 0.04 0.10 0.18  
Average 0.30 0.56 0.59 0.18 0.10 0.54 0.51 0.58 0.57 0.51 0.19 0.50 0.42 0.29 -0.02 0.54 0.41 0.49 0.45 0.51 0.56 0.50 0.54 0.11
S.D. 0.10 0.30 0.29 0.13 0.12 0.28 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.24 0.13 0.32 0.29 0.17 0.13 0.30 0.15 0.29 0.26 0.30 0.26 0.27 0.20 0.14
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We calculated a uniform critical value of r=0.83 that can be employed for all country 
pairs 32 . In both tables, we mark bold for significantly positive correlations after 
considering international business cycle. It is very clear that European countries are 
significantly positive correlated with European partners and the correlations of non-
European countries are insignificant after removing international business cycle in Table 
3-15. But in Table 3-16 only part of European country pairs have significant and positive 
correlations after removing international effects. 
We report both variables’ statistical descriptions in Table 3-17. Three bilateral trade 
observations are missing since there is no trade data between China and Hong Kong in 
our second period and no trade data between China and Mexico in the first two periods. 
The lowest bilateral trade intensities for both normalisations are between US and China in 
the first period since China was really close at that time. The highest bilateral trade 
intensities are between Belgium-Luxembourg and the Netherlands when trade intensity 
normalised by GDP and between US and Canada when trade intensity normalised by total 
                                                 
32 Kendall and Stuart (1967) present the equation ( ) ( )[ ]rr −+ 1/1lnμ  to calculate the critical value. The 
statistic ( ) ( )[ ]rr −+ 1/1lnμ  is distributed approximately normally, with a mean of ( ) ( )[ ]ρρμ −+ 1/1ln  and a 
variance of group countries, where μ  is the average group correlation; r is the estimated correlation 
coefficient and ρ  is the null value of the correlation coefficient. The 5 percent significance level will be 
used to estimate the critical value. Therefore our equation is: 0.4xln[(1+r)/(1-r)]=95% and the critical 
value can be calculated r=0.83 under 95% confidential level and r=0.81 under 90% confidential level. 
Table 3-17 
Variables Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Trade1 1377 0.0041 0.01 0.0000 0.0801 
Trade2 1377 0.0107 0.02 0.0000 0.1732 
GDP-HP 1380 0.45 0.43 -0.8957 0.9984 
GDP-DI 1380 0.41 0.44 -0.8970 0.9987 
Notes: trade1 is bilateral trade intensity normalised by nominal GDP, trade2 is bilateral trade intensity 
normalised by total trade. GDP-HP is real GDP correlation de-trended by HP filter and GDP-DI is de-
trended by first differences. The trade data are without log. 
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trade, respectively. The lowest correlation de-trended by HP filter -0.8957 is from 
country pair of Italy and China in the first period and Japan-Mexico in the fourth period 
have the lowest real GDP de-trended by first differences. Austria - the Netherlands in the 
fourth and fifth period have the highest correlations for first different and HP filter 
respectively.  
 
3.6 Conclusions 
21 industrial countries plus China, Hong Kong and Mexico are selected for our sample 
since China, Hong Kong and Mexico are very important trading partners to these 21 
industrial countries. The sample starts from 1959 to 2003 and is split into five equal-sized 
sub-periods. This chapter defines two variables that will be used in our empirical analysis, 
the bilateral trade intensity and the business cycle correlation representing economic 
integration. The bilateral trade intensity is normalised by either nominal GDP or total 
trade since it is hard to say which one is more appropriate. From statistical analysis we 
find that the trade intensity becomes closer over time. Across country pairs, we find the 
bilateral trade intensity depends on the location and distance between country pairs. For 
example, Scandinavian countries have higher trade intensities with Scandinavian 
countries than with other European countries. U.S. and Canada present very high trade 
intensity as well. Real GDP correlation is used to measure the business cycles de-trended 
by HP filter or first differences. We find all the European countries have much higher 
correlations than non-European countries and economic integration increases over time. 
We also drop off the international business cycle effect from the correlations and only 
European countries have significant correlations with each other. This result is consistent 
with the OCA theory that countries with positively correlated business cycles are more 
likely to join and to gain from an optimum currency area.  
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Chapter 4 Econometric Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In OCA theory entry into a currency union may increase international trade intensity. 
And also, high international trade can be expected to affect the nature of national business 
cycles. Countries that enter a currency union are likely to experience dramatically 
different business cycles than before. In part this will reflect the adoption of a common 
monetary policy; but it will also be a result of closer international trade with the other 
members of the union. However, if the OCA criteria are endogenous closer international 
trade could result in either tighter or looser correlations of national business cycle 
depending on inter-industry or intra-industry trade accounts for most bi-lateral trade.  
In this chapter we would like to implement a formal model to investigate the relationship 
between trade intensity and the business cycle correlation based on the theory in chapter 
2. In the previous chapter we defined the ratios of bilateral trade between country i and j 
to their total GDP or total trade as trade intensity and the real GDP correlation. From the 
statistical analysis we found that the trade intensity in our sample becomes higher over 
time, but the GDP correlations do not have a clear trend. The European countries have 
much closer correlations than non-European countries. We will start from Ordinary Least 
Squares model to estimate the relationship empirically. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: section 4.2 outlines the model for 
estimation; section 4.3 considers two-stage least squares estimation considering the 
endogeneity of trade; Section 4.4 develops a panel data framework including both fixed 
and random effects model and considers the unobservable country-pair specific effects. 
Section 4.5 introduces the two-stage panel data model; Section 4.6 provides concluding 
remarks. 
 
 83
4.2 A Simple Ordinary Least Squares Model 
In this section, we estimate the effect of trade on business cycle. Firstly, the simplest 
linear model which specifies a linear relationship between the dependent variable 
business cycle correlation and the single explanatory variable trade intensity is: 
tijtijtij TICorr ,,, εβα ++=     (4-1) 
where Corrij,t denotes the correlation between country i  and country j  over time span t 
of real GDP de-trended by HP-filter and first differences. TIij,t denotes the natural 
logarithm of the average bilateral trade intensity between country i  and country j over 
time span t using trade intensity normalised by either nominal GDP or total trade. Finally 
the error term tij ,ε  is assumed to be independently and identically distributed with mean 
zero and represents all other influences on real GDP correlations above and beyond the 
influences of international trade. It is also assumed to be independent of trade: 
0][ ,, =tijtij TIE ε . The least squares line (equation (4-1)) is the line with the minimum sum 
of squared deviations comparing observed values of the country-pair correlations to 
corresponding values from the estimated correlations. The least squares estimates of 
intercept and slope, α  and β , are the regression coefficients to be estimated. In this 
regression, we would like to focus on the slope coefficient β  from sign and size. The 
sign of the slope can tell us the effects from trade on business cycle are positively or 
negatively (in which case, coefficient would be expected to be significantly positive). The 
size of the coefficient allows us to quantify the economic importance of this effect.  
 
4.3 The Endogeneity of Trade – Two-Stage Least Squares 
Estimation and the Gravity Model 
A simple Ordinary Least Squares regression of bilateral real GDP correlation on trade 
intensity might be inappropriate. The equation (4-1) assumes that the error term tij ,ε  
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should be uncorrelated with TIij,t. However, countries are likely to peg their currencies 
deliberately to those of their most important trading partners, in order to capture gains 
associated with greater exchange rate stability. This implies that the two countries will 
operate monetary policy in a similar fashion, since pegging is a form of monetary policy 
coordination that may increase business-cycle correlation. In the OLS regression, it is not 
only the trade of goods and services that cause the business cycles to be correlated but 
rather the operation of economic policies and other influences. Therefore the assumption 
in OLS that TIij,t is uncorrelated with the error term may not exist any more and using the 
OLS may give a bias result. OLS cannot identify the separate contribution from trade and 
the contribution from the common policies enacted because of close trading relationship. 
To identify the effect of bilateral trade patterns on business cycle correlation, we need 
exogenous determinants of bilateral trade patterns to use as instrumental variables which 
are highly correlated with bilateral trade intensity. 
As Rose (2001) said, the gravity model explains the flow of international trade between a 
pair of countries and has a remarkably consistent history of success as an empirical tool. 
Frankel and Romer (1999) applied the gravity model for bilateral trade to explain income 
determinants. They find that bilateral trade is negatively related to the distance between 
country pairs and positively related to their size. Therefore, their instrumental variables 
for trade are distance between country pairs, log of population and log of area for country 
i and country j, and a dummy variable whether country pair landlocked. Frankel and Rose 
(1998) use log of distance, adjacency dummy and common language as instrumental 
variables to estimate bilateral trade intensity to eliminate the endogenous bias in business 
cycle equation. Frankel and Rose (2002) again use the gravity model to find good 
instrumental variables for trade intensity to estimate the real income. Distance, country 
j’s population, common language, common border, product of area and the landlocked 
are selected as instruments in the first stage.  
A country’s geographical position is a powerful determinant of bilateral trade that is not 
affected by the incomes of countries or by government policies. It is hard to imagine that 
geographical characteristics could have important effects on its business cycle and the 
only effects on business cycle are through trade. Therefore countries’ geographic 
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characteristics can be viewed as good instrumental variables for trade. As we reported in 
the last chapter that how far a country is from other countries provides considerable 
information about the amount that it trades. Distance acts as a deterrent to trade due to the 
increased transportation costs associated with longer distance. Hence distance between 
country pairs always is considered an important instrument.  
Bilateral trade is an increasing function of each economy’s size. To estimate international 
trade’s effect on business cycle, it is necessary to control for country size. In this thesis, 
we would like to follow Rose and Engel (2000) to adopt product of GDP per capita as a 
proxy to measure economy size.33 Dummy variables for sharing a common language and 
geographical adjacency also are important determinants of bilateral trade intensity which 
take the value of one when a country pair use the same official language or they share the 
common border. Hence our gravity equation for bilateral trade includes geographic 
characteristics: distances between country pairs, the product of GDP per capita, a dummy 
whether they share a common border, and a dummy when they use the same language.  
Apart from these geographic characteristics, there are another two important variables 
that should be considered in our gravity equation. A dummy variable to establish whether 
a free trade agreement has a significant effect on trade and it affects business cycle 
through trade. The variable is an average values across five years in a period. Another 
dummy variable whether countries peg their currencies with each other or with the third 
country or whether they are in the same currency union is always to be used in literatures 
to explain trade or business cycle. However, it is ambiguous whether fixed exchange rates 
affect the business cycle directly or through trade indirectly. The Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1994) argue that the high correlation among European economies is a result 
not of trade links, but of Europeans’ decision to relinquish monetary independence vis-à-
vis their neighbour. Frankel and Rose (1998) have the same view that more similar 
business cycles are more natural candidates for membership in a common currency area. 
Furthermore, the currency union itself might change the nature of bilateral business 
                                                 
33 The product of GDP per capita is justified, since gravity models predict that when two countries trade in 
imperfect substitutes, the variety of goods and services trade rises with size, contributing to a larger overall 
volume of trade as each or both economies grow (Micco et al., 2003) 
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cycles. Hence, they include the ‘fixed exchange rate’ in the business cycle correlation 
equation. Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005) also support that the effect of currency union to 
business cycle is a direct one.  
While part of the literature has considered the direct impact from fixed exchange rate on 
the business cycle, some studies find that the fixed exchange rate improve the bilateral 
trade by decreasing the exchange rate risk associated with trade contracts and the effect 
on income comes through the trade route. Frankel and Rose (2002) estimate the effect of 
common currencies on bilateral trade by the gravity model supplemental with a currency 
union dummy and find that currency union have a large effect in creating trade in almost 
8000 country-pair observations over 25 years. A country that joins a currency union 
experiences a tripling in its trade with the other members of the union and some of 
estimates of this effect are even higher. Furthermore they conclude that the effect of 
currency union on income comes through the trade route. Their results prove that fixed 
exchange rate is a good instrumental variable which is highly correlated with trade but 
not with income. Rose (2000, 2001) also finds an economically and statistically 
significant positive effect of a currency union on international trade in large data set, even 
after controlling for a host of features, including the endogenous nature of the exchange 
rate regime. Currency unions like EMU may lead to a large increase in international trade 
which is three times as much as the trade for countries with different currencies. This 
result is confirmed by Klein and Shambaugh (2006) as well. 
Rose and Engel (2000) find that currency union impacts both bilateral trade and business 
cycle. Based on the gravity model, Rose and Engel show a large effect of a common 
currency on trade controlled by traditional instrumental variables such as distance, 
product of GDP per capita, area, common language, common border and so on. This 
effect is not from the other omitted variables and is found to be statistically robust. At the 
same time, they also show that countries that are members of a common currency union 
tend to have more highly synchronised business cycles. The business cycle correlation is 
perhaps 0.1 higher on average for currency union members than for non-members. To 
identify the impact from fixed exchange rate on business cycle correlation is directly or 
indirectly through trade, we will do a test in the next chapter. 
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Therefore, our instrumental variables include common language, distance between 
country i and country j, common borders, common free trade agreement, product of GDP 
per capita and fixed exchange rate (we assume it is in the first stage initially). The two-
stage least squares estimation consists of the following two steps: (i) estimate the trade 
intensity by 6 instrumental variables using OLS, and retrieve the fitted trade intensity; 
then (ii) perform OLS estimation again using the fitted trade intensity from the first step. 
The equations are as follows: 
tijtijtijtijijijijtij FIXYYFTAADJDISLANTI ,,6,5,43210, ωϕϕϕϕϕϕϕ +++++++=   (4-2) 
tijtijtij ITCorr ,,, ˆ εβα ++=      (4-3) 
where TIij,t is the trade intensity normalised by either GDP or total trade which is from 
last chapter and tijIT ,ˆ is the estimated trade intensity from equation (4-2); LANij is a 
dummy variable which equals unity if the pair of countries share a common language, 1 
share the common language, 0 otherwise34; DISij denotes the natural logarithm of the 
distance between country i and j measured in kilometres35; ADJij is a dummy variable for 
geographic adjacency equalling one, if two countries share the common border; FTAij,t 
equals unity when both countries participate in a bilateral free trade agreement.36 For 
example, two countries are the member of the same free trade agreement since 1989, we 
set the dummy variable to equal one since 1989 and before 1989 the dummy is zero. 
FTAij,t for each period is the mean of 9 years. Variable YYij,t denotes the natural logarithm 
of product of GDP per capita measured by:  
 
Pop
Y
Pop
YYY
jt
jt
it
it
tij ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ×= ln,     (4-4) 
                                                 
34 Source: CIA, 2004. 
35 Source: FREIT, 2004. 
36 Specifically, a regional trade agreement under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or 
notified to the World Trade Organization (WTO). SourceWTO, 2004. Our free trade agreement data 
include those agreements that are still in force which come from WTO website and also include the expired 
agreements which come from WTO Trade Policies Review Division, Regional Trade Agreements Section. 
We acknowledge Roberto Fiorentino for receipt of the data. 
 88
We defined the fixed exchange rate as whether two countries have a direct or indirect 
fixed exchange rate or they are in the same currency union. A dummy variable will be 
used here and equals to 1 if there was a direct or indirect fixed exchange rate between 
countries i and j at time t or they are in the same currency union. We define the direct 
fixed exchange rate as whether both countries fixed their currencies (announced or 
unannounced) to each other. For example, a peg between HK Dollar and US Dollar 
existed from 1972, the dummy fixed exchange rate variable between Hong Kong and 
USA is one from 1972. The indirect fixed exchange rate is both countries had a peg by 
the same third country’s currency e.g. both Hong Kong and China would have had a peg 
to the US dollar, the dummy variable between Hong Kong and China is one.  
However, how should a country’s exchange rate regime be classified? The textbook will 
give a simple answer: either the exchange rate is fixed or it floats. Some papers, such as 
Rose (2001), use the IMF37 data to define the fixed exchange rate. In the thesis we 
consider not only the announced fixed exchange rate but also the unannounced fixed 
exchange rate. Therefore, we use the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) data to create our fixed 
exchange rate dummy variable. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) defined 14 different levels of 
exchange rate:  1. No separate legal tender; 2. Pre announced peg or currency board 
arrangement; 3. Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%; 4. 
De facto peg; 5. Pre announced crawling peg; 6. Pre announced crawling band that is 
narrower than or equal to +/-2%; 7. De factor crawling peg; 8. De facto crawling band 
that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%; 9. Pre announced crawling band that is wider 
than or equal to +/-2%; 10. De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-
5%; 11. Moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% (i.e., allows for both 
appreciation and depreciation over time); 12. Managed floating; 13. Freely floating; and 
14. Freely falling. We follow these definitions to classify the variable of exchange rate 
into two categories: fixed exchange rate and floating exchange rate. We define 1 to 11 as 
                                                 
37  Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. IMF tracks exchange 
arrangements and foreign exchange systems for all member countries on an annual basis and also provides 
historical information on these since 1950. They define the levels of exchange rate in 1999 1. Exchange 
arrangement with no separate legal tender; 2. Currency board arrangement; 3. Conventional pegged 
arrangement; 4. Pegged exchange rate within horizontal bands; 5. Crawling peg; 6. Crawling band; 7. 
Managed floating with no pre-announced path for the exchange rate; 8. Independently floating. 
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fixed exchange rate including announced and pre-announced fixed exchange rate and 12 
to 14 as floating exchange rate.  
 
4.4 Panel Data Model  
Estimating equation (4-1) by pooled OLS is not feasible for another reason. Our sample 
includes 24 countries across 276 country pairs from 1959 to 2003 split equally into 5 
periods. There are large number of cross-sectional units and only a few periods. Thus, the 
time-series methods may be somewhat problematic and also cross-section OLS 
estimation ignores potentially important unobservable country-pair specific effects. We 
estimate our model using both fixed effects and random effects and in doing so control 
for differences in the business cycle correlation across country pairs through the level of 
trade intensity and potentially important unobservable factors. 
Similar industry structures or a high degree of financial integration could explain a rise in 
the level of bilateral economic integration. Proxies can be used to measure these factors 
however they are likely to be measured with error. For example, Sweden and Finland are 
close and hence they have large trade in line with the gravity model. But being close, they 
also have similarities in industrial structure, such as large forest industry, which itself 
makes business cycles correlated. One way to control for this is include some measure of 
structural similarity but such a measure is likely to be very imperfect. Another and better 
way is to include fixed effects.38 Fixed effects can control for all of the country pair 
specific effects even if they are correlated with trade intensity.  
The random effects approach treats the unobservable component as randomly distributed 
although, unlike fixed effects, the individual effects are assumed to be independent of 
trade intensity.  
                                                 
38 Professor Nils Gottfries (The Scandinavian Journal of Economics editor) comments on the paper ‘Trade 
Integration and Business Cycle Convergence: Is the Relation Robust Across Time and Space?’  
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Firstly, we review the theory of the panel data model. The basic framework is a 
regression model of the form: 
itiitit xy εμβα ++′+=     (4-5) 
There are K regressors in xit. The individual effect is µi which contains a set of individual 
specific variables, all of which are taken to be constant over time t. We apply our 
regression equation into the panel data model: 
tij,ijtijtij TICorr εμβα +++= ,,     (4-6) 
for ij=1,…,n (n=276) and for each ij, t=1,…,T (T=5). µij denotes the unobservable 
individual country-pair specific effects. The dependent variable is business cycle 
correlation tijCorr , , and we only have one independent variable, trade intensity tijTI , . 
Both of them are 276×5 matrix. The reminder residual tij,ε  has the normal properties 
(mean 0, uncorrelated with itself, uncorrelated with TIij,t, uncorrelated with µij, and 
homoskedastic).  
 
4.4.1 Fixed Effects 
If µij is unobserved, but correlated with TIij,t, then the least squares estimator of β  is 
biased and inconsistent as a consequence of an omitted variables in equation (4-1), and 
we implement fixed effects model. The model assumes that differences across country-
pairs can be captured in differences in µij. Each µij is treated as an unknown parameter to 
be estimated and it does not vary over time. Totally, we have 275 country-pair dummy 
variables plus a constant39 (Baltagi, 2005). Therefore in equation (4-6), µij is the vector of 
275 country-pair dummies. 
                                                 
39 The model has been estimated with an overall constant and ij-1 dummy variables and each dummy 
variable coefficient will now be an estimate of difference with constant term where dummy “1” is the 
omitted group. Therefore we have 276-1 [= 223)231( ÷×+ -1] group dummy variables. 
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Whatever the properties of µij and εij,t, if (4-6) is true, it must also be true that 
ijijijFEij TICorr εμβα +++=     (4-7) 
for ij=1,…,n (n=276) and for each ij, t=1,…,T (T=5), of which Ti periods are actually 
observed. ∑
=
= i
T
t
itijij TCorrCorr
1
, / , ∑
=
= i
T
t
itijij TTITI
1
, / , and ∑
=
= i
T
t
itijij T
1
, /εε . Subtracting (4-7) 
from (4-6), it must be equally true that 
)()()( ,,, ijtijijtijFEijtij TITICorrCorr εεβα −+−+=−    (4-8) 
These three equations provide the basis for estimating β . Estimation (4-8) is known as 
the fixed effects estimator also known as the within estimator and it is performed by OLS. 
40 The covariance matrix of the estimators is adjusted for the extra 275 estimated means, 
so results are the same as using OLS on (4-6) to estimate 275 individual dummies, µij, 
directly. 
 
Testing the Significance of the Individual Effects – FE vs. OLS 
If all the differences across country-pairs are all equal, and the regression only contains a 
constant term, then the OLS provides consistent and efficient estimates and fixed effects 
are not necessary. Therefore, we are interested in difference across country pairs, and test 
the hypothesis that the specific effects, ijμ , are all equal.  
This is a simple F test with restricted residual sums of squares (RRSS) being that of OLS 
on the pooled model and the unrestricted residual sums of squares (URSS) being that of 
fixed effects regression. The null hypothesis is: 0... 121 ==== −ijμμμ  against the 
                                                 
40 We select the Stata 9.0 as econometrics program, and use the command ‘xtreg, fe’ and ‘xtreg, re’ for 
fixed effects model (within-group) and random effects model (GLS). Details of within-groups estimations 
see Stata 9.0 manual (XT).  
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alternatively hypothesis that all unobserved country-pair specific effects exist. The F-
statistic is calculated by: 
)/()1(
)1/()(
),1( 2
22
KnnTR
nRRKnnTnF
FE
PooledFE
−−−
−−=−−−    (4-9) 
where FE indicates the fixed effects model (or dummy variable model) and Pooled 
indicates the pooled or restricted model with only a single overall constant term. If the F-
statistic rejects the null hypothesis, the F-test indicates that unobservable country-pair 
specific effects are different, and then the fixed effects model is more appropriate than 
pooled OLS. 
However, fixed effects least-squares has some limitations. If we include the country pair 
dummy variables in the constant, 275 dummies will be in the regression. The fixed 
effects least-squares suffers from a large loss of degrees of freedom. We are estimating 
275 extra parameters, and many dummies may aggravate the problem of multicollinearity 
among the regressors. The random effects model can solve this problem by putting αi into 
the error term. The more important reason is the random effects treatment does allow the 
model to contain observed time invariant characteristics, such as the dummy variable of 
language, distance between country-pairs, while the fixed effects model does not, if 
present, they are simply absorbed into the fixed effects.  
 
4.4.2 Random Effects 
If the unobserved individual effects µij can be assumed to be uncorrelated with the 
independent variables TIij,t, then it might be appropriate to model the individual specific 
constant terms as randomly distributed across cross-sectional units. This view would be 
appropriate if we believe that our country-pairs were drawn from a large population. The 
payoff to this form is that it greatly reduces the number of parameters to be estimated. 
The cost is we have to assume strictly that µij is uncorrelated with TIij,t. Then the model 
may be formulated as:  
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tijijtijREtij TICorr ,,, ευβα +++=    (4-10) 
where μα =  and μμυ −= ijij . Now the single constant term is the mean of the 
unobserved heterogeneity. The component vij is the random heterogeneity specific to the 
ijth observation and is constant through time. We assume further that: 
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Based on these assumptions, random effects model is performed by Generalised Least 
Squares (GLS).41 GLS based on the true variance component is best linear unbiased 
estimator (BLUE) and all the feasible GLS estimators considered are asymptotically 
efficient as country pairs are large. 
Again, the crucial distinction between fixed effect estimation and random effect 
estimation is whether the unobserved individual effect embodies elements that are 
correlated with the regressors in the model, not whether these effects are stochastic or not.  
Testing Breusch-Pagan for Random Effects – RE vs. OLS 
Breusch and Pagan (1980) have devised a Lagrange multiplier test for the random model 
based on the OLS residuals. The random effects model reduces to the pooled OLS model 
if the variance of the individual effects becomes zero. The null hypothesis of the test is 
the variance of the individual effects equal zero against not equal zero. In estimation 
(4-10), we let tijijtije ,, ευ += . 
                                                 
41 For details of GLS see Greene (2002) pp.293-98, Gujarati (2003) pp. 394-98 and Stata Manual ‘XT’. 
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where n=275, T=5  and eij,t is the error component. Under the null hypothesis, LM is 
distributed as chi-squared with one degree of freedom.42 
 
4.4.3 Hausman’s Specification Test for the Panel Data Model 
We have presented the differences between fixed and random effects estimations. Which 
one should be used? From a purely practical viewpoint, the fixed effects model is costly 
in terms of degrees of freedom lost. But it does not need to treat the individual effects as 
uncorrelated with the other regressors, as is assumed in the random effects model. The 
random effects treatment, therefore, may suffer from the inconsistency due to this 
correlation between the included variables and the random effect.  
The specification test devised by Hausman (1978) is used to test for orthogonality of the 
random effects and the regressors. The test is based on the idea that under the hypothesis 
of no correlation, both fixed effects model and GLS are consistent, but fixed effects 
model is inefficient, whereas under the alternative, fixed effects model is consistent, but 
GLS is not. Therefore, under the null hypothesis, the two estimates should not differ 
systematically, and a test can be based on the difference. The other essential ingredient 
for the test is the covariance matrix of the difference vector. We apply the Hausman’s 
specification test in our sample regression and the chi-squared test is based on the Wald 
criterion: 
                                                 
42 For details of Breusch and Pagan LM test see Baltagi (2005) Chapter 4. 
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)1(2 REFEREFEKH ββββχ −Ψ′−= −−    (4-14) 
where FEβˆ  is the estimated slope by fixed effects model from equation (4-8), and REβˆ  is 
the estimated slope by random effects model from equation (4-10). 
][.][.ˆ REFE VarEstVarEst ββ −=Ψ  , ][. FEVarEst β   and ][. REVarEst β  are the two estimated 
asymptotic covariance matrices (standard error covariance matrices) and  Ψˆ   is the 
estimated covariance matrices of the slope estimator in the fixed effects model minus the 
estimated covariance matrix in the random effects model, excluding the constant term. In 
our model, we only have one regressor, TIij,t. Thus all slopes and standard errors are only 
one value rather than matrices and the H-statistic change to 
22
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Under the null hypothesis, H has a limiting chi-squared distribution with K-1 degrees of 
freedom, where is one. 
 
4.5 Two-Stage Fixed Effects and Random Effects Model 
We have presented that estimating equation (4-1) by pooled OLS is not feasible for two 
reasons: firstly, trade intensity could be endogenous due to the omission of relevant 
variables which causes inconsistency of the usual OLS estimates and requires 
instrumental variable methods like two-stage least squares (2SLS) to obtain consistent 
parameter estimates. Secondly, pooled estimations also ignore potentially important 
unobservable country-pair specific effects which could be solved by panel data model. 
Here we combine the two-stage least squares (2SLS) with panel data models.43 
tijijtijtijtijijijijtij FIXYYFTAADJDISLANTI ,,6,5,43210, ωςϕϕϕϕϕϕϕ ++++++++=  (4-16) 
                                                 
43 In Stata V9.0, we use the ‘xtivreg, fe’ and ‘xtivreg, re’ command for 2SLS fixed and random effects 
model, respectively.  
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tijijtijtij ITCorr ,,, ˆ εμβα +++=     (4-17) 
We still use the same six instrumental variables and ijς  and ijμ  are unobservable 
country-pair specific effects in the first and second stage, respectively. tij ,ω  and tij ,ε  are 
the ‘usual’ residual with the usual properties (mean 0, uncorrelated with itself, 
uncorrelated with TIij,t, uncorrelated with µij, and homoskedastic).  
The 2SLS panel data estimation also consists of two steps but using panel data model 
rather than OLS: (i) estimate the trade intensity by 6 instrumental variables by fixed or 
random effects model, and retrieve the fitted trade intensity; then (ii) perform fixed or 
random effects estimation again using the fitted trade intensity from the first step.44 The 
fixed effects model still uses the within estimator and the random effects model uses the 
GLS estimator. 
After 2SLS fixed and random effects estimations, the Hausman’s specification test again 
is performed to compare which model we should use following by the equation (4-15). 
However, in the 2SLS panel data model, we cannot perform Hausman’s specification test 
directly after 2SLS fixed and random effects estimation. As we noticed that random 
effects treatment does allow the model to contain observed time invariant characteristics, 
then our first stage include all six instrumental variable running by random effects model. 
However, the three time invariant variables (distance, land adjacency and common 
official language) are dropped running by fixed effects model and the first stage only 
include three instrumental variables (fixed exchange rate, common free trade agreement 
and product of GDP per capita). Therefore, it does not make sense to compare the fixed 
and random effects models directly, because from the Hausman test is not immediately 
apparent whether this difference is due to the number of instruments selected or, as is 
normally assumed, because the individual effects are correlated with TIij,t. 
We re-estimate (4-16) and (4-17) via random effects model but using only the time-
variant instruments to estimate the slope, 3REβ .  
                                                 
44 The details of 2SLS panel data model see Baltagi (2005) chapter 7 and Stata 9.0 manual (xtivreg). 
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tijijtijtijtijtij FIXYYFTATI ,,3,2,10, ωςϕϕϕϕ +++++=    (4-18) 
tijijtijREtij ITCorr ,,3, ˆ εμβα +++=     (4-19) 
Use the information from equations (4-18) and (4-19) to compare with fixed effects 
model by the Hausman test: 
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4.6 Conclusions 
Following the OCA theory and the statistical analysis, we start to investigate the 
relationship between trade intensity and business cycle correlation by OLS estimation. 
However, countries are likely to link their currencies deliberately to those of their 
important trading partners in order to capture gains associated with greater exchange rate 
stability. In doing so, they will lose to set monetary policy independently of those 
neighbours. The close monetary policy might increase bilateral trade between countries. 
In addition, a stable exchange rate could cause both high trade and business cycle co-
movement. Therefore, to identify the effect of bilateral trade patterns on business cycle 
correlations, we need exogenous determinants of bilateral trade patterns to use as 
instrumental variables. Two-stage least-squares estimation is used and the trade intensity 
is estimated by the gravity model. We select six instrumental variables for trade intensity: 
language, distance, adjacency, product of GDP per capita, and supplement them with 
dummies to define the bi-lateral free trade agreements and fixed exchange rate 
agreements trade agreement.  
Pooled OLS estimation also ignores potentially important unobservable country-pair 
effects. Two-step fixed effects estimation is implemented since it allows for pair-specific 
factors being correlated with trade. Two-step random effects estimate also is used since it 
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can avoid the loss of degree of freedom associated with fixed effect estimate and more 
importantly we can include the specific effect on trade intensity of language, distance and 
adjacency. This development of the econometric model also is one of this thesis’s 
contributions. Hausman’s specification test is used for comparing the fixed and random 
effects model after two-stage panel data model. 
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Chapter 5 Empirical Results: Aggregate Countries 
Results and Sensitivity Analysis 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The empirical investigation of the relationship between the bilateral trade intensity and 
the business cycle is presented in this chapter. As we discussed in the literature review, 
closer international trade could result in either tighter or looser correlations of national 
business cycle from a theoretical viewpoint. Closer trade ties could result in countries 
becoming more specialized in the goods for which they have comparative advantage. The 
countries might then be more sensitive to industry-specific shocks, resulting in more 
idiosyncratic business cycles. However, if demand shocks or other common shocks 
predominate, or if intra-industry trade accounts for most bi-lateral trade, then the business 
cycles may become more similar across countries when countries trade more. Therefore, 
we estimate the relationship between the trade intensity and the business cycle correlation 
using econometric models described in last chapter. 
The estimation analysis starts with OLS. We find a positive and statistically significant 
estimator and the magnitude is higher than previous literature. Because of the 
endogeneity of trade, we develop the estimation to two-stage least square with six 
instrumental variables. Also considering the potentially important unobservable country-
pair effects, panel data estimation is used here as well. From the two stage panel 
estimation, we find a stronger relationship than OLS and literature.  
Furthermore, a couple of tests are used to examine the robustness of the relationship. 
Firstly, we apply different proxies to measure the business cycle correlation including 
industrial production, total employment and unemployment rate de-trended by both HP-
filter and fourth difference. We also do sub-period analysis to investigate whether their 
significance and magnitude of relationship changes over time. Finally, we conduct a 
couple of sensitivity analyses, such as including time dummies in 2-stage FE estimations, 
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splitting whole period into two sub-period, adding potential omitted variables, such as 
financial integration, specification, time trend and third trade partner. None of these 
change our main results. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: section 5.2 discusses the Ordinary 
Least Square estimation results; section 5.3 defines 6 instrumental variables and 
implements two-stage least square regression to investigate the relationship in aggregate 
sample; Section 5.4 presents the fixed and RE estimation results and section 5.5 presents 
two-stage fixed and RE estimations. The sensitivity analyses are shown in section 5.6. 
Section 5.7 is the conclusion for this chapter. 
 
5.2 Aggregate Countries Results Estimated by OLS 
As we described in the previous chapter, the analysis starts with a simple OLS regression 
equation (4-1) which specifies a linear relationship between the business cycle correlation 
and single explanatory variable trade intensity. The estimates shown in Table 5-1 are 
estimated by OLS regression. We have two versions of the regressand (real GDP 
correlations de-trended by both HP-filter and first differences) and two versions of the 
regressor (bilateral trade intensity normalised by nominal GDP and total trade). They 
show a significant and positive relationship between the trade intensity and the business 
cycle correlation. Average of the β  estimates has a magnitude of 0.10, suggesting that 
the business cycle correlation would rise by 0.069 following a doubling of trade intensity.  
Coefficients from the estimation of GDP de-trended by HP filter are slightly smaller than 
those from the estimation of GDP de-trended by first differences and the coefficient from 
the estimation of trade normalised by GDP is slightly greater than those from the 
estimation of trade normalised by total trade. Generally, both de-trending methods and 
both normalisations have consistent results. The model explains 9% of the overall 
variations in Corrij,t. The overall significance of the model is established by the F-
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statistics, and all F-tests reject the null hypothesis at the 5% confidence level indicating 
that our OLS estimation fits the data well.45  
The β s presented in Table 5-1 are larger than those reported in previous literature. For 
example, Frankel and Rose (1998) report a slope estimate of 0.048 using the same 
measure of the business cycle correlation and the trade intensity as this study, though the 
time period and the number of countries differ. Clark and van Wincoop (2001) report a 
slope estimate for trade intensity of 0.09 using data on 14 EU countries from 1963 to 
1997, while Imbs (2004) reports a β  estimate of 0.079 for a panel of 24 developing and 
industrialised countries over the period 1960 to 2000. 
                                                 
45 F-test is calculated by 
RSSMSS
ESSMSSF
of
 of =  with the degree of freedom (1,1375) , where MSS is mean sum of 
squares which is obtained by dividing SS by their degree of freedom, ESS is explained sum of square, and 
RSS is residual sum of square. The null hypothesis is H0: coefficients of Trade and constant are both zero, 
and the F-test follows the F-distribution with 1 df in numerator and 1375 (n-2, since we miss 3 
observations and the number of total observations is 1377) df in denominator. 
Table 5-1 
OLS Estimates 
  Normalised by Nominal GDP Normalised by Total Trade 
  HP filter First difference HP filter First difference
1.11* 1.17* 0.84* 0.91* 
Constant 
(21.12) (21.54) (16.92) (18.39) 
0.10* 0.12* 0.07* 0.09* 
TIij,t 
(12.48) (13.74) (8.04) (10.16) 
156* 189* 65* 103* Overall Significance 
(F-test with p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.14 0.05 0.07 
Notes: Pooled OLS estimates from tijtijtij TICorr ,,, εβα ++= where Corrij,t is the bilateral real GDP 
correlation between countries i and j de-trended by HP filter and first differences and TIijt is bilateral trade 
intensity normalized by GDP and total trade. t-statistics are shown in parentheses, and regressions are with 
robust standard errors. * denotes statistical significance at the 5% levels. Bilateral data are from 24 
countries, from 1959 to 2003 which is split into five sub-periods. Sample size is 1380 including 3 omitted 
observations.  
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5.3 Two-Stage Least-Squares Estimation Results 
Table 5-2 presents the first stage linear regression results on bilateral trade intensity. The 
first step is to identify which instruments are important determinants of trade intensity. 
The OLS estimates of equation (4-2) (see Table 5-2) are all statistically significant at the 
5% level, except for the YYij,t, using bilateral trade as a proportion of aggregate trade. The 
standard errors are robust to clustered heterogeneity. Estimates are correctly signed and 
have reasonable magnitudes, though there is some variation across trade normalisations 
for FIXij,t and FTAij,t estimates. The model explains approximately 41% of the total 
variation in trade intensity. Again, an F-statistics confirms the overall significance of the 
model. 
The impact of a fixed exchange rate on trade intensity is 18.5% [ )1(100 17.0 −×= e ] using 
the GDP normalisation (40.5% using the total trade normalisation). The highly 
statistically significant coefficients indicate a strong effect from fixed exchange rate on 
trade intensity. Later we are going to test this variable following equation 4-3 (the 
business cycle equation). Geographical factors are important determinants of bilateral 
trade intensity. ‘Distance’ has a negative impact and a country-pair that is twice the 
geographical distance compared to another would be expected on average to have one 
third less trade intensity. Both ‘common language’ and ‘common border’ have a 
significantly positive effect on trade intensity, approximately 44.1% and 232%, 
respectively. If two countries participate in a bilateral free trade agreement then the 
increase in trade intensity is on average 118.1% using the GDP normalisation or 36.3% 
using the total trade normalisation. Finally, the product of GDP per capita estimates are 
significant and positive in one case, suggesting that economic growth in either one or 
both of the economies, acts as a stimulus to international trade.  
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Table 5-3 presents instrumental variable estimation of equation (4-3). The fitted trade 
intensity is predicted from the first stage (4-2). The β  estimates show a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between trade intensity and the real GDP correlation 
Table 5-2 
Trade Intensity Equation estimated by OLS 
 Normalised by Nominal GDP Normalised by Total Trade 
-6.31* -3.63* 
Constant 
(-12.46) (-7.12) 
0.17* 0.34* 
FIXij,t (2.29) (4.58) 
0.42* 0.31* 
LANij (5.09) (3.79) 
-0.31* -0.31* 
DISij (-8.26) (-8.21) 
1.11* 1.29* 
ADJij (9.01) (10.39) 
0.78* 0.31* 
FTAij,t (8.36) (3.37) 
0.10* 0.02 
YYij,t (5.13) (1.05) 
191.51* 138.91* Overall Significance 
(F-statistics) (0.00) (0.00) 
Adjusted R2 0.45 0.38 
   
291* 235* Test of excluded 
Instruments (0.00) (0.00) 
Partial R2 0.46 0.38 
288* 244* 
Wu-Hausman F test: 
(0.00) (0.00) 
239* 207* Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
χ2 test (0.00) (0.00) 
Note: First step estimates are from: 
tijtijtijtijijijijtij FIXYYFTAADJDISLANTI ,,6,5,43210, ωϕϕϕϕϕϕϕ +++++++= . 
t-statistics for coefficients and probability values for tests are shown in parentheses and regressions are with 
robust standard errors. * denotes statistical significant at the 5% level. F-test indicates whether excluded 
instrumental variables are significantly different with the whole equation and the Wu-Hausman test and 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test identifies whether it is necessary to instrument trade intensity with the above 
regressors. Bilateral data come from 24 countries, and are from1959 to 2003 split into five sub-periods. 
Sample size is 1380 including gaps. * are significant coefficients at 95% based on t value. 
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for all de-trending methods and trade normalisations which is stronger than those 
reported in Table 5-1 and in the literature.  
Table 5-3 
The Business Cycle Correlation Equation estimated by IV 
  Normalised by Nominal GDP Normalised by Total Trade 
1.94* 1.97* 1.68* 1.67* 
Constant 
(26.56) (20.57) (21.13) (15.51) 
0.23* 0.24* 0.23* 0.23* 
TIij,t (19.86) (16.79) (15.44) (12.28) 
-0.02* 0.01* 
FIXij,t - (-0.53) 
- 
(0.19) 
394* 195* 238* 120* Overall Significance 
(F-statistics) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
243* 176* 
H
P 
fil
te
r 
Hausman Test 
(OLS vs. IV) (0.00) 
- 
(0.00) 
- 
      
2.03* 1.96* 1.76* 1.64* Constant 
 (27.58) (21.30) (22.20) (15.81) 
0.25* 0.24* 0.25* 0.23* 
TIij,t (21.30) (17.92) (16.93) (13.02) 
0.03* 0.06* 
FIXij,t - (1.02) 
- 
(1.62) 
454* 232* 287* 151* Overall Significance 
(F-statistics) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
271* 183* 
Fi
rs
t d
iff
er
en
ce
s 
Hausman Test 
(OLS vs. IV) (0.00) 
- 
(0.00) 
- 
Notes: results are estimated by 
tijtijtijijijijtij YYFTAADJDISLANTI ,,5,43210, ωϕϕϕϕϕϕ ++++++=  
tijtijtijtij FIXTICorr ,,2,1, εββα +++=  
tijtijtijtijijijijtij FIXYYFTAADJDISLANTI ,,6,5,43210, ωϕϕϕϕϕϕϕ +++++++=  
tijtijtij TICorr ,,1, εβα ++=  
t-statistics for coefficients and probability values for tests are shown in parentheses regressions are with 
robust standard errors. * denotes statistical significance at the 5% levels. Hausman test compare the 
bilateral trade intensity from OLS and that from IV estimations and the null hypothesis is they are the 
same. Bilateral annually data from 24 countries, 1959 through 2003 split into five sub-periods. Maximum 
sample size is 1380. 
 105
We do not report R2 or adjusted R2 since they really have no statistical meaning in the 2-
stage least square and are not bounded in 0 and 1. 46 With an average magnitude of 0.24, 
the business cycle correlation is expected to rise by 0.17 if trade intensity were to double. 
The t-statistics in parentheses are calculating using robust standard errors. There is no 
significant difference between de-trending methods and normalisation. These results 
suggest that the increased bilateral trade observed in chapter 3 is the result of expanding 
intra-industry trade feeding through to greater economic convergence. Also F-statistics 
confirms the overall significance of the model. 
However, it is possible that the observed relationship between the trade intensity and the 
business cycle correlations is spurious. As Frankel and Rose (1998) note, countries that 
trade more intensively with one another are more willing to join a bilateral fixed 
exchange rate agreement, which may influence the real GDP correlation directly through 
the coordination of monetary. Moreover, they could be more financially integrated (Imbs, 
2004). Fixed exchange rate could be another form of economic integration that further 
strengthens the case that OCA criteria are endogenous. Because pegging is a form of 
monetary policy coordination that itself may increase the business cycle correlation. For 
example, regarding to the debate about Swedish membership in EMU, statistical 
correlations showed that Sweden and Finland had relatively low correlations with the rest 
of Europe countries and this was seen as an argument against membership. But low 
correlation may be due to devaluation policy which set the business cycle out of phase 
with the rest countries.47 Therefore the fixed exchange rate could appear in the business 
cycle correlation equation directly as another indicator of economic integration.  
tijtijtijijijijtij YYFTAADJDISLANTI ,,5,43210, ωϕϕϕϕϕϕ ++++++=  (5-1) 
                                                 
46 For two-stage least squares, some of the regressors enter the model as instruments when the parameters 
are estimated. However, the model sum of squares (MSS) is determined by the actual values, not the 
instruments for the endogenous right-hand-side variables. The model’s residuals are computed over a set of 
regressors different from those used to fit the model. This means a constant-only model of the dependent 
variable is not nested within the two-stage least squares model, even though the two-stage model estimates 
an intercept, and the residual sum of squares (RSS) is no longer constrained to be smaller than the total sum 
of squares (TSS). When RSS exceeds TSS, the MSS and the R2 will be negative. (Stata,  1999) 
47 Details see Calmfors et al. (1997) pp. 314. 
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tijtijtijtij FIXTICorr ,,2,1, εββα +++=    (5-2) 
If the business cycle correlation is directly affected by a fixed exchange rate rather than 
trade intensity, then it follows that 01 =β and 02 ≠β . However, the results in Table 5-3 
show that 1β  remains significantly positive and 2β  is statistically insignificant in all de-
trended methods and normalisations, suggesting that bilateral pegging of currencies only 
affects economic integration indirectly through its impact on international trade. 
Therefore we would like to follow Frankel and Rose (2002) and Shambaugh (2004) to 
put FIXij,t variable in the first step as an instrumental variable. 
 
5.3.1 Why Are the IV Estimates Greater than the OLS Estimates? 
It is obvious that trade intensity coefficient in Table 5-3 is much greater than coefficient 
in Table 5-2 (average 0.24 from IV regressions and 0.10 from OLS regressions). The 
Hausman specific test can be used here to compare that the coefficient of bilateral trade 
intensity from OLS is the same with the coefficient from IV estimation.48 The Hausman 
test results reported in Table 5-3 show that the coefficients from IV estimation are 
statistically significant different with OLS estimates.  
In the first stage analysis, we find both ‘distance’ and ‘product of GDP per capita’ are 
very important determinants for trade intensity and including either of them increases the 
magnitude of β  much. Thus the main reason of the IV estimates are greater than the OLS 
estimates is that instruments does affect the trade intensity particular for distance and 
product of GDP per capita and using estimated trade intensity increase the magnitude.  
                                                 
48 The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is that we have two consistent estimators of β , OLSβ  and IVβ . 
Under the alternative hypothesis, only one of these 
IVβ  is consistent. The suggestion, then, is to exam 
d=
IVβ - OLSβ . Under the null hypothesis, plim d=0, whereas under the alternative, plim 0≠d . For example, 
the slope of trade from OLS estimation is 0.1028 with the robust standard error 0.0082 and the slope of 
trade from IV estimation is 0.2332 with the robust standard error 0.0117 in HP filter de-trending method 
and GDP normalisation regression. With these figures it is possible to carry out Hausman’s test: 
73.242
0082.00177.0
)1028.02332.0(
....
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22
2
22
2
=−
−=−
−=
OLSIV
OLSIV
ESES
H
ββ , the 95% critical value from the Chi-squared distribution 
with one degree of freedom is 3.84. So the hypothesis that OLS estimator is consistent would be rejected.  
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The OLS estimate is determined by the association between the trade intensity and the 
business cycle correlation, while the IV estimate is determined by the association 
between the business cycle correlation and the component of trade correlated with the 
instruments. Thus, the fact that the OLS estimate is smaller than the IV estimate means 
the business cycle’s association with the component of trade that is not correlated with 
the instrument is weaker than its association with the component that is correlated. To 
explain this, we consider a simple model. In our OLS regression the coefficient of trade 
intensity: 
TI
Corr
TICorr
TI
TICorrCov
σ
σρσβ ,2
, ==      (5-3) 
In this equation, the coefficient of trade intensity depends on the correlation coefficient 
between the business cycle and the trade intensity ( TICorr ,ρ ) and the standard deviation of 
the business cycle and the trade intensity ( Corrσ and TIσ ). In the OLS and IV estimation, 
the standard deviation of the business cycle is identity. That means we should only focus 
on the correlation coefficients and the standard deviation of trade, i.e. compare the 
TICorr ,ρ  with TICorr ,ρˆ  and TIσ  with TIσˆ . 
Figure 5-1 to Figure 5-3 present these two associations. Figure 5-1 shows that there is a 
positive association between real GDP correlation and the component of trade is not 
correlated with the instrument, and the correlation coefficient is only 29.46%. Figure 5-2 
and Figure 5-3 present that there is a positive association between real GDP correlation 
(by HP filter) and the component of trade (normalised by GDP) correlated with the 
instrument estimated by either FE or RE model, too.  
Figure 5-2 is very similar with Figure 5-3 which proves that both FE and RE model 
estimate very similar result in the trade intensity equation. Also we find that the slopes in 
Figure 5-2 and Figure 5-3 are higher than the slope in Figure 5-1. The associations in FE 
and RE models (31.11% for FE and 31.69 for RE) are higher than that from estimation of 
actual trade intensity. The observations at the upper right and lower left result in high 
coefficient and lower right and upper left observations lead to low coefficient. This 
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smaller relationship causes the OLS estimate to be less than the IV estimate. Regarding to 
TIσ  and TIσˆ , we find the standard deviation of trade intensity (1.40) is greater than the 
standard deviation of fitted trade intensity (1.33 for FE and 1.29 for RE). That is one of 
the reasons why the IV estimates is greater than the OLS estimates. 
Also the explanation of the IV estimates exceeding the OLS estimates is that OLS is in 
fact biased down. The bilateral shipping of goods between countries does not raise 
income, but trade is a proxy for the many ways in which interactions between countries 
raise income by specialization, spread of idea and so on. Trade is likely to be highly 
correlated with the extent of such interactions. Thus trade is an imperfect measure of the 
business cycle correlation among countries. And since measurement error leads to 
downward bias, this would mean that OLS would lead to an understatement of the effect 
of closer business cycle interactions. 
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Figure 5-1. Associations Between  Real GDP Correlation and the Component of the 
Trade Intensity uncorrelated with Instruments 
Notes: Corr is the correlations of real GDP de-trended by HP-filter and TI is the trade intensity normalized 
by GDP. 
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5.3.2 The Quality of Instruments 
We are interested in whether these variables in the gravity model are good instrumental 
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Figure 5-2. Associations Between Real GDP Correlation and the Component of the Trade 
Intensity correlated with Instruments by FE Model. 
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Figure 5-3. Associations Between Real GDP Correlation and the Component of the Trade 
Intensity correlated with Instruments by RE Model. 
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variables and whether they eliminate the endogeneity problem for trade intensity. As we 
have mentioned an instrumental variable must satisfy two requirements: it must be 
correlated with the included endogenous variables, and be orthogonal to the error process. 
The former condition may be readily tested by examining the fit of the first stage 
regressions. The first stage regressions are reduced form regressions of the endogenous 
variable trade intensity on the full set of instruments (six instruments); the relevant test 
statistics here relate to the explanatory power of the excluded instruments in these 
regressions. A statistic commonly used, as recommended for example by Bound et al. 
(1995) is the R2 of the first-stage regression with the included instruments partialled-out. 
This is the squared partial correlation between the excluded instruments and the 
endogenous regressor. The values of partial R2 are very close to our adjusted R2 which is 
0.46 for GDP normalization and 0.38 for trade normalization. Alternatively, this may be 
expressed as the F-statistics of the joint significance of the instruments in the first-stage 
regression. F-statistics significantly reject the hypothesis of excluding instruments in our 
first step.  
Secondly, one can imagine reasons why all the variables used to estimate the trade might 
have some endogenous component that is correlated with the error term in the business 
cycle equation, particularly for fixed exchange rate and the product of GDP per capita. 
Indeed, that is precisely the point of much of the existing currency union literature. 
Regarding the ‘fixed exchange rate’ variable, we control for the third factors that could 
affect both fixed exchange rate and trade intensity, such as landlocked, colonial history, 
political union and so on. The fixed exchange effect remains almost as strong as ever. 
Also we separate the variable ‘fixed exchange rate’ into ‘direct pegged’ ‘indirect pegged’ 
and ‘currency union’.49 Three variables are still significant and have not changed other 
coefficients much. To control the product of GDP per capita endogenous problem, we use 
the product of the fitted values from the model of income determination (Frankel and 
Romer, 1999) in place of actual values of product of GDP per capita. After control the 
                                                 
49 Direct pegged is defined by both countries pegged their national currency each other directly. For 
instance, China pegged the RMB with US dollar and the dummy between them is one. Indirect pegged is 
defined by both countries pegged their national currency with the same third country.  For instance, both 
China and Hong Kong pegged RMB and HK dollar with US dollar, and the dummy between China and 
Hong Kong is one. Currency union means countries are in the same currency union, such as Euro zone. 
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endogenous of product of GDP per capita, we find that the product of fitted GDP per 
capita remains positive and has similar magnitudes. All other instruments have no 
significant differences. 
Finally, to check that no single variable that could conceivably be endogenous is driving 
the results, we redo the construction of the instruments and the regressions of equation (4-
2) in four ways: omitting the fixed exchange rate; excluding common language and 
common border; omitting the free trade agreement; and using GDP and population for 
country i and county j separately instead of product of GDP per capita. None of these 
changes has a major effect on the results and the IV estimates remain much larger than 
the OLS estimates. Excluding either distance or the product of GDP per capita does affect 
the trade intensity and change the magnitudes of coefficient in the second step. 
Nevertheless, it is certainly possible that an element of endogeneity remains in the 
instruments such as fixed exchange rate. While we do not believe that our results can be 
explained away by endogeneity.  
In addition, we report the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test in Table 5-2. DWH compute 
a test for endogeneity in a regression estimated via instrumental variables (IV), the null 
hypothesis for which states that an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator of the same 
equation would yield consistent estimates: that is, any endogeneity among the regressors 
would not have deleterious effects on OLS estimates. A rejection of the null indicates that 
endogenous regressors' effects on the estimates are meaningful, and instrumental 
variables techniques are required. The test was first proposed by Durbin (1954) and 
separately by Wu (1973) (his T4 statistic) and Hausman (1978). The details of the DWH 
test are presented in the Appendix. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests, in both 
normalisations, reject the null hypothesis that an OLS estimator of the same equation 
would yield consistent estimates and we think the IV estimation is required. Wu-
Hausman F tests also reported in Table 5-2 present the same results to the DWH test. 
From all of the above tests, we have confidence to believe that our six instrumental 
variables fit the first stage well and are good instruments. 
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5.4 Panel Data Model  
Estimating equation (4-1) by pooled OLS is not feasible for another reason. Pooled OLS 
estimation also ignores potentially important unobservable country-pair specific effects. 
The estimates shown in Table 5-4 were obtained using FE model assuming that trade is 
weakly exogenous. The estimates consistent with OLS estimate that a positive and 
statistically significant relationship exists between trade intensity and the real GDP 
correlation. The average coefficient is 0.09 which is very close to OLS estimate, i.e. the 
impact of trade intensity on the business cycle correlation is 9.4%. And there are no 
Table 5-4 
FE Model Results 
  Normalised by Nominal GDP Normalised by Total Trade 
  HP filter First differences HP filter First differences 
1.09* 1.08* 0.85* 0.94* 
Constant 
(9.34) (9.13) (6.27) (6.85) 
0.10* 0.10* 0.07* 0.10* 
TIijt (5.52) (5.64) (2.95) (3.82) 
Within R2 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 
Between R2 0.23 0.28 0.11 0.15 
Overall R2 0.11 0.14 0.05 0.08 
30.46* 31.85* 8.73* 14.59* 
F-statistics 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
     
2.33* 2.40* 2.65* 2.77* F test 
(all ijμ =0) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
0.02 0.69 0.01 0.04 Hausman Test 
(FE vs. OLS) (0.89) (0.41) (0.94) (0.84) 
Notes: All the results estimated by tijijtijtij TICorr ,,, εμβα +++=  where ijμ  is the matrix of country pair 
dummies. Within R2 is based on time-series component data, between R2 is based on cross-sectional data, 
and overall R2 includes both of them. The first F-statistics is the same with before with the null hypothesis 
that β =0. The F-test with the null hypothesis that all the country pair specific effects are zero indicates that 
the FE model report the same results with OLS. The Hausman test compares the OLS estimation and FE 
model. t-statistics for coefficients and probability values are shown in parentheses. * denotes statistical 
significance at the 5% levels. Bilateral annually data from 24 countries, 1959 through 2003 split into five 
sub-periods. Maximum sample size is 1380. 
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significant differences between de-tending methods and normalisation. 
We report three R2s: within R2 which is based on the time-series component of the data, 
between R2 which is based on the cross-sectional component of the data and overall R2 
which includes both of them. The overall R2s are very close to the adjusted R2 from OLS 
estimation which also confirm that the estimates from FE model have no significant 
difference with OLS estimates. Comparing the between and within R2s, it is apparent the 
cross-sectional dimension of the data accounts for the largest part of the overall R2. The 
F-statistics in the first panel is the same with before and confirms the overall significance 
of the model. Following by equation (4-9), we also implement another F-test for the joint 
significance of county-pair specific dummies. We find that the country pair specific 
effects are statistically significant thus justifying the use of panel methods. The Hausman 
test in Table 5-4 compares the FE estimations with OLS estimations. None of them can 
reject the hypothesis and we can say that results from OLS are not explained away by 
country-pair specific effects.  
Table 5-5 presents RE estimates. Again we find a positive and significant slope, and they 
are very close to FE model and OLS estimation. The impact of the trade intensity on the 
business cycle correlation is 10%. Again we do not find any statistically significant 
differences between de-trending methods and normalisation. The cross-sectional 
dimension of the data accounts for the largest part of the overall R2. However, these R2s 
are not as useful as they are from OLS regressions. “When we estimate the model’s 
parameters using generalized least squares (GLS), the total sum of squares cannot be 
broken down in the same way, making the R2 statistic less useful as a diagnostic tool for 
GLS regressions. Specifically, an R2 statistic computed from GLS sums of squares need 
not be bounded between zero and one and does not represent the percentage of total 
variation in the dependent variable that is accounted for by the model.” (Stata, 2005)  
A Wald-statistics for RE model confirms the overall significance of the model. Following 
equation (4-13), Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier tests are reported to compare the 
pooled OLS and RE model. Again the country pair specific effects are statistically 
significant, justifying the use of panel methods. The Hausman test statistic for the OLS 
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and RE estimations is close to zero, showing that the OLS and RE are not different from 
one another. When comparing the FE and RE, the low Hausman test statistic suggests 
that the FE and RE estimates are statistically indistinguishable from one another. 
Table 5-5 
RE Model Results 
 Normalised by Nominal GDP Normalised by Total Trade 
 HP filter First differences HP filter First differences 
1.10* 1.15* 0.84* 0.91* 
Constant 
(17.38) (17.71) (13.36) (14.12) 
0.10* 0.12* 0.07* 0.09* 
TIijt (10.61) (11.67) (6.43) (7.97) 
Within R2 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 
Between R2 0.23 0.28 0.11 0.15 
Overall R2 0.11 0.14 0.05 0.08 
113* 136* 41* 64* 
Wald-test 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
     
117* 126* 165* 183* BP-LM test 
(Var 0ij =μ ) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
0.00 0.23 0.00 0.00 Hausman Test 
(RE vs. OLS) (0.95) (0.63) (0.97) (0.94) 
0.02 0.52 0.00 0.04 
(0.90) (0.47) (0.95) (0.85) Hausman Test (FE vs. RE) 
RE RE RE RE 
Notes: All the results estimated by tijijtijtij TICorr ,,, εμβα +++=  where ijμ is random. Within R2 is 
based on time-series component data, between R2 is based on cross-sectional data, and overall R2 include 
both of them. The Wald Chi-squared test instead of F-test in RE model with the null hypothesis that 
beta=0. Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for RE test whether the random ijμ are all zero. The 
Hausman test compares the OLS estimation vs. FE model and FE model vs. RE model. t-statistics for 
coefficients and probability values for tests are shown in parentheses. * denotes statistical significance at 
the 5% levels. Bilateral annual data from 24 countries, 1959 through 2003 split into five sub-periods. 
Maximum sample size is 1380. 
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5.5 Two-Stage FE and RE Estimations 
This section presents the result of two stage panel data estimation. The determinants of 
trade intensity are shown in Table 5-6. The first step is to identify which instruments are 
important determinants of trade intensity.  
All of the estimated coefficients are strongly and statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Estimates are correctly signed and have reasonable magnitudes. In the FE model, time-
invariant variables, LANij, DISij, and ADJij, are dropped since they are constant across 
periods. Hence only three variables are reported in Table 5-6 and the magnitudes of 
coefficient vary across trade normalisations. The impact of a fixed exchange rate on trade 
intensity is 15% using the GDP normalisation and 27% using the total trade 
normalisation. If two countries participate in a bilateral free trade agreement then the 
increase in trade intensity is on average 68% using the GDP normalisation or 22% using 
the total trade normalisation. Compare with the first stage in IV estimation, the product of 
GDP per capita show strongly positive effect on trade in Table 5-6, 35% using GDP 
normalisation and 11% using total trade normalisation. The FE model explains 
approximately only 19% of the total variation in trade intensity, since three geographical 
variables are dropped. Comparing the between and within R2, we can see that cross-
sectional data and time-series data account for an equal part of the overall R2.  
RE model reports all six instrumental variables. The fixed exchange rate effect is 14% 
using GDP normalisation and 27% using total trade normalisation. Geographical factors 
are important determinants of trade intensity and indicate quite consistent magnitude 
across normalisation: distance has a negative impact and adjacency has a positive impact. 
Using the common language indicates the gain to trade to be approximately 40%. Free 
trade agreement has similar magnitude with FE model. Finally, positive product of GDP 
per capita suggests that economic growth in either one or both of the economies acts as a 
stimulus to international trade with the impact of 17% using GDP normalisation and 4% 
using trade normalisation. After including three time-invariant variables the average 
overall R2s are 41% and mostly explained by cross-sectional data.  
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Table 5-6 
First Stage Results from 2-step Panel Data Model 
 Normalised by GDP Normalised by total trade 
 FE+3IV RE+6IV RE+3IV FE+3IV RE+6IV RE+3IV
-12.31* -7.22* -10.34* -7.46* -3.91* -6.87* 
Constant 
(-32.22) (-14.17) (-25.89) (-23.90) (-7.98) (-17.98)
0.14* 0.13* 0.30* 0.24* 0.28* 0.44* 
FIXij,t 
(3.19) (2.28) (4.99) (6.63) (4.91) (7.76) 
0.38* 0.30* 
LANij dropped 
(4.06) 
dropped dropped 
(3.37) 
dropped
-0.32* -0.32* 
DISij dropped 
(-8.33) 
dropped dropped 
(-8.69) 
dropped
1.16* 1.32* 
ADJij dropped 
(8.14) 
dropped dropped 
(9.80) 
dropped
0.52* 0.68* 1.06* 0.20* 0.28* 0.68* 
FTAij,t 
(8.35) (8.80) (15.04) (3.98) (3.69) (10.03) 
0.30* 0.16* 0.18* 0.10* 0.04* 0.06* 
YYij,t 
(14.75) (8.04) (8.59) (6.10) (2.20) (2.83) 
Within R2 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.09 0.09 0.09 
Between R2 0.21 0.46 0.25 0.17 0.40 0.20 
Overall R2 0.22 0.44 0.25 0.16 0.37 0.18 
       
134.52* 960.00* 525* 37.65* 726.00* 260* F-test (FE)/ 
Wald test (RE) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
17* 1500* 1546* 28* 1924* 1886* F-test /  
BP-LM test 
( 0=ijμ ) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Note: First step estimates are from:  
tijijtijtijtijijijijtij FIXYYFTAADJDISLANTI ,,6,5,43210, ωυϕϕϕϕϕϕϕ ++++++++= .  
FE+3IV is the FE estimates using three time-variant instruments, RE+6IV shows the RE estimator using all 
six instruments, and the last column is the RE estimates using the same three instruments as the FE estimator. 
t-statistics for coefficients and probability values for tests are shown in parentheses. * and ** denotes statistical 
significant at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. F-test for FE model and Wald test for RE model indicates 
significant level for all equation. The second F-test and BP-LM test exam whether country-pair specific effects 
are different with 0 for FE and RE model, respectively. Bilateral data come from 24 countries, and are 
from1959 to 2003 split into five sub-periods. Sample size is 1380 including gaps.  
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We also report RE estimates using the same three instruments as the FE estimates in 
RE+3IV column. In fact, LANij, DISij, and ADJij add at least 19% to overall fit of the 
instrument equation. Dropping the time-invariant instruments also affects the magnitude 
of the remaining estimates. For example, we focus on the GDP normalisation, using only 
3 instruments the RE estimate for FIXijt is 0.30 compared to 0.13 using all of the 
instruments, while the FE estimate for YYij,t is 0.30 compared to 0.16 using RE with 6 
instruments. 
The overall significance of the model is established by the F- or Wald- statistics for FE 
and RE, respectively. All of them confirm the overall significance of the model. The 
country-pair specific effects are proved statistically significant by F- or BP-LM test for 
FE and RE, respectively, thus justifying the differences existing across country-pairs and 
confirming that panel estimation in the first stage is necessary. 
Table 5-7 presents instrumental variable estimates of equation (4-17). The column of 
RE+6IV shows the RE estimator using the full instrument set. The β  estimates suggest a 
stronger relationship between trade intensity and the business cycle correlation than those 
reported in previous tables. With an average magnitude of 0.26, the business cycle 
correlation is expected to rise 0.18 if trade intensity were to double. The FE+3IV reports 
even larger estimators, though it is derived using only 3 instruments since the time-
invariant variables (distance, land adjacency, and common official language) are dropped 
in this case. In RE with full instrument set, we find very consistent estimates between de-
trending methods and normalisations, but in FE with 3 instruments, the magnitude of 
estimates more than double between trade normalisations. Trade intensity normalised by 
total trade explain more business cycle correlation variation.50 The size of the β  estimate 
still is greater than those reported in the literature, such as Frankel and Rose (1998), Clark 
van Wincoop (2001) and Imbs (2004, 2006). This increase in magnitude can be explained 
by the additional instrumental variables in the first step and the extended group of 
                                                 
50 When we test the variable of FIXij,t, we find a consistent result. When FIXij,t in business cycle equation, 
trade intensity is still significantly positive and FIXij,t is statistically insignificant, which suggests that 
bilateral pegging of currencies only affects economic integration through its impact on international trade. 
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countries and sample period we use for estimation and also the panel data estimation 
technique,  
rather than a pooled instrumental variable estimation method. F-test again rejects the null 
hypothesis that all country-pair specific effects are zero suggesting the panel estimation; 
however the BP-LM test can not be used for 2-stage RE estimation. 
The Hausman specification test is implemented to compare the 2-stage panel data 
estimation with OLS, IV and Panel estimations. The 2-stage FE model is strongly 
different with OLS IV and FE estimations and all tests reject the null hypothesis at 5% 
level. RE estimation is different with OLS and RE estimation at the 5% level and 
different with IV estimation at 10% level when trade intensity normalised by GDP, but 
Table 5-7 
Second Step Results from 2-Step Panel Data Model 
Normalised by GDP Normalised by total trade   Variable 
FE+3IV RE+6IV RE+3IV FE+3IV RE+6IV RE+3IV
2.73* 2.08* 3.08* 4.36* 1.77* 3.08* 
Constant 
(11.18) (19.13) (13.65) (7.76) (16.13) (13.65)
0.36* 0.25* 0.49* 0.73* 0.25* 0.49* 
TIijt (9.36) (15.18) (11.73) (6.97) (12.18) (11.73)
2.13* 1.78* H
P 
fil
te
r 
F-test  
( ijμ =0) (0.00) - (0.00) - 
 
 
2.89* 2.16* 2.90* 4.77* 1.85* 3.31* 
Constant 
(11.50) (19.55) (17.81) (8.15) (16.77) (13.89)
0.39* 0.27* 0.39* 0.81* 0.27* 0.54* 
TIijt 
(9.86) (15.99) (15.41) (7.44) (13.17) (12.22)
2.14* 1.77* Fi
rs
t d
iff
er
en
ce
s 
F-test  
( ijμ =0) (0.00) - (0.00) - 
Notes: tijijtijREtij ITCorr ,,3, ˆ εμβα +++=  where all variables are defined the same with before. Two-step 
fixed effect model and two-step random effect model are adopted to estimate this equation. Trade 
intensity is estimated by six instrumental variables which are from equation 4-2. t-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. * denotes statistical significance at the 5% levels. Bilateral annually data from 24 countries, 
1959 through 2003 split into five sub-periods. Maximum sample size is 1380. 
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the hypothesis that the two estimates are the same can not be rejected for IV estimation 
when trade intensity is normalised by total trade.  
The Hausman test statistics for FE+3IV and RE+6IV comparing two GDP de-trending 
methods and two trade normalisations are 8.97, 22.12, 10.30 and 25.80, showing the FE 
and RE estimates are different from each another. However, it is not immediately 
apparent whether this difference is due to the number of instruments selected or, as is 
normally assumed, due to the individual effects being correlated with TIij,t. When 
Table 5-8 
Hausman Specification Test-2-step Panel Data Model vs. Other Estimation 
Normalised by GDP Normalised by total trade    
FE+3IV RE+6IV RE+3IV FE+IV RE+IV RE+3IV 
46.58* 107.94* 39.64* 92.23* OLS (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
11.66* 3.17** 23.19* 1.38 IV (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.24) 
58.51* 41.54* FE (0.00) - (0.00) - 
123.12* 107.33* RE - (0.00) 
- 
- (0.00) 
- 
8.97* 0.01 22.12* 6.15* 
(0.00) (0.91) (0.00) (0.01) 
H
P 
fil
te
r 
FE+3IV - 
FE RE 
- 
FE FE 
  
  
49.38* 110.76* 43.80* 92.90* 
OLS 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
12.97* 3.00** 26.86* 1.30 IV 
(0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.25) 
66.66* 45.39* FE 
(0.00) 
- 
(0.00) 
- 
128.44* 110.09* RE - 
(0.00) 
- 
- 
(0.00) 
- 
10.30* 0.00 25.80* 7.45* 
(0.00) (0.95) (0.00) (0.01) 
Fi
rs
t d
iff
er
en
ce
s 
FE+3IV - 
FE RE 
- 
FE FE 
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equation (4-17) is re-estimated via RE but using only the time-variant instruments (see 
RE+3IV columns in Table 5-7 and Table 5-8 following by equation (4-19)) the Hausman 
test does not exceed the relevant critical value for GDP normalisation, suggesting that the 
FE and RE estimates are statistically indistinguishable from one another.  
Thus the use of RE is preferred given (i) the wider set of instruments available and (ii) the 
assumption that the randomly distributed individual effects are independent of trade 
intensity holds. While it is not possible to compare directly the FE estimates with those 
obtained using RE with all of the instruments, it is a reasonable assumption to treat 
distance, land adjacency and a common official language as exogenous variables. 
Nevertheless, in total trade normalisation panel, the Hausman test still rejects the null 
hypothesis and prefers FE.  
 
5.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
5.6.1 Measurements of the Business Cycle Correlation 
The standard practice to measure the business cycle is real GDP which has been 
employed in many papers, but as Frankel and Rose (1998) said, it is difficult to select the 
optimal single empirical analogue to the theoretical concept of the business cycle. 
Industrial production, total employment and unemployment rate also are selected to 
measure the business cycle correlation in literature.51 Also in chapter 3, we have found 
that these proxies are statistically different with real GDP. We would like to follow 
Frankel and Rose (1998) to use industrial production, total employment and 
                                                 
51 Davidas and Szapary (2004) discuss various measures of the business cycles also from the perspective of 
the Central and Eastern European countries. Anderson, Kwark & Vahid (1999) use the quarterly indices of 
industrial production to measure the business cycles since GDP data for their countries is only available at 
an annual frequency and Bergman (2004), Fidrmuc (2004) use the industrial production as well. Bayoumi 
and Eichengreen (1994), Crosby (2003) and Calderon et al. (2007) use annual data on GDP to measure the 
correlations of business cycle. Clark and Van Wincoop (2000) adopt both Employment and GDP. 
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unemployment rate to measure the business cycle and exam the robustness of our result 
from above.   
The data of an index of industrial production are from the IMF (IFS) database; total 
employment and the unemployment rate are from SourceOECD Economics Outlook. The 
employment and unemployment rate data of Hong Kong come from Hong Kong Census 
& Statistics Department (GovHK, 2004). Industrial production, total employment and 
unemployment rate are quarterly data. All the data (with gaps52) cover the same 24 
sample countries from 1959 to 2003 and are transformed by the same methods with real 
GDP. Firstly, we take natural logarithms for industrial production and total employment 
but not for the unemployment rate and then de-trend them so as to isolate cyclical 
components of economic time series conforming to a certain definition of the business 
cycle by HP filter and fourth-differences, multiplying by 100, so that the resulting 
variable can be interpreted as a growth rate.  
To be consistent with the real GDP correlations analysis, average business cycle 
correlations measured by industrial production, total employment and unemployment rate 
between 24 individuals countries with their 23 partners across 5 sub-periods are reported 
in Table 5-9, Table 5-10 and Table 5-11, respectively. In Table 5-9, we find that not all of 
European countries have closer business cycles and Greece and Norway present less 
business cycle synchronisation. Countries such as Australia, Canada, Japan and the USA 
all have reasonably high business cycle correlations. However, Hong Kong, Mexico and 
New Zealand remain low correlations with their partners. The average country 
correlations indicate that after jumping to 0.47 in the second period, the last three periods 
have consistent correlations between 0.31 and 0.33.  
Total employment correlations have lower values than other measurements and some 
countries even European countries such as Greece and Norway have negative correlations 
for the whole period. The average employment correlations from 24 countries show that 
they increase progressively over time up till the 1986-94 period. All individual countries  
                                                 
52 We have no data of industrial production, employment and unemployment rate data for China and no 
employment, unemployment rate data for Mexico. 
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have positive correlations for the whole period when the business cycle is measured by 
unemployment rate. The average countries’ correlations increase in the first two periods 
and then decrease. We do not report the business cycles de-trended by fourth difference 
tables here, since they have similar values with economic activities de-trended by the HP- 
filter. 
Table 5-9 
Average Industrial Production Correlations de-trended by HP-filter 
  1959-67 1968-76 1977-85 1986-94 1995-03 Change (%) 1959-03
Australia 0.09 0.58 0.34 0.40 0.26 188 0.33 
Austria 0.44 0.59 0.52 0.32 0.46 5 0.46 
Belgium & 
Luxembourg 0.42 0.65 0.42 0.42 0.27 -34 0.44 
Canada 0.04 0.58 0.46 0.23 0.44 954 0.35 
China        
Denmark 0.19 0.47 0.35 0.14 0.23 18 0.28 
Finland 0.30 0.49 0.30 0.34 0.48 57 0.38 
France 0.30 0.55 0.48 0.47 0.47 58 0.45 
Germany 0.42 0.58 0.52 0.45 0.48 15 0.49 
Greece 0.12 0.07 0.40 0.25 0.12 0 0.19 
Hong Kong   -0.07 0.01 0.08  0.01 
Ireland 0.16 0.55 0.34 0.40 0.34 113 0.36 
Italy -0.13 0.50 0.39 0.50 0.42 414 0.33 
Japan 0.14 0.62 0.53 0.39 0.23 63 0.38 
Mexico   0.02 0.05 0.20  0.09 
Netherlands 0.42 0.59 0.48 0.25 0.38 -10 0.42 
New Zealand   0.17 0.02 0.07  0.09 
Norway 0.25 -0.41 0.43 0.16 0.11 -54 0.11 
Portugal 0.34 0.51 -0.05 0.26 0.03 -91 0.22 
Spain 0.06 0.56 0.24 0.48 0.38 499 0.35 
Sweden 0.31 0.23 0.40 0.32 0.31 1 0.31 
Switzerland 0.30 0.57 0.31 0.33 0.49 67 0.40 
UK 0.40 0.52 0.21 0.38 0.46 13 0.39 
USA -0.12 0.57 0.43 0.30 0.42 469 0.32 
Average 0.22 0.47 0.33 0.30 0.31 137 0.31 
Notes: data are from IMF IFS, and the average industrial production correlations are calculated by the 
individual correlations from each country vis-à-vis their 23 partners. Bold marks are the negative 
correlations.  
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Figure 5-4 compares the four different measures of real economic activity across time. 
Their trends are quite different. Real GDP correlations have the highest values and 
employment correlations have the lowest values. As we expected, the total employment 
correlations and unemployment rate correlations are relatively consistent and industrial 
production relatively close to real GDP correlations. 
Table 5-10 
Average Total Employment Correlations de-trended by HP-filter 
  1959-67 1968-76 1977-85 1986-94 1995-03 Change (%) 1959-03
Australia 0.03 0.32 0.33 0.34 -0.14 -565 0.18 
Austria 0.23 0.31 0.36 0.17 0.36 56 0.29 
Belgium & 
Luxembourg 0.20 0.37 0.43 0.39 0.43 114 0.36 
Canada 0.01 0.11 0.40 0.24 0.19 1463 0.19 
China        
Denmark 0.19 0.28 0.20 0.21 0.16 -16 0.21 
Finland 0.31 -0.10 0.13 0.47 0.41 36 0.25 
France 0.09 0.39 0.07 0.46 0.38 307 0.28 
Germany 0.23 0.28 0.39 -0.09 0.38 65 0.24 
Greece 0.00 -0.24 -0.04 0.03 -0.02 -234 -0.05 
Hong Kong    0.08 -0.16  -0.04 
Ireland 0.06 0.22 0.34 0.39 0.39 526 0.28 
Italy -0.19 0.13 0.29 0.27 0.26 232 0.15 
Japan -0.09 0.15 -0.09 0.16 0.02 119 0.03 
Mexico        
Netherlands  0.16 0.46 0.30 0.41  0.33 
New Zealand 0.03 0.25 -0.02 -0.15 -0.41 -1618 -0.06 
Norway -0.12 -0.29 0.18 -0.04 0.14 217 -0.03 
Portugal 0.27 -0.12 -0.14 0.19 0.41 51 0.12 
Spain 0.01 0.35 0.03 0.41 0.42 5701 0.24 
Sweden 0.18 -0.08 0.33 0.49 0.29 58 0.24 
Switzerland -0.05 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.31 682 0.21 
UK 0.17 0.28 0.30 0.34 0.21 22 0.26 
USA 0.00 0.20 0.21 0.15 0.26 17987 0.16 
Average 0.08 0.15 0.21 0.23 0.21 1260 0.17 
Notes: data are from SourceOECD, and the average employment correlations are calculated by the 
individual correlations from each country vis-à-vis their 23 partners. Bold marks are the negative 
correlations.  
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Following the different measurements of the business cycle correlation, Table 5-12 
presents a positive and statistically significant relationship between the bilateral trade 
intensity and the business cycle correlation. All proxies, de-trending methods and trade 
normalisation estimated by both fixed effect and RE model have not changed results only 
except the case of industrial production correlation estimated by FE when trade 
normalised by total trade. The relationship estimated by RE with full instruments set has 
very consistent magnitudes across de-trending methods, proxies for the business cycle 
and normalisations (11%) and all are strongly significant. However, the magnitude of the 
Table 5-11 
Average Unemployment Rate Correlations de-trended by HP-filter 
  1959-67 1968-76 1977-85 1986-94 1995-03 % Change 1959-03
Australia 0.23 0.48 0.48 0.43 0.05 -80 0.33 
Austria 0.27 0.40 0.55 0.43 0.41 49 0.41 
Belgium & 
Luxembourg 0.27 0.51 0.57 0.37 0.39 44 0.42 
Canada 0.07 0.30 0.51 0.37 0.32 333 0.31 
China        
Denmark 0.27 0.49 0.52 0.19 0.23 -14 0.34 
Finland 0.33 0.01 0.30 0.57 0.17 -47 0.28 
France 0.30 0.52 0.12 0.49 0.42 40 0.37 
Germany 0.29 0.43 0.61 0.51 0.36 22 0.44 
Greece 0.01 -0.41 0.56 0.51 -0.17 -1308 0.10 
Hong Kong    0.09 0.14  0.12 
Ireland -0.11 0.39 0.48 0.55 0.38 436 0.34 
Italy -0.18 0.16 0.24 0.06 0.14 181 0.09 
Japan 0.03 0.50 0.45 0.24 -0.11 -452 0.22 
Mexico        
Netherlands  0.46 0.59 0.22 0.32  0.40 
New Zealand 0.29 0.25 0.25 0.05 -0.04 -112 0.16 
Norway 0.01 0.44 0.44 -0.12 0.14 1101 0.18 
Portugal 0.26 0.14 -0.05 0.13 0.32 24 0.16 
Spain -0.08 0.44 0.04 0.39 0.37 544 0.23 
Sweden 0.30 0.00 0.52 0.57 0.35 19 0.35 
Switzerland 0.18 0.41 0.51 0.55 0.40 126 0.41 
UK 0.25 0.45 0.40 0.49 0.22 -15 0.36 
USA -0.05 0.33 0.25 0.28 0.32 758 0.23 
Average 0.15 0.32 0.40 0.34 0.23 82 0.28 
Notes: data are from SourceOECD, and the unemployment rate correlations are calculated by the 
individual correlations from each country vis-à-vis their 23 partners. Bold marks are the negative 
correlations.  
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estimated relationship in FE with only 3 instruments varies depending on economic 
activities and trade normalisation. The coefficients estimated by FE are greater than those 
from RE estimation which is the same with the result from real GDP correlation equation. 
Comparing with real GDP correlation equation, all of these proxies decrease the 
magnitudes of estimate more than 50% but have not change the result of a significant and 
positive relationship. 
Recall the three columns in Table 5-7, to enable us to choose one estimate for inferences, 
we still can not compare the FE+3IV with RE+6IV directly. In Table 5-12, a Hausman 
test was computed to compare the FE estimates with the RE estimates using only time-
variant instruments (i.e. FE+3IV vs. RE+3IV). If the test statistic was found to be less 
than the 5% critical value then RE using the full instrument set was chosen as the 
‘optimal’ estimator, otherwise inferences were made from the FE results. 
The RE model is more appropriate in the industrial production equation and the FE model 
is more appropriate in the unemployment rate equation. In the total employment equation, 
we find that when employment is de-trended by HP filter, the FE model is more suitable, 
however, when employment is de-trended by fourth difference, the random effect model 
is more appropriate.  
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Figure 5-4. Average Business Cycles Across Time 
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Table 5-12 
The Business Cycle Correlation Equation 
Industrial Production Employment Unemployment Rate
 Variable 
FE+3IV RE+6IV FE+3IV RE+6IV FE+3IV RE+6IV
1.39* 1.03* 1.84* 0.85* 2.26* 1.04* 
Constant 
(5.72) (12.71) (5.65) (7.48) (6.98) (11.93) 
0.17* 0.11* 0.27* 0.11* 0.32* 0.12* 
TIijt (4.37) (8.86) (5.08) (5.92) (6.07) (8.66) 
R2 0.09 0.03 0.08 
3.65 8.83* 14.28* 
H
P 
fil
te
r 
Hausman  
RE FE FE 
1.14* 0.92* 1.05* 0.88* 1.84* 0.96* 
Constant 
(4.66) (13.56) (3.24) (9.08) (5.84) (11.56) 
0.13* 0.09* 0.14* 0.12* 0.25* 0.11* 
TIijt (3.26) (8.67) (2.72) (7.45) (4.93) (8.16) 
R2 0.11 0.06 0.07 
1.90 0.49 8.25* 
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y 
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Hausman   
RE RE FE 
         
0.93* 0.96* 2.41* 0.76* 2.77* 0.96* 
Constant 
(2.06) (12.51) (4.27) (6.82) (4.98) (10.80) 
0.11 0.12* 0.43* 0.11* 0.47* 0.13* 
TIijt 
(1.33) (8.43) (3.94) (5.23) (4.45) (7.58) 
R2 0.09 0.02 0.05 
0.00 6.81* 9.05* 
H
P 
fil
te
r 
Hausman 
RE FE FE 
0.83** 0.90* 1.08* 0.86* 2.03* 0.89* 
Constant 
(1.82) (13.86) (2.02) (8.60) (3.86) (10.57) 
0.09 0.11* 0.17** 0.13* 0.33* 0.12* 
TIijt 
(1.07) (8.72) (1.70) (7.01) (3.31) (7.23) 
R2 0.10 0.05 0.05 
0.00 0.12 3.98* 
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RE RE FE 
Notes: tijijtijREtij ITCorr ,,3, ˆ εμβα +++=  where all variables are defined the same as before. Two-step 
fixed effect model and two-step random effect model are adopted to estimate this equation. Trade intensity 
is estimated by three or six instrumental variables. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. * denotes statistical 
significance at the 5% levels. Bilateral annual data from 24 countries, 1959 through 2003 split into five 
sub-periods. Maximum sample size is 1380. 
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Therefore, in industrial production equation, even the FE estimation has no significant 
estimates when trade normalised by total trade, we still can confirm significant effect 
from trade on the business cycle, since RE estimation is optimal method and presents a 
significant relationship. 
 
5.6.2 Sub-period Analysis 
Whether the relationship between the trade intensity and the business cycle correlations 
varied across sub-periods was tested using a cross section regression with country pair 
data. The first stage results are in Table 5-13 and the second stage results are in Table 
5-14.  
The same instruments are used in the first stage, common official language, distance, 
adjacency, free trade agreement, product of GDP per capita and fixed exchange rate. This 
result is perhaps not surprising given that tables in chapter 3 show that many of the 
countries are now undertaking a greater amount of bilateral trade and becoming more 
economically integrated in terms of the business cycle co-movements. In explaining the 
observed rise in trade intensity, the FIXijt coefficient is only significant for the first two 
sub-periods, a result which could be partly explained by the switch to floating exchange 
rates, among some of the countries in the sample, post-1973. LANij’s estimates are 
significant and positively signed for all periods, though the marginal effect declines over 
time, a result that could be explained by the rising use of second languages in many 
countries, particularly those were English is not the first language. The DISij estimates are 
statistically significant and negative for all periods and the magnitudes are broadly stable. 
The estimate for ADJij is positive and significant for all the periods.  
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Magnitude rises across the sub-periods, suggesting a greater proportion of overall trade 
took place among immediate neighbours. The FTAijt estimates suggest that membership 
of a free trade agreement raises trade intensity, though the size of this impact does vary 
Table 5-13 
IV Estimations for Each Sub-period, First-step 
  Period Const FIXijt LANij DISij ADJij FTAijt YYij,t 
Adjusted
R2 
-4.63* 0.60* 0.62* -0.43* 0.66* 0.79* 0.04 
1959-67 
(-3.87) (3.91) (2.89) (-5.42) (2.01) (2.98) (0.89) 
0.37 
-6.03* 0.70* 0.54* -0.31* 0.85* 1.11* 0.07 
1968-76 
(-5.47) (3.56) (3.00) (-3.63) (3.03) (4.21) (1.54) 
0.49 
-4.93* 0.15 0.48* -0.35* 1.17* 0.61* 0.05 
1977-85 
(-4.19) (0.75) (2.80) (-3.74) (4.50) (2.88) (1.13) 
0.48 
-4.83* -0.23 0.32* -0.32* 1.27* 0.86* 0.04 
1986-94 
(-3.95) (-0.91) (1.99) (-3.46) (5.17) (2.92) (0.87) 
0.49 
-3.79* 0.13 0.23 -0.38* 1.16* 0.46* 0.03 
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1995-03 
(-2.66) (0.79) (1.33) (-4.13) (4.55) (2.10) (0.52) 
0.45 
          
-2.34* 0.77* 0.57* -0.33* 0.99* 0.59* -0.06 
1959-67 
(-2.03) (5.15) (2.80) (-4.30) (3.15) (2.28) (-1.21)
0.35 
-2.71* 0.95* 0.46* -0.24* 1.00* 0.78* -0.08**
1968-76 
(-2.63) (5.17) (2.74) (-2.98) (3.81) (3.16) (-1.93)
0.43 
-3.18* 0.03 0.41* -0.33* 1.36* 0.33 0.01 
1977-85 
(-2.61) (0.16) (2.29) (-3.44) (5.04) (1.52) (0.17) 
0.39 
-4.44* -0.34 0.14 -0.33* 1.48* 0.58** 0.08 
1986-94 
(-3.35) (-1.23) (0.77) (-3.35) (5.53) (1.80) (1.64) 
0.40 
-3.78* 0.06 0.05 -0.40* 1.36* 0.17 0.08 
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1995-03 
(-2.43) (0.33) (0.28) (-4.03) (4.91) (0.70) (1.39) 
0.38 
 
Notes: The regression estimated by OLS: 
  ijijijijijijijij FIXYYFTAADJDISLANTI ωϕϕϕϕϕϕϕ +++++++= 6543210  
Six Instrumental Variables are: Fixed exchange rate agreement, language, distance, adjacent, free trade 
agreement and product of GDP per capita for each period. t-statistics are shown in parentheses and 
regressions are with robust standard errors. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. Bilateral annually data are from 24 countries, maximum sample size for each period is 276. 
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somewhat over the sub-periods. We also find variability across the YYij,,t estimates, 
switching between positive and negative values and statistical significance. The fit of 
regressions in first stage also confirm that all these instruments explain trade well and it is 
the lowest in the first period and increase around 47% for the later four periods using 
GDP normalisation and 40% using trade normalisation. Both normalisations present very 
similar results.  
 
Table 5-14 
IV Estimations for Each Sub-period, Second-step 
  HP filter First differences 
  
Period 
Constant TIijt Constant TIijt 
0.39* 0.03 0.47* 0.05** 
1959-67 
(2.19) (1.24) (2.53) (1.82) 
1.44* 0.14* 1.48* 0.15* 
1968-76 
(12.07) (7.75) (12.64) (8.54) 
1.95* 0.21* 2.11* 0.25* 
1977-85 
(14.16) (9.86) (13.70) (10.61) 
2.57* 0.35* 2.61* 0.34* 
1986-94 
(14.36) (12.10) (14.52) (12.03) 
2.18* 0.28* 2.30* 0.30* 
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1995-03 
(10.67) (8.26) (10.71) (8.55) 
 
0.30* 0.02 0.38* 0.05 
1959-67 
(1.92) (0.82) (2.35) (1.54) 
1.18* 0.12* 1.31* 0.15* 
1968-76 
(9.85) (5.50) (10.90) (6.88) 
1.38* 0.14* 1.57* 0.20* 
1977-85 
(10.87) (6.16) (11.29) (7.85) 
1.87* 0.27* 1.87* 0.26* 
1986-94 
(12.18) (9.53) (12.28) (9.32) 
1.89* 0.26* 1.97* 0.28* 
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1995-03 
(10.45) (7.73) (10.44) (7.99) 
Notes: The regression estimated by IV estimation: 
  ( ) tijtijtji TradeYYCorr ,,, εβα ++= , the first stage results are from Table 5-13. t-statistics are in parentheses 
and bold marks are significant values at 95%. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. Bilateral annually data are from 24 countries, maximum sample size for each period 
is 276. 
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The β  estimate is statistically insignificant for the first time period, but significance and 
magnitude increases progressively over time up until the 1986-94 period, when the 
maximum marginal effect occurs. All other de-trending methods and normalisations also 
report very close results and show a stronger relationship between trade intensity and the 
business cycle correlation across time. We do not report R2 in the second stage, since the 
R2s in IV estimations are not bounded between 0 and 1. 
 
5.6.3 Panel Unit Root Test 
Our four proxies for the business cycle, particularly the real GDP, exhibit strong trends 
and they are not stationary and thus are not amenable to the analysis. If a real GDP, for 
example, is truly I (1), then shocks to it will have permanent effects. If confirmed, then 
this variable would mandate some rather serious reconsideration. For example, the 
argument that a change in bilateral trade could have a transitory effect on real output 
would vanish. In many cases, stationarity can be achieved by simple differencing or some 
other transformation. That is the reason we take the natural log (except for the 
unemployment rate) and de-trend them by both HP-filter and differencing.  
To test the stationarity of our variables the Dickey-Fuller test (DF) and augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) are used. They are the most popular unit root tests which are 
common practices among applied researchers and have become an integral part of 
econometric courses. The testing procedure for the ADF test is the same as for the 
Dickey-Fuller test but it is applied to the model. For example we have a model: 
tptpttt yyyty εγγγβμ +Δ++Δ+++= −−− L111    (5-4) 
where μ is a constant, β  the coefficient on a time trend and p the lag order of the 
autoregressive process. Imposing μ  = 0 and β  = 0 corresponds to modelling a random 
walk and using the β  = 0 corresponds to modelling a random walk with a drift. The unit 
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root test is then carried out under the null hypothesis γ  = 1 against the alternative 
hypothesis of γ  < 1. Once a value for the test statistic 
)ˆ(
)1ˆ(
γ
γ
SE
DF −=       (5-5) 
is computed it can be compared to the relevant critical value for the Dickey-Fuller test. If 
the test statistic is less than the critical value then the null hypothesis of γ  = 1 is rejected 
and no unit root is present. 
These tests can only be used with a time series data set. But in our sample the individual 
specific intercepts and time trends should be considered as well. Recently, a couple of 
papers developed the unit root test to be used in panel data, such as Levin, Lin and Chu 
(2002), Im et al. (2003) and Hadri (2000). The details of their methodologies are 
introduced in appendix III.  
We apply the Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) (LLC), Im et al. (2003) (IPS) and Fisher tests to 
our panel data of 276 country pairs over 5 periods from 1959 to 2003. The variable of the 
business cycle correlations measured by GDP is a balanced panel, without gaps, and all 
others miss a couple of observations. Therefore, we implement LLC and IPS tests for real 
GDP correlations only and Fisher test for all variables. 
Table 5-15 investigates the integration properties through the use of LLC, IPS and Fisher 
panel unit root tests for the 276 country pairs for the variables: Real GDP correlations; 
industrial production correlations; total employment and unemployment rate de-trended 
by HP-filter and by first or fourth difference. We test the real GDP correlations by all 
three panel unit root test since it is a balanced panel variable. All panel unit root statistics 
reject the null of a unit root. However, our other three proxies for the trade intensity and 
the business cycle all miss a couple of observations, and only the Fisher test can be 
implemented to test the panel unit root. Again, all of them reject the null hypothesis. 
Hence our variables are all stationary after transforming variables. 
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5.6.4 Other Robustness Tests 
The FE two-stage estimations take into account the individuality of country pairs to let 
the intercept vary for each country pair but each country pair’s intercept does not vary 
over time which is time invariant. Therefore, we would like to consider how the intercept 
varies over individuals as well as time here.  
Just as we used the dummy variables to account for country pair effect, we can allow for 
time effect in the sense that the business cycle correlation equation change over time 
Table 5-15 
Panel Unit Root Tests 
    LLC IPS Fisher 
   
*
ρt  t  2χ  
-76.50* -3.48* 4598* 
Real GDP 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
2239* Industrial 
Production - - (0.00) 
1816* Total 
Employment - - (0.00) 
1675* 
H
P-
Fi
lte
r 
Unemployment 
Rate - - (0.00) 
-71.75* -3.00* 4627* 
Real GDP 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
3098* Industrial 
Production - - (0.00) 
1533* Total 
Employment - - (0.00) 
1808* 
D
iff
er
en
ci
ng
 
Unemployment 
Rate - - (0.00) 
2504* Trade normalised by 
GDP - - (0.00) 
2021* Trade normalised by 
total trade - - (0.00) 
Notes: all tests have the null hypothesis that H0: non-stationary against the Ha: stationary. 
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because of the factors such as changes in policies, and government regulatory or external 
effects such as wars or other conflicts. Such time effects can be easily accounted for if we 
introduce time dummies, one for each period. Since we have data for 5 periods, from 
1959 to 2003, we can introduce 4 dummies as well as 275 country pair dummies. When 
we run the regressions, we find most time dummies are significant but this has not 
changed the significance and magnitude of the trade intensity on the business cycles. We 
also have split our data set into two sub-periods across time (instead of five) and re-
estimated our equations. The resulting point-estimates of β  remain similar to those 
recorded before.  
As Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005) mentioned a couple of variables are the key 
determinants of the business cycle comovement rather than trade intensity, such as 
sectorial structure, factor endowments. Imbs (2004, 2006) also pointed out that financial 
integration and industrial specification lead to changes of the business cycles. Therefore, 
someone may ask any omitted problems in the business cycle correlations equation. We 
include several potential variables to solve the omitted variables problem. A dummy 
variable whether a county pair share the same most important trade partner is included as 
a control variable since the third-country effects are very important. Close business cycle 
correlations could be raised by high bilateral trade, but it also could be caused by similar 
trade partners. Then highly correlated business cycles are likely affected by demand 
shocks from the common third country economies. A time trend also could be considered 
in the regression. There may be other trending factors in the background which affect the 
convergence. Still, it is reassuring to us that the effects of bilateral trade intensity on the 
business cycle symmetry do not seem very sensitive to the presence of these variables. 
Finally, we include another two additional variables, industry specialisation and financial 
integration and the results remain similar to those observed before. However, the 
interactions amongst these two variables and trade intensity are complex and we discuss 
them in chapter 7. 
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5.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we investigated the relationship between two of the OCA criteria. The 
empirical analysis is used to estimate the effect of increased trade integration on the 
bilateral country correlation of the business cycle activity since from a theoretical 
viewpoint, this effect is ambiguous. Our evidence shows that economic convergence has 
increased among the world’s major economies and the volume of international trade has 
risen.  
To test the endogeneity of optimum currency area criteria empirically, data was obtained 
for a group of 24 countries over the sample period 1959 to 2003. We follow Frankel and 
Rose (1998) and start our empirical model from Ordinary Least Square estimation. We 
find that the business cycle correlation would rise by 0.069 following a doubling of trade 
intensity. This impact is stronger than literature since extending sample countries and 
sample period.  
However, OLS estimation cannot provide a feasible result, because theory and a large 
body of literature show that bilateral trade flows are endogenous. We develop OLS model 
to two-stage least square estimation using six instrumental variables from the gravity 
model, language, distance, adjacency, free trade agreement, product of GDP per capita 
and fixed exchange rate. With an average magnitude of 0.24, the business cycle 
correlation is expected to rise by 0.17 if trade intensity were to double. The higher 
magnitude can be explained by the higher correlation coefficient between the business 
cycle correlation and the estimated trade intensity by 6 instruments and lower standard 
error of estimated trade intensity. Also it is because OLS is in fact biased down. We did a 
couple of tests to prove that our six instrumental variables from the gravity model are 
good instruments and they explain trade intensity very well but are not correlated with the 
business cycle correlation. Particularly for the fixed exchange rate, we find it is 
insignificant in the business cycle correlation equation but is significantly correlated with 
trade intensity. Furthermore, we extend the model to panel data estimation considering 
the unobservable country pair specific effects. Both FE and RE estimation results are 
reported and are found to be very close to the OLS results.  
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Finally, the two-stage RE model presents an average magnitude of 0.26. The business 
cycle correlation is expected to rise 0.18 if trade intensity were to double and the two-
stage FE model reports even larger estimators, though it is derived using only 3 
instruments (time-invariant variables distance, land adjacency, and common official 
language are dropped in this case). Hausman specification test is implemented here to 
select the ‘optimal’ estimator, but the result depends on trade normalisation. When trade 
intensity is normalised by GDP, the model prefers RE and when trade intensity is 
normalised by total trade, the model prefers FE. The ß estimates are still larger than those 
reported by the previous literature since the time period, number of countries and 
econometric methodology differs.    
To prove the robustness of our result presented above, we did a couple of sensitivity 
analyses. We use industrial production, total employment and unemployment rate instead 
of real GDP to measure the business cycle correlations. We find their results are very 
consistent with real GDP’s, and trade intensity has significant and positive impact on the 
business cycle. In sub-period analysis we find that the β  estimate is not statistically 
significant for the first time period, but the magnitude increases progressively over time 
up until the 1986-94 period, when the maximum marginal effect occurs. We also include 
time dummies in our 2-stage FE estimation, split the sample into 2 periods, and add 
control variables in the business cycle equation, such as financial integration, 
specification, a time trend and a dummy variable for third trade partners. None of these 
change our main result and the trade intensity remains statistically significant with 
positive effects on the business cycles. 
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Chapter 6 Individual Countries and Regional 
Analysis 
 
6.1 Introduction 
From the aggregate estimation approach, we find a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between bilateral trade intensity and business cycle correlation. Although 
panel data estimation considers the difference between individual country pairs, the 
model still assumes that the slope coefficients are the same. However, different countries 
have different trade policies and appear to produce different relationships. If we pool all 
the countries together, interaction will ignore differences between countries and only 
generate a general result as we had before. Another significant contribution of this thesis 
is that we regress our model for each country as well as the main geographic regions thus 
identifying whether differences in the estimated relationship emerge between economies. 
In this chapter we focus on the individual countries with their 23 partners and estimate 
coefficients individually. Two-stage panel estimation is still used here. To enable us to 
choose an ‘optimal’ estimate for inferences, a Hausman test was computed to compare 
the fixed effects estimates with the random effects estimates (using only time-variant 
instruments: FIXij,t, FTAij,t and YYij,t). If the test statistic is found to be less than the 5% 
critical value then random effects using the full instrument set is chosen as the optimal 
estimator, otherwise inferences are made from the fixed effects results.  
The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows: section 6.2 presents the individual 
country analysis, we find a significant slope estimate mainly for the European countries. 
Section 6.3 explains why the significant effects are only for European countries from four 
factors. We analyse the Asia-Pacific economies with a wider sample of 28 trade partners, 
and estimate different region slopes and also try to use the third country partner to explain 
it.  Section 6.4 presents the relationship for each European country only with European 
county partners. The last section (6.5) is the summary of this chapter. 
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6.2 Disaggregated Analysis 
The whole sample results presented in the previous chapter do not show significant 
differences between trade normalisation and de-trending methods, and only the 
magnitude of β  increases in total trade normalisation when the regression is estimated by 
FE. Hence, we would like to focus on the estimation when the GDP de-trended by HP 
filter and trade normalised by GDP to investigate the 24 countries’ relationships 
individually. Each country’s observations are still panel data containing 23 partners 
across 5 periods and we still implement the ‘optimal’ estimation, two-stage fixed and 
random effects model. Variations in the sign and magnitude of the relationship between 
the trade intensity and the business cycle correlation could take place across countries or 
geographical regions, particularly given the importance of gravity variables in the 
determination of trade intensity.  
Table 6-1 presents the determinants of trade intensity for individual countries using FE. 
Again, time-invariant variables, LANij,t, DISij,t and ADJij,t, are dropped since they are 
constant across periods subsumed within the individual fixed effects and only three 
instruments are reported in Table 6-1. The product of GDP per capita explains trade 
intensity very well. Except Australia Greece New Zealand and Portugal all countries 
present positive and statistically significant estimators. The average magnitude of the 
product of GDP per capita for 24 individual countries is 0.33 suggesting a gain in trade 
intensity of 39%. The average estimator is very close to the aggregate estimator which is 
0.30. For only 9 countries the fixed exchange rate was found to be statistically significant 
with the average magnitude of 0.13. It is also very close to the aggregate countries’ result 
(0.14), and the gain from doubling FIXij,t is a 9% rise in trade intensity. On average, all 
founding members of EU53 have a significant impact from the free trade agreement on 
trade. Canada, Mexico plus some other European countries, such as Ireland and the UK, 
also present significant estimators. The average coefficient, 0.51 is still close to the 
aggregate coefficient, 0.52.  
                                                 
53 Belgium and Luxembourg, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands. 
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The European countries explain the overall fit of the instrument equation (using only 3 
instruments) much better than non-European countries. The average R2 for the European 
countries, 0.33, more three times higher than the non-European countries, 0.10. Expect 
China, all European countries have higher R2 than the non-European countries. Counties 
like Australia Canada and Hong Kong only explain 1% on the instrument equation. 
Table 6-2 presents the instrumented equation for all individual countries estimated by RE. 
All six instrumental variables are reported, however, some countries have constant values 
for particular variables and we leave ‘-’ for them in the table. For example, there are no 
common borders for Australia, China, Greece, Japan and New Zealand, and their 
dummies are always zero. Therefore these dummies are collinear with the constant and 
are dropped. The instruments of language and free trade agreement have the same 
problem too.  
Bilateral economic cooperation benefits trade intensity: Free trade agreement presents a 
significant impact on trade intensity; however, not many countries show a significant 
impact of fixed exchange rate on trade. The average FIXij,t and FTAij,t estimates are 0.16 
and 0.73 respectively, suggesting a gain in trade intensity of 17% and 108% respectively. 
19 of the 24 countries have a significant effect from the product of GDP per capita on 
trade and the average gain from doubling YYij,t is a 25% rise in trade intensity. 
Geographical characteristics are important determinants of trade intensity with a gain of 
263% for two countries that are adjacent to one another. Except Finland, Sweden and the 
UK, all other countries present a significant impact from it. A country pair that has twice 
the geographic distance of another would be expected to have 35% less trade, whereas the 
gain to trade from a common language is 46%. In all but 4 cases have significant 
estimates for distance emerged; however, only seven countries have significant 
coefficients of language. Again, European countries show a better overall fitness (with 
the average R2=0.64) than non-European countries (with the average R2=0.37). 
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Table 6-1 
Instrumented Equation Estimated by FE for Individual Countries 
Countries Constant FIXij,t FTAij,t YYij,t R2 
-8.59* -0.24** 0.36 0.10 0.00 
Australia  
(-7.01) (-1.75) (0.74) (1.57)  
-11.91* 0.21** 0.23 0.27* 0.33 
Austria 
(-18.34) (1.66) (1.39) (7.49)  
-8.35* 0.21* 0.38* 0.13* 0.47 Belgium & 
Luxembourg (-12.33) (2.11) (3.35) (3.65)  
-11.41* 0.08 0.81* 0.25* 0.01 
Canada 
(-8.47) (0.74) (2.58) (3.59)  
-21.55* 1.05 0.93* 0.31 
China 
(-14.32) (1.50) 
- 
(9.43)  
-9.55* 0.19 0.19 0.16* 0.38 
Denmark 
(-8.82) (1.34) (1.04) (2.82)  
-14.12* -0.04 0.03 0.39* 0.15 
Finland 
(-10.13) (-0.35) (0.19) (5.36)  
-14.42* -0.01 0.80* 0.42* 0.30 
France 
(-10.07) (-0.09) (5.07) (5.66)  
-9.76* 0.21** 0.29* 0.23* 0.30 
Germany 
(-12.21) (1.65) (2.02) (5.28)  
-9.27* 0.27** 0.66* 0.07 0.54 
Greece 
(-5.21) (1.89) (3.34) (0.83)  
-18.93* -0.10 0.67* 0.01 
Hong Kong 
(-19.57) (-0.51) 
- 
(13.03)  
-20.27* 0.26** 0.78* 0.68* 0.54 
Ireland 
(-13.44) (1.74) (4.18) (8.41)   
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Table 6-1 
Instrumented Equation Estimated by FE for Individual Countries (Continued) 
Countries Constant FIXij,t FTAij,t YYij,t R2 
-11.23* 0.02 0.74* 0.26* 0.32 Italy 
(-6.77) (0.15) (5.20) (2.99)  
-10.93* 0.19 0.22* 0.00 Japan 
(-12.47) (1.29) 
- 
(4.99)  
-19.73* 0.02 1.33* 0.67* 0.11 Mexico 
(-8.46) (0.09) (3.25) (5.08)  
-9.98* 0.05 0.30* 0.23* 0.33 Netherlands (-10.61) (0.45) (1.98) (4.51)  
-8.81* -0.24 0.29 0.06 0.01 New Zealand 
(-2.28) (-0.55) (0.23) (0.29)  
-9.62* 0.08 0.21 0.16* 0.31 
Norway (-7.67) (0.59) (1.19) (2.46)  
-9.61* -0.05 1.03* 0.11 0.54 
Portugal 
(-4.39) (-0.26) (4.88) (0.96)  
-15.50* 0.15 0.80* 0.45* 0.29 
Spain 
(-6.35) (0.87) (4.33) (3.49)  
-10.61* 0.00 0.13 0.24* 0.21 
Sweden 
(-8.53) (0.03) (0.89) (3.78)  
-8.59* 0.18** 0.14 0.13* 0.21 
Switzerland 
(-11.12) (1.81) (0.88) (3.16)  
-11.53* 0.22** 0.76* 0.30* 0.30 
UK 
(-7.68) (1.78) (4.40) (3.90)  
-22.97* 0.51* 0.51 0.83* 0.09 
USA 
(-9.25) (2.21) (0.79) (6.59)   
Average Magnitude -12.80 0.13 0.51 0.33 0.25 
Notes: t-statistics are shown in parentheses. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The trade equation estimated by FE.  
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Table 6-2 
Instrumented Equation Estimated by RE for Individual Countries 
Countries Constant FIXij,t LANij DISij ADJij FTAij,t YYij,t R2 
10.03* -0.44 0.51* -1.88* -1.47** 0.06 0.36 
Australia 
(3.33) (-1.32) (2.53) (-5.52) 
- 
(-1.91) (0.69)  
-5.69* 0.33* 0.15 -0.56* 1.20* 0.21 0.16* 0.82 
Austria 
(-6.19) (2.24) (0.73) (-6.86) (5.68) (1.10) (4.11)  
-5.52* -0.02 0.21 -0.45* 1.03* 0.40* 0.16* 0.87 Belgium & 
Luxembourg (-7.13) (-0.18) (1.53) (-8.70) (5.71) (2.82) (4.25)  
-5.91* 0.16 0.24 0.09 2.59* 1.25* -0.09 0.27 
Canada 
(-2.09) (0.76) (1.25) (0.37) (3.39) (2.04) (-1.17)  
-10.39* 1.45** 1.81** -1.12* 0.85* 0.49 
China 
(-2.18) (1.86) (1.72) (-2.41) 
- - 
(6.52)  
-2.97* -0.37* -0.20 -0.84* 0.67* 0.46* 0.16* 0.79 
Denmark 
(-2.44) (-2.10) (-1.61) (-10.53) (2.13) (2.07) (3.04)  
-2.44** -0.23** 0.36 -1.01* 0.00 0.17 0.20* 0.78 
Finland 
(-1.81) (-1.76) (0.82) (-9.75) (0.00) (1.15) (3.70)  
-7.75* -0.18 -0.09 -0.27* 1.14* 0.83* 0.18* 0.64 
France 
(-5.20) (-1.17) (-0.34) (-2.93) (4.46) (4.43) (2.66)  
-5.03* -0.03 -0.21 -0.40* 0.74* 0.35** 0.13* 0.64 
Germany 
(-4.05) (-0.18) (-0.72) (-4.10) (2.58) (1.76) (2.63)  
-8.50* 0.14 -0.58* 0.92* 0.27* 0.62 
Greece 
(-4.43) (0.80) 
- 
(-4.17) 
- 
(4.01) (4.31)  
-6.79* -0.15 0.73* -1.18* 3.08* 0.57* 0.56 
Hong Kong 
(-2.15) (-0.50) (3.24) (-4.03) (4.13) 
- 
(7.26)  
-14.81* 0.31** 0.26 -0.24* 1.77* 0.84* 0.48* 0.75 
Ireland 
(-8.75) (1.89) (1.01) (-2.10) (3.34) (4.22) (6.95)  
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Table 6-2 
Instrumented Equation Estimated by RE for Individual Countries (Continued) 
Countries Constant FIXij,t LANij DISij ADJij FTAij,t YYij,t R2 
-4.04* 0.00 -0.32* 0.87* 0.87* 0.01 0.53 Italy (-2.26) (-0.01) - (-2.57) (3.58) (3.79) (0.08)  
1.79 0.29 -1.28* 0.16** 0.13 Japan (0.75) (1.00) - (-4.15) - - (1.94)  
-0.81 -0.19 1.33* -1.09* 1.37** 1.54* 0.16 0.30 Mexico (-0.16) (-0.58) (2.43) (-2.27) (1.82) (2.43) (1.47)  
-7.57* 0.19 0.33 -0.14* 1.23* 0.99* 0.14* 0.68 Netherlands (-7.07) (1.22) (0.77) (-2.55) (3.58) (5.54) (2.57)  
-7.69* 0.54 0.80* 0.00 2.52* -0.02 0.31 New Zealand (-3.72) (1.06) (3.21) (0.02) - (4.17) (-0.22)  
-9.11* 0.49* - -0.10 1.14* 1.26* 0.13** 0.47 Norway (-5.17) (2.13)  (-0.99) (3.44) (5.47) (1.74)  
-12.39* 0.58* - -0.19** 1.08* 1.32* 0.30* 0.66 Portugal (-6.98) (3.03)  (-1.77) (2.62) (6.94) (4.34)  
-11.95* 0.24 1.00** 0.00 1.20* 1.06* 0.25* 0.45 Spain (-5.16) (1.30) (1.69) (-0.02) (2.63) (5.64) (2.56)  
-1.60 -0.11 -0.39 -0.89* 0.44 0.02 0.14* 0.79 Sweden (-1.31) (-0.97) (-1.05) (-10.21) (1.48) (0.12) (2.87)  
-4.62* 0.02 0.06 -0.43* 0.93* 0.12 0.09* 0.68 Switzerland (-4.41) (0.12) (0.38) (-5.07) (4.64) (0.64) (2.06)  
-10.95* 0.18 0.28 0.00 0.65 0.68* 0.27* 0.35 UK (-6.96) (1.22) (1.29) (-0.03) (1.38) (3.63) (3.77)  
-23.19* 0.56* -0.02 0.76* 3.41* 1.00 0.48* 0.32 USA (-5.29) (1.78) (-0.06) (2.19) (4.27) (1.00) (4.26)   
Average 
Magnitude -6.58 0.16 0.38 -0.51 1.29 0.73 0.22 0.55 
Notes: t-statistics are shown in parentheses. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The trade equation estimated by RE. 
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Comparing Table 6-1 with Table 6-2, explanatory power is highest when using all of the 
instruments. In fact, LANij, DISij and ADJij add 30% to the overall fit of the instrument 
equation. Consistent with aggregate results, dropping the time-invariant instruments also 
affects the magnitude of the remaining estimates. For example, using only 3 instruments 
the FE estimate for FTAij,t is 0.51 compared to 0.73 using all of the instruments in RE, 
while the FE estimate for YYij,t is 0.3 compared to 0.22 using RE with 6 instruments. 
Table 6-3 presents individual country regressions using both fixed and random effects. 
The estimated trade intensity is from first step reported in Table 6-1 and Table 6-2. In line 
with the aggregate results nearly all of the slope estimates are positive and statistically 
significant. To enable us to choose an ‘optimal’ estimate for inferences, a Hausman test 
was computed to compare the fixed effects estimates with the random effects estimates 
(using only time-variant instruments: FIXij,t, FTAij,t and YYij,t). If the test statistic was 
found to be less than the 5% critical value then random effects using the full instrument 
set was chosen as the “optimal” estimator, otherwise inferences were made from the fixed 
effects results. The conclusions from this selection process are shown in bold figures. For 
15 countries random effects was found to be the optimal estimator.  
In all but 4 cases the β  estimate is found to be positive however it is only statistically 
significant for the 17 European countries in the sample plus China, where the t-ratio for 
the slope estimate just exceeds the 5% critical value and all of these significant 
coefficients are positive. Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Japan and New Zealand all 
present insignificant estimates. Although it is statistically significant for Mexico and the 
USA their coefficients are negative. This result is consistent with what we find in chapter 
3. Both Mexico and the USA have significant increasing trend for trade intensity from 
0.004 to 0.0022 and from 0.0019 to 0.0053, respectively but less synchronized with the 
cycle in the other countries from 0.24 to -0.40 and from 0.16 to -0.09 respectively. Hong 
Kong has a similar situation but presents an insignificant slope estimate. The average 
slope estimate for the European countries is 0.495, with a standard deviation of 0.34. 
Seven of the estimates are in the range 0.15 to 0.30. FE+IV still reports higher magnitude 
of slopes than those from RE+IV.  
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Table 6-3 
Individual Countries Results Estimated by Two-Stage Panel Estimation 
FE+IV RE+IV 
Countries 
Constant TIij,t Constant TIij,t 
Hausman Test 
6.80** 0.96** 0.26 -0.02 2.26 Australia 
(1.80) (1.70) (0.77) (-0.36) (0.13) 
RE 
2.74* 0.33* 1.93* 0.20* 0.00 
Austria 
(4.49) (3.51) (9.08) (6.34) (0.95) 
RE 
4.00* 0.62* 1.69* 0.20* 5.28* Belgium & 
Luxembourg (5.33) (4.51) (9.52) (6.20) (0.02) 
FE 
0.10 -0.02 0.28 0.01 0.01 
Canada 
(0.10) (-0.12) (0.87) (0.13) (0.93) 
RE 
0.75* 0.08** 0.64* 0.06* 0.77 
China 
(2.54) (1.95) (2.73) (1.99) (0.38) 
RE 
6.45* 0.94* 1.71* 0.18* 7.63* 
Denmark 
(4.19) (3.81) (9.73) (6.53) (0.01) 
FE 
2.61* 0.31* 1.62* 0.16* 0.13 
Finland 
(3.00) (2.37) (6.35) (4.24) (0.72) 
RE 
2.34* 0.30* 1.82* 0.21* 0.02 
France 
(4.89) (3.68) (6.31) (4.36) (0.89) 
RE 
3.36* 0.54* 1.97* 0.27* 1.49 
Germany 
(4.79) (4.02) (7.57) (5.57) (0.22) 
RE 
6.43* 0.80* 2.12* 0.22* 4.52* 
Greece 
(3.33) (3.06) (8.47) (6.39) (0.03) 
FE 
-0.54** -0.12* 0.21 0.00 0.09 
Hong Kong 
(-1.79) (-2.57) (1.03) (-0.08) (0.77) 
RE 
2.12* 0.23* 2.22* 0.24* 2.74 
Ireland 
(7.52) (5.62) (9.61) (7.41) (0.10) 
RE 
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Table 6-3 
Individual Countries Results Estimated by Two-Stage Panel Estimation (Continued) 
FE+IV RE+IV Countries 
Constant TIij,t Constant TIij,t 
Hausman Test 
6.97* 1.11* 2.40* 0.33* 9.30* Italy (5.36) (5.02) (6.47) (5.35) (0.00) FE 
4.11* 0.58* 1.21* 0.15 0.53 Japan (3.86) (3.64) (1.96) (1.58) (0.47) RE 
-3.21* -0.41* -0.37 -0.05 54.29* Mexico (-4.94) (-4.99) (-0.91) (-0.99) (0.00) FE 
3.72* 0.58* 1.96* 0.26* 3.84* Netherlands (4.88) (4.13) (9.70) (6.99) (0.05) FE 
10.59 1.31 0.99* 0.06 0.39 New Zealand (0.70) (0.66) (2.66) (1.31) (0.53) RE 
8.29* 1.22* 2.22* 0.26* 5.72* Norway (3.41) (3.19) (8.71) (6.65) (0.02) FE 
4.18* 0.52* 1.97* 0.21* 4.63* Portugal (4.15) (3.66) (8.96) (6.79) (0.03) FE 
3.21* 0.41* 2.85* 0.36* 0.05 Spain (5.84) (4.86) (7.07) (5.79) (0.82) RE 
3.77* 0.55* 1.53* 0.17* 1.26 Sweden (2.98) (2.54) (7.55) (4.89) (0.26) RE 
5.36* 0.82* 1.91* 0.23* 2.03 Switzerland (3.57) (3.20) (6.78) (4.83) (0.15) RE 
1.85* 0.25** 2.06* 0.29* 0.19 UK (2.81) (1.97) (4.79) (3.51) (0.66) RE 
-0.73** -0.13* 0.17 0.00 10.64* USA (-1.72) (-2.09) (0.75) (0.09) (0.00) FE 
Average Magnitude 3.55 0.49 1.47 0.17 40% prefers FE 
Notes: t-statistics are shown in parentheses. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The first column shows the FE 
estimates using three instruments, the second column is RE estimator using all six instruments. A Hausman test statistic is also included to compare the FE 
estimates with the RE estimates using 3 instruments, from which an “optimal” estimator is chosen (see bold figures). * denotes significance at the 5% level. 
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For example the slope estimates in FE+IV for Italy and Norway are 1.11 and 1.22 
respectively, but only are 0.33 and 0.26 with 5% significant level in RE+IV respectively. 
The average slope estimate for the FE+IV (0.49) is much higher than the average slope 
estimate for RE+IV (0.17).  
Change of de-trending methods and trade normalisation does not impact the results in 
Table 6-3. All the β estimates are very consistent and all European countries appear 
positive and significant coefficients as well and Australia Canada Hong Kong Japan 
Mexico New Zealand and the USA remain the negative or insignificant coefficients. 
Different business cycle correlation proxies, such as using the correlation of industrial 
production, employment and unemployment rate, changes individual countries slightly, 
but remain the main findings that European countries present significant slope estimates 
but the relationship does not exist in non-European countries. 
 
6.3 Explaining Differences in the Significance of the 
Estimation 
In an attempt to explain the differences in the results between the European countries and 
the rest of the sample a number of additional hypotheses are tested. Firstly, we re-
estimate the relationship for the Asia-Pacific group of countries (Australia, China, Hong 
Kong, Japan and New Zealand) with an extended sample of partners. For this group, a 
significant proportion of total trade also takes place with Indonesia, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand (See Appendix I). Therefore, we extend these five 
countries’ partners to 28, initial 23 partners plus 5 additional Asian countries. The results, 
presented in Table 6-4 suggest two significant differences to the original set of individual 
country results. Firstly, the significance level of the t-ratio for the China’s slope estimate 
has risen from 6.3% to 7.8%. Secondly, the β  estimate for Hong Kong changes from 
0.0001 to -0.10 and is now statistically significant at the 5% level. However, Australia, 
Japan, and New Zealand still present insignificant slopes. 
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Another reason for the observed differences could be that the European countries have a 
greater number of institutional agreements that facilitate trade and therefore economic 
convergence indirectly. The estimates in table 5-6 suggest that free trade agreements and 
fixed exchange rates are important determinants of trade intensity. For the full sample, 
50% of the FIXijt observations are non-zero, whereas for the European countries 77.5% 
are non-zero. The proportion of non-zero observations for FTAijt is 85.53% for the 
European countries but only 39.06% for the full sample. It is obviously that European 
countries have more fixed exchange rate agreements and free trade agreements with each 
other than non-European countries. 
Also regional factors could be so important that trade with European countries is not 
particularly important for the NAFTA and Asia-Pacific economies. Table 6-5 presents 
estimates for trade amongst countries within European, NAFTA and the Asia-Pacific 
regions. In our sample, 16 countries are in the Europe region, 5 are in the Asia-Pacific 
region and 3 are NAFTA members. Both Europe and Asia-Pacific regions prefer fixed 
Table 6-4 
Revised Estimates for the Asia-Pacific Countries 
FE+IV RE+IV 
Countries 
Constant TIij,t Constant TIij,t 
Hausman Test 
0.36 0.00 0.20 -0.03 0.76 Australia 
(0.34) (-0.02) (0.62) (-0.51) (0.38) 
RE
0.76* 0.07** 0.80* 0.08* 0.06 China 
(2.66) (1.79) (3.38) (2.33) 0.81 
RE
-0.29 -0.10* 0.77* 0.07* 25.77* Hong 
Kong (-1.01) (-2.14) (3.72) (2.18) 0.00 
FE 
1.26 0.15 0.90* 0.10 0.20 Japan 
(1.36) (1.06) (2.02) (1.41) 0.66 
RE
-0.87 -0.17 0.72 0.04 18.13* New 
Zealand (-1.00) (-1.51) (1.39) (0.54) (0.00) 
FE 
Notes:  t-statistics are shown in parentheses. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. Estimates derived for each country using panel data for the original 23 countries plus 
Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.  Column 1 are the FE estimates using three 
instruments and column 2 shows the RE estimator using all six instruments. A Hausman test statistic is also 
included to compare the FE estimates with the RE estimates using 3 instruments. Robust t-ratios are shown 
in parentheses. Bold figures represent the “optimal” estimator. * denotes significance at the 5% level. 
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effects and have statistically significant slope estimates, suggesting an impact of 100% 
and 66% respectively. The β  estimate for the NAFTA is insignificant. 
A further reason for the observed statistical significance of the European β  estimates 
could be that third-country effects are more important in Europe. Their business cycles 
are highly correlated since they have more similar trade patterns compared to the non-
European countries and therefore are more likely to be affected by demand shocks from 
common third country economies. For example, when France and the UK integrated, 
there was a simultaneous integration between France and Germany and the UK and 
Germany, e.g. demand shocks in France could affect the UK directly, however, both 
France and the UK are likely to be influenced by the same demand shock originating 
from Germany. The European countries are very open and close together and they have 
very strong direct and indirect (via third country) trade linkages each other. For countries 
outside Europe, such as USA, China, Japan, there has not been the same systematic and 
simultaneous integration. Trade spillovers probably also exist, but these trade spillovers 
are so small that they are swamped by other shocks, particularly the domestically 
generated business cycle.  
A proxy for trade similarity that we adopted was a dummy variable that equals unity 
when both countries have the same top trade partner country. We therefore re-estimated 
Table 6-5 
Regional Results 
FE+IV RE+IV 
Countries 
Constant TIij,t Constant TIij,t 
Hausman Test 
4.56* 0.69* 1.53* 0.15* 1436 Europe 
(17.93) (15.17) (15.21) (8.25) (0.00) 
FE 
3.15* 0.51* 0.75* 0.08 19.95 
Asia Pacific 
(3.13) (2.84) (2.09) (1.27) (0.00) 
FE 
0.57 0.07 0.38 0.03 0.07 
NAFTA 
(0.70) (0.43) (0.97) (0.40) (0.79) 
RE
Notes: t ratios in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 5% level. 16 of our sample are European 
countries, Asia-Pacific region contains 5 countries and Canada, Mexico and the USA are the three members 
of NAFTA. A Hausman test statistic is also included to compare the FE estimates with the RE estimates 
using 3 instruments. Bold figures represent the “optimal” estimator. * denotes significance at the 5% level. 
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the relationship using the full data set and regressed the business cycle correlation on 
trade intensity and the dummy variable for trade similarity. The results of this exercise 
are shown in Table 6-6. The chosen estimator in this case is fixed effects and the 
estimated coefficient for the trade partner regressor is positively signed (as expected) and 
significant at the 10% level. The business cycle correlation is expected to rise by 1.2%. 
The impact from trade intensity has not any changes in both FE and RE estimation. 
30.87% of the total observations for the partner variable had a value different from zero, 
and 23.12% of the non-zero observations were for European country pairs. 
 
6.4 European Regional Analysis 
From the individual country analysis, we find trade amongst the European countries has 
had the most beneficial effect on the business cycle co-movements. A further test of our 
hypothesis it that we estimate the model for each European country only with their 
European trading partners (see Table 6-7). All of the slope estimates remain statistically 
significant and positive in both fixed and random effects estimations. Again, a Hausman 
Table 6-6 
Extended Results Including Trade Similarity Dummy 
Countries FE RE 
2.70* 2.05* 
Constant 
(11.13) (17.60) 
0.36* 0.25* 
TI 
(9.36) (14.29) 
0.10** 0.02 
Partner 
(1.88) (0.44) 
54.26* 
(0.00) Hausman Test 
FE 
Notes: t-statistics are shown in parentheses. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. ‘Partner’ is a dummy variable that equals unity when both countries have the same top 
trade partner country.  
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test was computed to compare the fixed effects estimates with the random effects 
estimates using only time-variant instruments.  
The random effects estimation using the full instrument set was chosen as the ‘optimal’ 
estimator if the test statistic was found to be less than the 5% critical value, otherwise 
fixed effects results were used. In Table 6-7 most countries prefer the fixed effects 
estimator and the magnitude increases quite considerably compared to the full sample 
estimates. Thus it would appear that the gain in economic convergence arising from trade 
is larger for the European countries when they trade with countries in Europe than trade 
from outside the continent.  
Interestingly, the slope estimate is largest for the Scandinavian countries like Demark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden, suggesting that a doubling of trade intensity would raise 
the business cycle correlation by more than 0.76. Finland is a member of Euro zone and 
Demark national currency is the Kroner, but maintains a peg with the Euro, through 
ERMII. We find that the level of trade intensity for these countries with the European 
countries is much higher than them with the non-European countries. Moreover, none of 
them present significant slope estimate in the group between them and non-European 
countries. 
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Table 6-7 
European Countries Results Estimated by Two-Stage Panel Estimation 
FE+IV RE+IV 
Countries 
Constant TIij,t Constant TIij,t 
Hausman Test 
4.41* 0.62* 1.51* 0.13* 0.41 
Austria 
(7.24) (5.99) (6.85) (3.41) (0.52) 
RE 
4.43* 0.75* 1.33* 0.11* 26.00 Belgium & 
Luxembourg (7.49) (6.20) (7.49) (3.19) (0.00) 
FE 
7.26* 1.18* 1.39* 0.12* 7.24 
Denmark 
(4.16) (3.74) (5.67) (2.70) (0.01) 
FE 
7.13* 1.09* 1.03* 0.06 10.37 
Finland 
(3.77) (3.40) (3.90) (1.30) (0.00) 
FE 
2.69* 0.36* 1.04* 0.05 17.12 
France 
(5.81) (4.21) (4.90) (1.39) (0.00) 
FE 
4.64* 0.84* 1.57* 0.18* 12.36 
Germany 
(5.75) (4.88) (6.61) (3.68) (0.00) 
FE 
6.08* 0.81* 2.46* 0.27* 4.43 
Greece 
(4.93) (4.39) (4.88) (3.57) (0.04) 
FE 
2.84* 0.33* 1.85* 0.18* 0.07 
Ireland 
(11.21) (8.40) (9.89) (6.09) (0.78) 
RE 
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Table 6-7 
European Countries Results Estimated by Two-Stage Panel Estimation Continued 
FE+IV RE+IV 
Countries 
Constant TIij,t Constant TIij,t 
Hausman Test 
6.39* 1.06* 1.56* 0.17* 14.33 Italy 
(5.55) (5.02) (4.09) (2.51) (0.00) 
FE 
5.02* 0.89* 1.70* 0.20* 10.53 Netherlands 
(5.34) (4.56) (6.73) (3.86) (0.00) 
FE 
7.92* 1.26* 1.59* 0.15* 4.25 Norway 
(3.29) (2.99) (4.18) (2.30) (0.04) 
FE 
3.95* 0.52* 2.49* 0.29* 11.57 Portugal 
(5.98) (5.01) (4.66) (3.47) (0.00) 
FE 
3.28* 0.43* 2.21* 0.25* 4.83 Spain 
(7.43) (5.83) (5.75) (3.91) (0.03) 
FE 
8.29* 1.46* 0.83* 0.02 4.03 Sweden 
(2.95) (2.70) (3.96) (0.61) (0.04) 
FE 
7.47* 1.25* 1.35* 0.12* 2.22 Switzerland 
(3.41) (3.09) (5.05) (2.40) (0.14) 
RE 
3.68* 0.61* 3.07* 0.48* 0.43 UK 
(4.81) (3.94) (3.38) (2.65) (0.51) 
RE 
Average Magnitude 5.34 0.84 1.69 0.17     
Notes: t-statistics are shown in parentheses. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Each European country only with their 
European trading partners. 
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6.5 Conclusions 
The aggregate estimation suggests that the greater economic convergence is strongly 
influenced by rises in bilateral trade intensity. Does this relationship vary over individual 
countries? To account for the differences between countries, we re-estimated the two-
stage panel estimation for each individual country with their own 23 partners across 5 
periods. In all but four cases the β  estimate is found to be positive, however, it is only 
statistically significant for the 17 European countries plus China with an average 
magnitude of 0.24, where the t-ratio for the slope estimate just exceeds the 5% critical 
value. Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Japan and New Zealand present insignificant 
estimates. Although it is statistically significant for Mexico and the USA, their 
coefficients are negative. Again, changing de-trending methods or trade normalisation 
does not change our main conclusion. This finding would support the decision of most of 
these economies to join European Monetary Union from the optimal currency area theory. 
We present two reasons to explain why this effect emerges only for European countries. 
Asia-Pacific economies have a significant amount of trade within the groups but not only 
with European countries. After extending their partners to 28 including additional 5 Asian 
countries, China and Hong Kong have significant changes but other three countries 
remain insignificant. Regional factors could be so important that trade with the European 
countries is not particularly important for the NAFTA and Asian-Pacific economies. We 
find a significant relationship in Europe and Asia-Pacific regions but not in the NAFTA 
group.  
Another reason for the observed differences could be that the European countries have a 
greater number of institutional agreements that facilitate trade and therefore economic 
convergence indirectly, particularly the fixed exchange rate and free trade agreements 
which are important determinants of trade intensity. For the full sample, 50% of the FIXijt 
observations are non-zero, whereas for the European countries 77.5% are non-zero. The 
proportion of non-zero observations for FTAijt is 85.53% for the European countries but 
only 39.06% for the full sample. 
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Also third-country effects are more important in Europe. Their business cycles are highly 
correlated since they have more similar trade partners compared to the non-European 
countries and therefore are more likely to be affected by demand shocks from common 
third country economies. In individual European countries analysis, we find stronger 
relationship between the trade intensity and the business cycle correlation. 
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Chapter 7 The Effects of Trade, Specialisation and 
Financial Integration for the Business Cycle 
Synchronisation 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In theory, increased trade could result in greater industrial specialisation if most trade is 
inter-industry, then lead to more asynchronous business cycles. On the other hand, 
increased trade could tend to raise the covariance of country-specific demand shocks and 
aggregate productivity shocks if intra-industry trade accounts for most trade thus 
increasing the international coherence of the business cycles. Therefore, the positive 
effects from trade intensity on the business cycle correlation could be indirect through 
industry specialisation. In addition, trade both in goods and in financial assets may affect 
the cross-country synchronisation of the business cycles. We should include these two 
additional variables to re-estimate the relationship between the trade and the business 
cycle as well as interactions between trade, specialisation and financial integration. 
The globalisation of financial markets has become one of the key factors in increasing 
world-wide economic integration. As a result, international financial markets have grown 
rapidly during the past decades and financial integration has increased significantly. This 
increase in the degree of financial integration is of major importance for research in 
macroeconomics because macroeconomic theories of open economies imply that the 
degree of financial integration can play a key role for the propagation of shocks in an 
open economy. The impact of financial integration on cycle synchronisation is 
ambiguous. There are two arguments. On the one hand, limited ability to borrow and lend 
internationally hampers the transfer of resources across countries and can increase GDP 
correlation. But on the other hand, if investors have imperfect information or face 
liquidity constraints, limiting capital flows can actually decrease GDP correlations, as 
investors herd or withdraw capital from many destinations simultaneously.  
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Industry specialisation is also likely to affect the business cycle directly. From theory, 
specialisation affects synchronisation negatively, since two economies producing the 
same types of goods will then be subjected to similar shocks, stochastic developments 
and also it may happen that a different policy affects different industrial sectors 
differently because of different market structures or labour markets. Then countries with 
similar production patterns will be synchronised.54 Two countries will be hurt similarly 
by sector-specific shocks if they have economic sectors of similar nature and size.  
The recent literature, e.g. Imbs (2004, 2006), Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003) also points to 
potentially important indirect interactions. Both trade of goods and assets may affect 
specialisation. Closer trade ties could result in countries becoming more specialised in 
which they have comparative advantage. The countries might then be more sensitive to 
industry-specific shocks, resulting in more idiosyncratic business cycles. However, as we 
discussed before, if demand shocks or other common shocks predominate or if intra-
industry trade accounts for most trade, then more bilateral trade might result in a more 
similar industry structure and then closer business cycles. Similarly, financial integration 
may induce specialisation, “as access to an increasing range of state-contingent securities 
unhinges domestic consumption patterns from domestic production, which then become 
free to specialise according to comparative advantage” (Imbs, 2004, page 723.). Kalemli-
Ozcan et al. (2001) explain that financial integration will likely lead to more 
specialisation since investors will be less reluctant to put more risks in the same basket. 
This is because a greater fraction of investors’ income will be derived from other sources, 
such as internationally diversified investment funds. Furthermore, foreign investors will 
be buying shares in domestic firms since they will be seeking to diversify their portfolios 
internationally. And also governments will insist less on subsidizing diversity within 
national borders.  Financially integrated economies would tend to specialise differently, 
and be less synchronised as a result. Obstfeld (1994) also introduces the idea that finance 
may afford specialisation in activities particularly needful of external funds. Therefore, 
the measured effect of finance on synchronisation could be through specialisation.  
                                                 
54 See Stockman (1988). 
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In addition, Imbs (2006) argues that effect of finance on synchronisation could be 
through trade as well. Financial flows depend on the information afforded by goods trade 
and are predicted by the same gravity model that captures trade in goods.55 Thus, the 
measured effect of finance on cycle synchronisation could be a reflection through trade 
and higher financial integration across countries might result in higher trade intensity and 
then closer business cycles correlations. Therefore, the overall effects of financial 
integration are ambiguous particularly because first, the direct link’s sign of financial 
integration is unclear in theory and second, because the indirect effect through 
specialisation and trade could change the direct link. We need a simultaneous-equation 
methodology to exam the direct as well as indirect channels between trade intensity, 
specialisation and financial integration on cycle synchronisation.  
This chapter makes two significant contributions to the literature. Firstly, we adopt 
bilateral foreign direct investment position as a proxy for financial integration. In the 
literature, gross capital flows or portfolio stocks are usually selected to measure financial 
                                                 
55 See details in Portes et al. (2001) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003) 
 
Figure 7-1. Direct and Indirect Impacts from Trade, Specialisation and Finance on Cycle 
Synchronisation 
Notes: This figure summarizes the views in the literature on the interactions between goods trade intensity, 
financial integration, specialisation and cycle synchronisation. A + or – sign reflects a theoretical prediction 
that was confirmed empirically. A sign with a question mark means theory has not been tested empirically. 
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integration. 56 Movements in the bilateral foreign direct investment position data are very 
close to gross capital flows, gross capital stock and portfolio investment. Furthermore, the 
main advantage of FDI data is that we can access bilateral FDI data across most OECD 
countries over more than 20 years, and these data can be consistent with our other 
variables to consider the unobservable country-pair specific effects in regressions. We 
describe more details for using FDI in section 7.3. Secondly, previous literature has used 
only pooled 3SLS to estimate their relationships without allowing for individual effects 
but our methodology panel data 3SLS does not only consider the potentially important 
unobservable country pair specific effects, it also allow us to disentangle the direct and 
indirect impact between them. Our results can be compared with literature estimated by 
either OSL or 3SLS to find whether unobservable individual effects or indirect effects are 
important. 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 7.2 presents the related literature. 
Section 7.3 discusses data, variables measurement and model; section 7.4 shows the 
econometric methodology. The main empirical results are in section 7.5 followed by 
random effects three-stage least square for pooled sample and individual countries. 
Section 7.6 provides conclusions. 
 
7.2 Theoretical Framework and Literature 
This section reviews the relevant literature. Most of the linkages in Figure 7-1 have been 
investigated empirically but only Imbs’s paper estimated them simultaneously.  
                                                 
56  Kose, et al. (2003) use accumulated gross capital flows to GDP to measure financial integration. 
Heathcote and Perri (2004) focus on the USA and select the sum of the USA FDI position plus the equity 
part of the stock of portfolio investment abroad relative to the USA capital stock as USA assets and the 
ratio of the sum of the stock of FDI in the USA plus foreigners holdings of US stocks to the USA capital 
stock as USA liabilities. While Imbs (2006) uses a Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) 
gathered by the IMF to proxy for finance. The CPIS data only include portfolio stocks while completely 
ignoring the FDI.  
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The relationship between trade and cycle synchronization has been estimated by 
numerous subsequent studies. 57  We have analysed this relationship carefully by 24 
countries over 40 years and confirm the literature result of a statistically significant and 
positive effect from trade intensity to cycles.  
The direct effect of industry specialisation on the business cycle synchronisation is well 
documented too. Otto et al. (2001) adopt the difference between industry structures of 
two economies to measure the industry specialisation and find a statistically significant 
role for differences in industry structure as an explanation of output correlations in 17 
OECD countries sample. The greater the difference in industry structures of a pair of 
countries, the lower is their output correlation.  Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001) show the 
same result empirically in 50 US states and a couple of OECD countries. Regions with a 
more specialised production structure exhibit business cycles that are less correlated with 
those of other regions. Imbs (2001) and Böwer and Guillemineau (2006) also find the 
same result that the more dissimilar the economies, the less correlated their cycles. 
However, Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005) do not find the significant relationship between 
the industrial structure and the business cycle correlations.  
Financial market linkages are a widely acknowledged mechanism for the international 
transmission of the business cycle shocks. Backus et al. (1994) document that in complete 
markets a positive technology shock will attract capital flows into economy and away 
from the no-shock economy which results in a negative correlation of GDP. Keheo and 
Perri (2002) show that introducing enforcement constraints results in higher capital flows 
and drives the economy far away from the complete markets allocation and produces the 
positive cross-country comovements. A large amount of evidence is available to prove 
the negative effect from finance in empirical work. Otto et al. (2001) find the negative 
relationship empirically in 17 OECD countries over 40 years. They adopt FDI stock, 
                                                 
57 Frankel and Rose (1998) estimate a strong and robust positive relationship between trade and cycle 
synchronisation by a single equation covering twenty one industrial countries over thirty years. Baxter and 
Kouparitsas (2005) extend the sample of countries to 100 developing and developed countries and 
Babetskii (2005) focuses on ten Central and Eastern European countries. Both of these papers found the 
statistically significant and positive relationship between bilateral trade and business cycle correlations. 
Bower and Guillemineau (2006) also found the same result for EMU. Clark and van Wincoop (2001), 
Canova and Dellas (1993), Schmitt-Grohe (1998), Kose and Yi (2002) have all used different methods to 
reproduce the magnitude of this relationship. 
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trade in equities and trade in long-term bonds to measure the financial integration by OLS 
and IV estimation and show that the higher variability in trade in assets, the higher the 
correlation of the business cycle. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001) also confirm that higher 
capital market integration leads to less symmetric fluctuations in OECD countries and US 
states. Hethcote and Perri (2004) document that financial globalization, by enhancing 
cross-border capital flows, reduces the international correlations in GDP in the US.  
But on the other hand, financial linkages could result in a higher degree of the business 
cycle synchronization from theory as well. For instance, if consumers from different 
countries have a significant fraction of their investments in a particular stock market, then 
a decline in that stock market could induce a simultaneous decline in the demand for 
consumption and investment goods in these countries. Furthermore, contagion effects that 
are transmitted through financial integration could also result in heightened cross-country 
spillovers of macroeconomic fluctuations. Baxter and Crucini (1995) have investigated it 
in the international business cycle models. If the assets that are tradable internationally 
are restricted exogenously to a single uncontingent bond, then the equilibrium allocations 
are similar to those arising under complete markets. A couple of empirical studies support 
this claim that financial integration results in synchronized business cycles.58 Kose et al. 
(2003) find empirical evidence for the proposition that financial integration enhances 
global spillover of macroeconomic fluctuations in 76 countries which include developed 
and developing countries over 40 years. However, Bordo and Helbling (2003) do not find 
a clear effect from financial integration on the synchronization of business cycles across 
16 countries over a long period.  
Trade intensity, industry specialisation and financial integration affect cycle 
synchronisation directly; nevertheless the potentially important indirect interactions 
should be considered simultaneously. A large amount of evidence proves the effect of 
trade on industrial specialisation, which then affects the business cycle. Dornbusch, 
Fischer and Samuelson (1977) proved that falling transport costs result in a narrowing 
non-traded sector, as it becomes cheaper to import goods rather than produce them 
                                                 
58 Calvo and Mendoza (2000) and Mendoza (2001) suggested a positive direct link from capital flows to 
cycle synchronisation based on portfolio theory. 
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domestically. Thus resources are freed up and used more intensely in fewer activities. 
Harrigan (2001) and Harrigan and Zakrajsec (2000) also show trade induced 
specialisation patterns to be significant. Recently, the evidence in Calderon et al. (2007) 
suggests that the link between trade intensity and cycle correlation is stronger among 
industrial countries than among developing countries or mixed industrial-developing 
country pairs. Calderon (2007) argues that the differences among developing and 
developed countries might be explained by the indirect effect from trade on cycle 
synchronisation through patterns of specialisation. He finds empirical evidence (in 147 
countries over the period 1965 to 2004) that the positive trade effect on cycle correlation 
hinges on the degree of similarity of industry specialisation patterns.  
Similarly, financial integration may induce specialisation as well. Increasing financial 
integration will result in domestic consumption, then industries will be free to specialise 
according to comparative advantage.59 Financial integration tends to specialise differently 
and then be less synchronized as a result indirectly. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001, 2003) 
provide empirical evidences for it. On the other hand, if the economy is short of external 
funds, such as risky funds, financial integration would tend to specialise similarly, and 
then be more synchronized as a result. In the meantime, specialisation in production 
could affect financial flows as well and then affect synchronization indirectly. For 
instance, large exogenous policy changes would produce more or less of a need for 
financial integration, but the specialisation patterns were a low-frequency phenomenon, 
finance will induce specialisation positively. There is also a possibility that financial 
integration could be an indirect manifestation of trade or trade could be an indirect effect 
of financial integration (Imbs, 2006). 
Therefore, the overall effect is ambiguous between them as the indirect effect could either 
mitigate or reinforce the direct link. None of these papers consider the direct and indirect 
effects simultaneously except Imbs (2004, 2006). Imbs (2004) considers both direct 
effects of trade in goods and in financial assets and specialisation on the business cycle 
and indirect effects from trade in goods and assets to the business cycle synchronisation 
through specialisation simultaneously. Imbs (2006) focuses on financial integration, and 
                                                 
59 See Helpman and Razin (1978), Grossman and Razin (1985) and Saint-Paul (1992). 
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considers its direct impact to synchronisation and indirect impact through trade and 
specialisation.  
 
7.3 Model and Data 
To investigate the determinants of the business cycle correlation, we start with a simple 
model which is similar to equation (3-1) in chapter 3 but includes another two additional 
variables: specialisation and financial integration. 
tijtijtijtijtij FISTICorr ,,3,2,10, εαααα ++++=    (7-1) 
where i, j index country pairs, tijCorr ,  is the bilateral business cycle correlation between 
country i and country j, tijTI ,  is bilateral trade intensity, S is a specialisation index 
capturing how different the sectorial allocations of resources are between country i and 
country j, and FI is bilateral financial integration. α  is coefficient for each variable. As 
we have proved empirically in previous chapters, we expect that in equation (7-1) 1α  is 
significantly positive, which indicates that more bilateral trade leads to closer business 
cycle correlation; 2α  is negative60 indicating that the more similar industry specialisation, 
the closer business cycles; while 3α  could be positive or negative61.  
Compared to the previous analysis, we reduce the sample period and sample countries 
since there is less bilateral FDI data available to measure financial integration. To be 
consistent for all four variables our sample period is from 1984 to 2003 and it is split into 
four periods: 1984-1988, 1989-1993, 1994-1998 and 1999-2003, and sample countries 
                                                 
60 The lower value for S, the smaller difference between industrial structures and then expect to result in 
synchronisation. Kalemi-Ozcan et al. (2001) only include specialisation with some control variables and 
find more similar industrial structure lead to closer business cycle. Imbs (2001) and Bower and 
Guillemineau (2006) find the same results. 
61 Heathcote and Perri (2004) focus on finance and found negative coefficient. However, Koes et al (2003) 
present the opposite results. 
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cover the 15 OECD countries.62 The total sample size is [(15×14)/2]×4=420 including 
missing observations. 
 
7.3.1 The Business Cycles Correlation and Bilateral Trade Intensity 
Following the analysis undertaken in chapter 3, we still use the same measurements for 
business cycle correlation and bilateral trade intensity. The business cycles correlations 
are measured by real GDP expressed in US dollars63, which is de-trended by a HP filter 
after taking the natural logarithm. Table 7-1 presents the average GDP correlations for 
each country vis-à-vis the other 14 partners for each period and whole period. It 
appears that the average correlations for the first period (i.e. 1984 to 1988) are the 
highest then decrease until the third period (i.e. 1994 to 1998). In the last period’s 
(1999-2003), correlations increase again which is consistent with our previous analysis, 
the GDP correlations increase till the period 1977-1985 when the marginal effects 
arrive and then increase again in the last period 1995-2003. In addition, our USA 
average GDP correlations are also consistent with Heathcote and Perri (2004)’s results 
that the USA business cycle was strongly correlated with others over the period 1972-
1986 and much weaker over the period 1986-2000. In Table 7-1 the USA first period’s 
(1984-1988) correlation is 77%, then decrease to 5% for 1989-1993, -54% for 1994-
1998 and back to -6% for the last period. Generally, European countries’ correlations 
are relatively higher than non-European countries. Only the UK has a negative 
correlation with others in the third period, 1994-1998.  
Bilateral trade intensity is calculated by natural logarithms of total bilateral trade over 
nominal GDP64: 
                                                 
62 15 OECD countries are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and US. 
63 The real GDP data are annual data and are from OECD’s Economics Outlook over 1984 to 2003.  
64 Bilateral trade data come from IMF’s direction of trade data set and nominal GDP is from OECD’s 
Economic Outlook. Both data are denoted by US dollars. 
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where Xij,t and Mij,t are bilateral exports and imports between countries i and j, Yit (Yjt) 
is nominal GDP for country i (j) expressed by US dollars. We think of higher values of 
TI the greater trade intensity between countries i and j.  
Table 7-2 presents the average bilateral trade intensity for each country. We find that 
during the second period (1989-1993) most countries decrease their trade intensities a 
little bit and increase in the last two periods a result which is fairly consistent with that 
reported in chapter 3. The last period has very clear rise for most countries, especially 
for France Germany and the Netherlands, which cover the introduction of the Euro. 
Although the trade intensity’s increasing trend in this sample is not as clear as that 
detected in the previous sample, we still find that most European countries have 
Table 7-1 
Average GDP Correlations 
Periods 
Countries 1984-1988 1989-1993 1994-1998 1999-2003 
Full sample 
1984-03 
Australia 0.03 0.29 0.36 0.83 0.38 
Austria 0.88 0.44 0.47 0.82 0.65 
Canada 0.69 0.34 0.24 0.57 0.46 
Denmark 0.87 0.57 0.54 0.82 0.70 
Finland 0.90 0.45 0.41 0.77 0.63 
France 0.89 0.54 0.49 0.82 0.68 
Germany 0.88 0.22 0.44 0.81 0.59 
Italy 0.89 0.61 0.37 0.76 0.65 
Japan 0.89 -0.54 0.26 0.37 0.25 
Netherlands 0.88 0.51 0.50 0.80 0.67 
Norway 0.88 0.58 0.53 0.71 0.68 
Sweden 0.90 0.57 0.43 0.81 0.67 
Switzerland 0.88 0.58 0.47 0.77 0.68 
UK 0.89 0.54 -0.34 0.82 0.48 
US 0.77 0.05 -0.54 -0.06 0.05 
Average 0.81 0.38 0.31 0.69 0.55 
Source: SourceOECD Economics Outlook. 
Notes: average GDP correlation calculated using the individual correlation from each country vis-à-vis 
their 14 partners. 
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relatively higher bilateral trade than non-European countries, particularly for large 
economies such as France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and UK.  
 
7.3.2 Specialisation 
There are no standard measures of similarity in industry specialisation. Following 
Krugman (1991), Clark and van Wincoop (2001) and Imbs (2004, 2006), we use the 
industrial sectoral real value added index to measure the industry specialisation as 
follows: 
 
Table 7-2 
Average Trade Intensity 
Periods 
Countries 1984-1988 1989-1993 1994-1998 1999-2003 
Full sample 
1984-03 
Australia 0.0019 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 
Austria 0.0043 0.0043 0.0044 0.0057 0.0047 
Canada 0.0039 0.0038 0.0042 0.0045 0.0041 
Denmark 0.0060 0.0055 0.0060 0.0066 0.0060 
Finland 0.0043 0.0038 0.0043 0.0048 0.0043 
France 0.0081 0.0080 0.0080 0.0098 0.0085 
Germany 0.0151 0.0137 0.0123 0.0146 0.0139 
Italy 0.0076 0.0072 0.0076 0.0080 0.0076 
Japan 0.0034 0.0032 0.0029 0.0029 0.0031 
Netherlands 0.0097 0.0088 0.0091 0.0117 0.0098 
Norway 0.0076 0.0067 0.0070 0.0079 0.0073 
Sweden 0.0080 0.0068 0.0088 0.0093 0.0088 
Switzerland 0.0062 0.0058 0.0056 0.0061 0.0059 
UK 0.0101 0.0090 0.0087 0.0087 0.0092 
US 0.0050 0.0052 0.0057 0.0057 0.0054 
Average 0.0067 0.0062 0.0064 0.0072 0.0067 
Source: Trade data are taken from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade data set, 
Nominal GDP data are taken from SourceOECD, Economic Outlook. 
Notes: Trade intensity is obtained using 
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
+= ∑
=
τ
1 ,,
,,1ln
,
t tjti
tijtij
YY
MX
t
TI
tij
 and an average value obtained 
using the values from the country-pairs. 
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where sn,i denotes the GDP share of industry n in country i. Sij,t is the time average of 
the discrepancies in the economic structures of countries i and j. S measures the 
industry difference between countries. The lower of S, the more similar industry 
structure between two countries. We expect the coefficient of S in regression to be 
negative which indicates that the more similar industry structure between countries, the 
closer business cycle correlations. Industry structure data are two digit manufacturing 
value-added data in US dollars issued by the UNIDO and two-digit manufacturing 
level codes are in appendix II. Table 7-3 reports average specialisations for each 
country. We find that in the first three periods from 1984 to 1998, most countries have 
consistent industry specialisations at 11%, but decrease sharply in the last period. This 
Table 7-3 
Average Specialization 
Periods 
Countries 1984-1988 1989-1993 1994-1998 1999-2003 
Full sample 
1984-03 
Australia 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.10 
Austria 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.08 
Canada 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.09 
Denmark 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.10 
Finland 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.06 0.10 
France 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.04 0.08 
Germany 0.17 0.16 0.11 0.04 0.12 
Italy 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.09 
Japan 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.08 0.13 
Netherlands 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.09 
Norway 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.09 
Sweden 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.09 
Switzerland 0.20 0.16 0.11 0.06 0.13 
UK 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.09 
US 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.09 
Average 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.10 
Source: two digit manufacturing value-added data in US dollars issued by the UNIDO 
Notes: industry specialisation is measured by ⎟⎠
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the values from the country-pairs.  
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decrease indicates that all countries in our sample have more similar industry structures 
since 1999. We believe that the introduction of Euro since 1999 leads most EMU 
countries to similar industry structures, as well as for other European countries, such as 
Switzerland and Denmark. The globalisation also results in low specialisation for non-
European countries. 
 
7.3.3 Financial Integration 
Financial integration is the process through which a country’s financial markets become 
more closely integrated with those in other countries or with those in the rest of the world. 
It implies the elimination of barriers for foreign financial institutions from some or all 
countries to operate or offer cross-border financial services in others. This may imply 
linking banking, equity and other types of financial markets. Financial integration can be 
achieved in a number of ways. It may emerge as a result of formal efforts to integrate 
financial markets with particular partners, typically those that share membership in a 
regional integration agreement. It can also emerge in the absence of explicit agreements.  
Financial integration can be difficult to measure effectively. Typical measures include 
indices capturing restrictions on capital flows, effective bilateral capital flows65, bilateral 
bank flows66, the spread among long-run and short-run interest rates67 and so on. Most 
popular restrictions data on capital flows are from IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) which includes multiple exchange 
rates, current account restrictions, capital account restrictions and surrender of export 
                                                 
65 This proxy is used by Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003) and Imbs (2004) which is calculated from index of 
risk sharing. 
66 Böwer and Guillemineau (2006) use a proxy bilateral bank flows to measure financial integration. The 
aggregate bank flows are defines as the change in international financial claims of a bank resident in a 
given country vis-à-vis the banking and non-banking sectors in another country. 
67 Schiavo (2005) define financial integration as the spread among long-run and short-run interest rates 
reported by the OECD: 22 )()( jijiij sirsirlirlirFI −+−= where lir is long-run interest rates and sir is short-run 
interest rates. 
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proceeds.68 Recently Imbs (2006) uses a new released dataset with direct observations on 
bilateral asset holdings by IMF. Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) data 
cover asset holdings which are decomposed into equities, short term and long term debt 
securities. However, this is survey data which maybe suffer a potential under-reporting 
and only portfolio stocks are included but do not consider the FDI. To examine the effect 
of financial integration on the business cycles, we use bilateral foreign direct investment 
position data.69 Countries that are closely integrated through FDI may transmit shocks to 
each other through the changes in FDI positions brought about by idiosyncratic shocks 
and it is similar with trade. Multinational firms may distribute the effects of local 
macroeconomic shocks throughout the organisation thus distributing the shock, to some 
extent, from one economy to another. For instance, a multinational organisation 
retrenches staff worldwide and suffers a downturn in some of its markets. Similarly if 
FDI is generated by the multinational organisation sourcing from production of 
intermediate inputs abroad, then the effects of changes in demand for final products may 
be transmitted to countries providing the intermediate inputs. The same, income flows 
generated by FDI positions may also serve to synchronise the business cycles of countries 
with strong FDI linkages. Finally, FDI also can be a channel through which technology 
and ideas are transferred between countries, which may also contribute to the correlation 
of the business cycle. Therefore, we use following equation to measure financial 
integration: 
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where FDIInward,ijt is bilateral foreign direct investment inward position data from country 
i to country j and FDIOutward,ijt is FDI outward position data from country i to country j. 
FDIInward,it (FDIOutward,it) and FDIInward,jt (FDIOutward,jt) are the total FDI inward (outward) 
                                                 
68 Imbs (2004) adopt AREAER data to measure the financial integration and found the positive relationship 
with business cycle synchronisation.  
69 Heathcote and Perri (2004) focus on the US and use total capital flow to measure financial integration 
which is the sum of the US foreign direct investment position plus the equity part of the stock of portfolio 
investment abroad, relative to the US capital stock. However, our sample covers 15 OECD countries and 
we cannot access both bilateral FDI and bilateral equity data for all these countries over 1984 to 2003. 
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position for county i and j, respectively. All these data are denoted by US dollars and 
come from OECD International Direct Investment Statistics. We select total FDI position 
instead of sum of country i and country j’s GDP because the size of FDI relative to GDP 
is likely to be small (the average value is only 0.62%), while the average value of 
financial integration measured by (7-4) is 1.97%. And also we do not anticipate that these 
flows will be very cyclical, certainly not the same extent as trade flows. Table 7-4 
presents the average financial integration for each country vis-à-vis the other 14 partners. 
Most European countries have clear increasing trend, in particular Finland and Sweden, 
but not for the Netherlands and Switzerland. Some non-European have clear downward 
financial integration, such as US and Canada.  
In a review of the main approaches used to proxy for financial integration, Adam et al. 
(2002) stress the superiority of a measure that is directly observable, bilateral rather than 
Table 7-4 
Average Financial Integration 
Periods 
Countries 1984-1988 1989-1993 1994-1998 1999-2003 
Full sample 
1984-03 
Australia 0.0127 0.0124 0.0126 0.0084 0.0103 
Austria 0.0039 0.0044 0.0044 0.0043 0.0042 
Canada 0.0215 0.0176 0.0136 0.0132 0.0153 
Denmark - 0.0111 0.0106 0.0107 0.0109 
Finland 0.0018 0.0068 0.0094 0.0131 0.0098 
France - 0.0233 0.0218 0.0222 0.0224 
Germany 0.0253 0.0277 0.0279 0.0265 0.0268 
Italy 0.0153 0.0178 0.0165 0.0138 0.0160 
Japan 0.0147 0.0191 0.0148 0.0109 0.0140 
Netherlands 0.0240 0.0216 0.0194 0.0173 0.0197 
Norway 0.0058 0.0105 0.0124 0.0107 0.0111 
Sweden 0.0166 0.0202 0.0206 0.0219 0.0200 
Switzerland 0.0427 0.0338 0.0172 0.0136 0.0242 
UK 0.0290 0.0307 0.0289 0.0309 0.0297 
US 0.0494 0.0432 0.0414 0.0399 0.0425 
Average 0.0202 0.0200 0.0181 0.0172 0.0184 
Source: OECD International Direct Investment Statistics 
Notes: Financial integration is measured by the ratio of bilateral FDI position and total FDI position: 
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aggregated across countries and capturing stocks rather than flows, if it is based on 
quantities rather than prices. Our bilateral FDI data fit all these three requirements. In 
addition, FDI data cover continually 20 years which can be used in panel data estimation 
and keep consistent with all other variables. This is an advantage compared with CPIS 
data. However, these data also have problems. Firstly, these data do not cover many 
countries and most countries’ data only start from 1984. That is why we only focus on 15 
OECD countries and over 1984 to 2003. Secondly, only FDI stocks are included, while 
the equity part of the stock of portfolio investment is completely ignored since we can not 
access bilateral data.  
Compared with Heathcote and Perri (2004)’s proxy, our data excludes portfolio 
investment, which are not available as bilateral data. To justify the use of this proxy we 
compare the co-movements in the FDI stock with the other measures. We find that the 
aggregate FDI data is highly correlated with both aggregate portfolio investment70 and 
gross capital formation71 which are 0.67 and 0.53, respectively. In addition, it is highly 
correlated with gross capital flows, 0.45, which are calculated by sum of financial 
account assets and liability72. The correlations between aggregate FDI and IMF’s Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) and Quinn’s 
index of capital account openness73  are high as well which is 0.54 and 0.57, respectively. 
We also compare the bilateral FDI data with bilateral Coordinated Portfolio Investment 
Survey (CPIS) reported by IMF which is used by Imbs (2006) for financial integration 
and all correlations are above 0.90.74 Therefore we have evidence to believe that bilateral 
                                                 
70 Portfolio investment data are from IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics, and is the sum of portfolio 
investment asset and liability denoted by US $.  
71 The gross capital formation data (formerly gross domestic investment) come from World Bank, World 
Development Indicators, and the data is expressed by current US $. It is defined by World Bank as: outlays 
on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories. Fixed assets 
include land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; 
and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential 
dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings. Inventories are stocks of goods held by firms to meet 
temporary or unexpected fluctuations in production or sales, and ""work in progress."" According to the 
1993 SNA, net acquisitions of valuables are also considered capital formation. 
72 The data are from IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics. 
73  Quinn (1997) measure builds on the AREAER indices, including information on each country’s 
individual experience. 
74 CPIS was initiated in 1997 when 29 countries participated. Since 2001, the survey has been undertaken 
on a yearly basis. Therefore, we only report the correlations in 1997, 2001, 2002 and 2003 which are 90%, 
91%, 90% and 91%. Imbs (2006) argues that CPIS data are decomposed into equities, short-term and long-
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FDI position data are a good proxy for financial integration and can be instead of 
portfolio investment or gross capital flows. 
Table 7-5 reports summary statistics for the dependent variable real GDP correlations and 
the three cycle determinants trade, specialisation and finance. Compared with the 
previous sample we find that both real GDP correlations and bilateral trade intensity have 
higher mean value (0.45, 0.0041 for 24 countries sample and 0.55 and 0.0066 for 15 
countries sample), since countries dropped in this sample are mostly non-European 
countries, such as China, Hong Kong, Mexico, which have low correlations and bilateral 
trade with European countries. Compared to Imbs (2004) our specialisation is relative 
low.75 This indicates that our European countries have more similar industry structures 
than Imbs’s 24 countries.  
 
7.4 Econometric Methodology: Three-Stage Least Squares in 
Panel Data Estimations 
Estimating (7-1) by pooled OLS only provides reduced form estimates for the effects of 
finance, trade and structure on cycle synchronization, but provides no notion of indirect 
                                                                                                                                                 
term debt securities, which make it in principle possible to evaluate whether different components of 
international investment have distinct effects on real variables.  
See CPIS, 2004.  
75 Imbs (2004) reports 038 and 0.54 for the sectoral similarities by the United Nations Statistical Yearbook 
(UNYB) and UNIDO, respectively.  
Table 7-5 
Variables Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Corrij,t 420 0.55 0.49 -0.88 0.9998 
TIij,t 420 0.0066 0.0075 0.0003 0.0397 
Sij,t 419 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.29 
FIij,t 379 0.0197 0.0256 0.0001 0.1430 
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as against direct effects. For instance, estimates of α3 in equation (7-1) embed the direct 
impact of finance on the business cycles, but also its indirect effects working via trade 
intensity or specialisation as we discussed in literature review. Thus, the coefficient of 
finance could be significantly positive just because financial market boosts bilateral trade 
or results in closer industry specialisation which is an indirect effect on the business 
cycles, but without any direct effects of finance on cycles. As we mentioned before, trade 
intensity could be endogenous since countries likely to link their currencies to their most 
important trade partners and then fixed exchange rate between them could cause both 
high bilateral trade and income links. Also this will affect the specialisation and financial 
integration at the same time. To disentangle direct from indirect channels and eliminate 
the endogenous problem, we follow Imbs (2004, 2006) to approach simultaneous 
equations.76  
tijtijtijtijtij FISTICorr ,1,4,3,21, εαααα ++++=   (7-5) 
tijtijtijtij IFISTI ,224,3,21, εββββ ++++=    (7-6) 
tijtijtijtij IFITIS ,334,3,21, εγγγγ ++++=    (7-7) 
tijtijtij ITIFI ,443,21, εδδδ +++=     (7-8) 
I2: LANij, DISij, ADJij, FTAij,t, YY ij,t, FIX ij,t; I3: YY ij,t, DISij, FTAij,t, POPi,t, POPj,t, DYYij,t; 
and I4: LANij, DISij, ADJij, YY ij,t, POPi,t, POPj,t, Ii,t, Ij,t. 
where I2, I3 and I4 contain the vectors of their exogenous determinants. The instrumental 
variables for trade intensity are from standard gravity model which is the same as before. 
We select the product of GDP per capita (YY ij,t), the log of distance (DISij) between the 
capital cities of the two countries and dummy variables to account for land adjacency 
(ADJij) and a common official language. Also supplementing instruments are dummies 
                                                 
76 Methodology see Wooldridge (2002), chapter 9, Baltagi (2005) and Stata Manual (XT) 9.0. 
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that equal unity when the two countries have a fixed exchange rate agreement (FIX ij,t) or 
a free trade agreement (FTAij,t).77 
The degree of regional specialisation is likely to be affected by any variable that affects 
the volume of interregional trade. As Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003) said in the extreme 
case where all regions have a similar composition of consumption, trade and 
specialisation are one and the same. Following with Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003) and 
Imbs (2006), the instrumental variables for specialisation include the product of GDP per 
capita (YY ij,t), the log of distance between the capital cities of the two countries (DISij), a 
dummy variable whether two countries have the same free trade agreement (FTAij,t), 
measures of both countries’ populations for country sizes (POPi,t, POPj,t) and the log of 
GDP disparity which is defined as DYYij,t=Max[(Yi/Yj),(Yj/Yi)].78  
We adopt gravity variables for financial integration as well, since FDI is a proxy for 
financial integration. The vector I4 includes gravity variables of language (LANij), 
distance (DISij), adjacency (ADJij), the product of GDP per capita (YY ij,t), and measures 
of both countries’ populations for country sizes (POPi,t, POPj,t) and also include the real 
interest rate of country i and county j (Ii,t, Ij,t).79 
Any direct impacts on cycles are captured by estimates of α , i.e. 2α  is the direct impact 
from trade, 3α  is the direct impact from structure and 4α  is the direct impact from 
finance. In turn, 22αγ and 22αδ  capture the indirect effects of trade working via 
specialisation and finance, respectively. 32αβ  is the indirect effect of specialisation via 
trade and 43αβ  and 43αγ are the indirect impacts of finance via trade and specialisation.  
                                                 
77 See all these instrumental variables measurement descriptions in chapter 5. Dummy variables of official 
language and land adjacency are from CIA website http://www.cia.gov. The distance data is from 
http://www.eiit.org/. Free trade agreement data is from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), World Trade Organisation (WTO). A dummy variable of fixed exchange rate is from Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2004). Product of GDP per capita is from the OECD Economic Outlook and IMF International 
Financial Statistics.  
78 The countries populations are from IMF, IFS and all other data source is the same with I2. 
79 High interest rate attracts more capital from domestic and overseas then increase the FDI inflow and 
decrease the outflow. The real interest rate data are from IMF’s IFS (lending interest rate- GDP deflator). 
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In these simultaneous equations we assume that bilateral trade intensity affect on 
synchronization via specialisation and financial integration, financial integration’s 
indirect effects are from trade and specialisation and specialisation affect synchronization 
via trade intensity. The procedure consists two steps, firstly, estimate them equation by 
equation using two-stage least squares and retrieve the covariance matrix of the equations 
distributions, and then perform a type of generalized least squares estimation on the 
stacked system, using the covariance matrix from the first step. Furthermore, as we 
discussed in chapter 4, the unobservable country-pair specific effects also should be 
considered in our simultaneous equations. Thus panel three-stage least should be adopted 
for equation (7-5) to (7-8).80 
 
7.5 Empirical Analysis 
This section reports the main results. Ordinary least squares and panel data model (both 
fixed effects and random effects model) results are compared with existing evidence and 
3SLS and panel 3SLS estimates are presented to evaluate the effects of unobserved 
country-pair specific effects, simultaneity and endogeneity. A final subsection discusses 
the magnitude and significance of the estimates for all individual countries. 
 
7.5.1 Aggregate Estimation 
Table 7-6 reports results of equation (7-5) and focuses on GDP correlation equation to 
examine the direct effect only. The first column is estimated by OLS and only focus on 
the trade intensity. The results show a significant and positive relationship between the 
business cycle correlation and the trade intensity. The slope estimate is 0.17, suggesting a 
                                                 
80 It is difficult to conduct panel 3SLS since no software has command that can run this regression so far. 
We select Stata’s command ‘xtdata’ to transform data set of all the variables. ‘xtdata, fe’ for fixed effects 
model and ‘xtdata, re’ for random effects model and transfer the data to contain unobservable country-pair 
specific effects. Then we run three-stage least square for equation (7-5) to (7-8) by command ‘reg3’. After 
‘xtdata’, the command of regress is the same with using xtreg directly. See Stata 9.0 manual for details. 
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doubling of trade intensity results in a correlation higher by 0.118 which is close to the 
estimates in Imbs (2004), Frankel and Rose (1998), Clark and van Wincoop (2001) and 
Kose and Yi (2002). 
The second column adds the other two variables, namely specialisation Sij,t and financial 
integration FIij,t and is estimated by OLS following equation (7-5). All three variables are 
statistically significant and present ‘correct’ signs. The coefficient of trade intensity 
increases to 0.32, suggesting that the business cycle correlation would rise by 0.222 
following a doubling of trade intensity. Country pairs with low industry production have 
significant higher correlation i.e. similarities in economic structure result in correlated 
business cycles. Our coefficient of -0.16 is very close to Imbs (2004) -0.12. Finance has a 
strongly negative effect on synchronisation which confirms the theory that limited ability 
to borrow and lend internationally hampers the transfer of resources across countries and 
can increase GDP correlations. This is consistent with Heathcote and Perri’s (2002) 
results. The model explains approximately 32% of total variation in GDP correlation 
which is more than twice than OLS (i) as two additional regressors. The overall 
significance of the model is tested by the F-statistic and both of them confirm the overall 
significance of the included independent variables in OLS (i) and OLS (ii). 
The last two columns in Table 7-6 estimate equation (7-5) by both fixed effects and 
random effects model. Random effects estimation reports a very consistent result with 
OLS: trade has a significant effect on cycles and both specialisation and financial 
integration affect cycles negatively. All estimates’ magnitudes decrease a little. The 
model also explains 32% of the overall variation in correlations, though comparing the 
between and within R2s it is apparent that the cross-sectional dimension of the data 
accounts for the largest part of the overall R2. The overall significance of the model is 
established by a Wald-statistic and the country pair specific effects are statistically 
significant from Breusch-Pagan test, thus justifying the use of panel methods. 
Nevertheless, the fixed effects model presents different results. Neither trade intensity nor 
finance has significant effects on cycles and only specialisation shows a significantly 
negative coefficient.  
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The first column of Table 7-7 reports equation by equation estimates of (7-5) to (7-8) by 
OLS. We have explained the GDP equation results in Table 7-6. Estimates for equation 
(7-6) show that the effect of specialisation on trade is significant and more similar 
economies result in more bilateral trade; the effect of financial integration is significant as 
well, and higher bilateral FDI leads to more bilateral trade. At the same time, in estimates 
of (7-7) and (7-8), we find reverse effects, that is, trade intensity affects finance positively 
and affects specialisation negatively. From equation (7-8) we also find that financial 
integration induces specialisation. More bilateral FDI is associated with high S, that is, 
financially integrated economies tend to have different industry structure.  
Table 7-6 
Results from OLS, FE and RE Estimations 
 OLS (i) OLS (ii) FE RE 
1.49* 1.12* 0.27 1.04* 
Constant (15.25) (8.23) (0.34) (6.09) 
0.17* 0.32* -0.02 0.28* 
TIij,t (9.37) (12.52) (-0.14) (8.46) 
 -0.16* -0.19* -0.18* 
Sij,t  (-4.92) (-4.58) (-4.74) 
 -0.16* 0.06 -0.13* 
FIij,t  (-7.20) (1.14) (-5.25) 
     
Within R2  - 0.08 0.04 
Between R2  - 0.02 0.51 
Overall R2 0.15 0.32 0.03 0.32 
     
Significance:     
  2.30* 22.13* Individual 
Effects   (0.00) (0.00) 
87.77* 66.48* 7.37* 108.82* Overall 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Notes: OLS (i) and OLS (ii) are single equation OLS estimates. FE and RE are fixed effects and random 
effects panel date estimates. T-ratios, that are robust to heteroscedasticity, are presented in parentheses. The 
F-test establishes the statistical significance of the fixed effects. The Breusch-Pagan test is for the 
significance of the random effects. An F- or Wald-statstic is included to establish the overall significance of 
the model and p-values are presented in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 7-7 
Results from OLS, 3SLS, FE 3SLS and RE 3SLS Estimations 
  OLS 3SLS FE 3SLS RE 3SLS 
1.12* 1.55* 11.52* 0.27** Constant 
(8.23) (4.69) (2.92) (1.90) 
0.32* 0.58* 1.38* 0.37* TIij,t (12.52) (13.43) (2.60) (5.39) 
-0.16* -0.03 0.17 -0.24* Sij,t (-4.92) (-0.26) (1.28) (-3.20) 
-0.16* -0.46* 0.62* -0.32* 
GDP 
equation 
FIij,t (-7.20) (-11.11) (2.65) (-4.31) 
      
-0.08* -1.06* 0.06 -0.55* Sij,t (-1.73) (-6.42) (0.85) (-3.57) 
0.47* 0.62* -0.08 0.70* 
TI 
Equation 
FIij,t (25.92) (16.18) (-1.09) (10.89) 
      
1.06* 0.91* -2.28* 0.39* FI 
Equation TIij,t (16.60) (11.26) (-5.57) (2.50) 
      
-0.02* -0.67* -0.92** -1.64* TIij,t (-0.40) (-3.70) (-1.67) (-5.55) 
0.10* 0.49* 0.71* 0.91* 
S Equation 
FIij,t (3.13) (3.98) (1.99) (4.59) 
Hausman Test   3.15 (0.37) RE 3SLS 
TIij,t  303.16* 38.83* 61.39* 
Sij,t  47.25* 2.78 26.27* Joint Test 
FIij,t  305.45* 13.28* 133.75* 
Notes: OLS is single equation OLS estimates equation by equation. FE 3SLS and RE 3SLS are 3SLS 
fixed effects and random effects panel date estimates. t-ratios are presented in parentheses. 3SLS, FE 
3SLS and RE 3SLS are estimated by equation (7-5) to (7-8).* and ** denotes significance at the 5% and 
10% levels. The Hausman test comparing the fixed effects 3SLS and random effects 3SLS indicates the 
data prefer random effects 3SLS where random effects 3SLS model drop the time-variant instrumental 
variables as we to be consistent with FE 3SLS. 
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Table 7-8 
Instrumental Variables Results 
 Coefficient 3SLS RE 3SLS 
Languageij 
-0.14* 
(-2.02) 
-0.10 
(-1.00) 
Distanceij 
-0.12* 
(-3.07) 
-0.07 
(-1.06) 
Adjacentij 
0.17** 
(1.82) 
-0.03 
(-0.21) 
FTAij,t 
0.33* 
(3.03) 
0.70* 
(4.68) 
Fixij,t 
0.28* 
(3.06) 
0.15 
(1.22) 
 
Trade  
equation 
(YiYj)t 
-0.58* 
(-7.59) 
-0.22* 
(-5.89) 
    
Languageij 
0.21** 
(1.92) 
0.69* 
(3.54) 
Distanceij 
0.13* 
(2.28) 
-0.24* 
(-2.05) 
Adjacentij 
0.14 
(0.90) 
0.35 
(1.33) 
(YiYj)t 
0.77* 
(5.90) 
-0.46* 
(-5.40) 
Popi,t 
0.24* 
(6.82) 
0.21* 
(3.06) 
Popj,t 
0.18* 
(6.96) 
0.14* 
(2.99) 
Interesti,t 
0.09* 
(4.80) 
0.03 
(1.32) 
 
FI  
Equation 
Interestj,t 
0.01 
(0.51) 
-0.05* 
(-2.93) 
    
(YiYj)t 
-0.62* 
(-5.23) 
-0.59* 
(-5.23) 
Popi,t 
-0.02 
(-0.37) 
0.17* 
(2.67) 
Popj,t 
-0.07 
(-1.40) 
0.09 
(1.57) 
Distanceij 
-0.05 
(-0.87) 
-0.07 
(-0.51) 
FTAij,t 
0.31 
(1.35) 
1.59 
(4.47) 
 
S  
Equation 
GDP Disparityij,t 
0.13* 
(2.20) 
-0.02 
(-0.26) 
Notes: t-statistics are shown in parentheses. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. All instrumental variables for trade, finance, and specialisation are from equations (7-5) 
- (7-8). 
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The second column implements 3SLS on equations. Except S in the GDP equation, all 
variables are significant and have the same signs as in OLS. 3SLS tends to magnify the 
estimate of 2α  relative to OLS. As in Frankel and Rose (1998), instrumenting trade with 
gravity variables results in a higher point estimate, as it controls for an attenuating 
endogeneity bias, because nonsynchronised economies tend to trade more. 3SLS also 
magnifies the estimate of 2β  relative to OLS. The endogeneity of S and TI would upward 
if anything tends to bias 2β , as trading partners specialise and thus have high S. The 
negative sign can be interpreted as meaning that countries with similar economic 
structures have more intra-industry trade. Therefore 2β  distinguishes the effects of inter- 
and intra-industry trade in simultaneous estimation. Finally, 3SLS magnifies finance’s 
direct and indirect effects. Low financial integration results in similar industry structures 
and close business cycles.  
The main appeal of panel 3SLS is that they make it possible to disentangle the direct and 
indirect impacts as well as unobservable country-pair effects. The last two columns in 
Table 7-7 report fixed effects 3SLS and random effects 3SLS. FE 3SLS is still quite 
different with OLS and 3SLS. The coefficient of trade in GDP equation jumps to 1.38 
which is much higher than our previous results and these in the literature. 
Specialisation is insignificant and finance changes to positive. Here, FE 3SLS drop all 
time-invariant instrumental variables in equation (7-6), (7-7) and (7-8), such as language, 
distance and adjacency. In addition, the Hausman test cannot reject the hypothesis that 
difference in coefficients is not systematic and prefers to random effects model. 81 
Therefore, we would like to focus on the RE 3SLS to explain results.  
The estimates from RE 3SLS are very consistent with OLS and 3SLS. In the GDP 
equation, we still find a large and significant effect of trade in accounting for cycles 
which indicate that a doubling of trade results in a correlation higher by 0.256. The 
impact from RE 3SLS is larger than OLS but less than 3SLS. The coefficient of S is 
                                                 
81  Again the RE 3SLS model drop the time-variant instrumental variables (language, distance, and 
adjacency) to be consistent with FE 3SLS when we conduct the Hausman test. In addition, the Hausman 
test only focuses on the GDP equation. Thus we can believe that the RE 3SLS with full instrumental 
variables is better then FE 3SLS.  
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significantly negative suggesting that more similar economic structure leads to closer 
business cycles. The impact of financial integration on synchronisation is -27.4%. High 
financial integration results in low business cycle correlation. In trade equation, finance 
equation and specialisation equation, all indirect effects present significantly. We find the 
positive indirect impact of financial integration on cycles via trade and via specialisation; 
positive indirect impact of trade intensity on cycles via financial integration but negative 
indirect effect via S. Also S affect cycles via trade negatively. These are consistent with 
the theory we mentioned in literatures that ‘both financial integration and trade intensity 
could affect specialisation in different sectors’.  
The overall impact (considering both direct and indirect impacts from trade intensity, 
specialisation and financial integration) on synchronisation are 89.7%, -35.8% and -
24.0%, respectively.82 We find the indirect effects increase the magnitudes of trade and 
specialisation, especially for trade. While financial integration decrease the magnitude 
from -0.32 to -0.28. A Wald test is performed to test the jointly significance of overall 
effects for three endogenous variables. The hypothesis for the test is the coefficients in all 
equations by three-stage least square are zero at the same time. For instance we consider 
the variable of trade intensity in GDP equation, in financial integration equation and in 
specialisation equation at the same time and test whether they are joint significant in all 
equation. The results indicate that all tests reject the hypothesis and the overall effects 
from trade, finance and specialisation are statistically significant in both 3SLS and RE 
3SLS. 
Table 7-8 reports all instrumental variables’ results. The 3SLS estimates strongly suggest 
that instrumental variables are important determinants of trade intensity and financial 
integration. Similarly with our previous results, all instrumental variables in trade 
equation indicate significant at least 10% level. However, the variables, language and 
product of GDP per capita change to negative effects on trade and they are different with 
what we expect. Except the interest rate of country j, all other instruments are significant 
in financial integration equation at 10% level. The distance between two countries reports 
a ‘wrong’ sign, but it change to negative in RE 3SLS. The estimates in the specialisation 
                                                 
82 The corresponding coefficients for trade, specialisation and finance are: 0.64, -0.44 and -0.28.  
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equation do not fit as well as the other two, but the most important variables, product of 
GDP per capita and GDP gap, suggested by Imbs (2004, 2006) are significant with 
‘correct’ signs.  Some estimates in trade equation estimated by RE 3SLS change to 
insignificant and only the dummy variable free trade agreement and the product of GDP 
per capita are statistically significant. In financial integration equation estimated by RE 
3SLS, ‘distance’ changes the sign to negative which is the same with what we expected: 
the closer to two countries, the greater their degree of financial integration. The country 
j’s interest rate is significant which is instead of country i’s in 3SLS. The product of GDP 
per capita and log of population in is significant in S equation.  
 
7.5.2 Sub-period Analysis 
To be consistent, whether the simultaneous relationship between the business cycles and 
the trade intensity, specialisation and finance varied across sub-period was tested by 
estimating a 3SLS with country-pair data (Table 7-9). Our sample is from 1984 to 2003 
which is split into 4 periods. Firstly, in GDP equation, trade intensity reports all 
significant coefficients over time, and magnitude increases over time up until 1989-1993 
period when the maximum marginal effect occurs which is consistent with our previous 
sample sub-period analysis. The coefficients increase from 0.3 in the first period to 0.9 in 
the second period and then decrease to around 0.6. Only the second period’s 
specialisation presents significantly negative coefficient and all others are either positive 
or insignificant. Financial integration has very similar result with trade, and it is 
significantly negative over time which also is consistent with our overall result. 
Magnitude increases up until the second period again from -0.18 to -0.62 then decrease to 
around -0.50. This result is not as clear as the result in chapter 5 since this sample is 
relative shorter than before and only covers recent 20 years. All other indirect effects are 
strong and significant only except the effect of FI on S in second period, trade on S in 
third period and S on trade in last period. Hence, the evidences from the sub-periods also 
support our aggregate results in Table 7-7 both from direct and indirect effects. 
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7.5.3 Individual Countries Analysis 
Variation in the size of coefficients could also take place across countries, particularly 
given the importance of indirect effects and instrumental variables for endogeneity. Table 
7-10 presents 15 individual countries with their 14 partners results estimated by RE 3SLS.  
In the GDP equation, the regressor of trade intensity presents a very similar result with 
previous study. Firstly, all four non-European countries still show insignificant 
relationship with the business cycle correlation. However, not all European countries 
Table 7-9 
Sub-period Analysis 
   1984-88 1989-93 1994-98 1999-03 
2.80* 3.35* -1.84 3.86* Constant 
(8.22) (4.40) (-1.32) (5.99) 
0.30* 0.90* 0.54* 0.68* TIij,t (4.68) (8.40) (3.85) (9.05) 
0.63* 0.35 -1.12* 0.55* Sij,t (4.45) (1.26) (-2.45) (3.86) 
-0.18* -0.62* -0.55* -0.48* 
GDP 
equation 
FIij,t (-3.17) (-6.48) (-4.52) (-9.09) 
      
-1.13* -1.10* -2.45* -0.16 Sij,t 
(-3.30) (-3.97) (-2.64) (-0.42) 
0.79* 0.62* 0.58* 0.71* 
Trade 
Equation 
FIij,t 
(7.18) (10.33) (6.69) (10.14) 
      
0.71* 0.94* 1.02* 0.72* FI 
Equation TIij,t (3.33) (5.81) (7.52) (5.52) 
      
-0.49* -0.33** 0.28 -0.43* TIij,t 
(-2.16) (-1.80) (1.50) (-2.49) 
0.32* 0.19 -0.34* 0.40* 
S 
Equation 
FIij,t 
(2.45) (1.38) (-2.30) (4.09) 
Notes: t-statistics are shown in parentheses. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. 3SLS is estimated for each period. 
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show significant coefficients. All founding members of European Union plus Demark, 
Norway and Switzerland have positive and statistically significant relationship between 
the trade and the business cycle. The average magnitude of coefficients, 0.31, is close to 
the aggregate country result, 0.37. However, the magnitude of coefficients for significant 
countries increases much, e.g. Italy’s coefficient increases to 0.82. This probably can be 
explained by the shorter sample period and fewer countries in the sample. We only 
consider the sample period after 1984 and most countries have joined EU for a few years 
and also we focus on OECD countries only.  
Consistently with the aggregate results, we find a negative relationship between the 
industrial specialisation and the business cycle correlation. Nevertheless, these results are 
quite different with trade intensity. Most significant countries for trade show an 
insignificant coefficient for specialisation and insignificant countries have negative and 
significant coefficients except Switzerland. This probably can be explained by their GDP 
are relatively much higher than industry volumes. Financial integration presents similar 
results with trade. Expect Demark all significant countries for trade appear negative and 
statistically significant coefficient for financial integration. UK also has a significant 
coefficient at 10% level. Generally, individual countries have consistent results to the 
aggregate country results. However, the magnitude and significance of the estimated is 
not the same for all countries. The magnitude and significance of indirect effects in the 
trade equation, finance and specialisation equations also change across countries but in 
most cases remain of the same signs.  
Finance affects the business cycles via both specialisation and trade positively, trade 
affect the business cycles via finance positively and via specialisation negatively. 
Specialisation has indirect effect on cycles through trade negatively. However, the 
indirect effects in Table 7-10 are not as clear as the aggregate country results. Some 
countries do not appear statistically significant coefficients. For example only five 
countries have significant impact for trade in finance equation and only four countries are 
significant for trade in specialisation equation. 
Table 7-10 
Individual Countries Results – Estimated by RE 3SLS 
   Australia Austria Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Italy Japan
Nether
lands Norway Sweden
Switzer
land UK US 
-0.26 0.46 -0.32 1.45* 0.33 0.52 0.57** 0.75* -0.85 0.32 0.50** 0.13 1.70* 0.19 -0.69** 
Const 
(-0.68) (0.83) (-0.97) (3.50) (1.27) (1.26) (1.79) (2.04) (-1.25) (0.99) (1.82) (0.49) (3.22) (0.43) (-1.66) 
0.14 0.15 -0.07 0.32* 0.16 0.43* 0.61* 0.82* 0.33 0.42* 0.43* 0.06 0.71* 0.09 0.06 
TIij,t (0.66) (0.74) (-0.39) (2.27) (1.07) (2.38) (3.70) (3.61) (0.75) (3.59) (3.97) (0.27) (3.28) (0.46) (0.23) 
-0.91* -0.27* -0.36** -0.22 -0.25* -0.07 -0.12 -0.19 -1.05* 0.06 -0.40* -0.39* 0.82* 0.07 -0.67* 
Sij,t (-3.33) (-2.04) (-1.68) (-1.20) (-2.06) (-0.44) (-1.26) (-1.63) (-2.82) (0.31) (-3.21) (-2.94) (2.48) (0.50) (-3.12) 
0.06 -0.01 0.07 0.00 -0.07 -0.40* -0.51* -0.61* -0.29 -0.53* -0.21* 0.06 -0.81* -0.20** 0.01 
G
D
P
 
E
q
.
 
FIij,t (0.46) (-0.03) (0.45) (-0.03) (-0.56) (-2.54) (-3.57) (-3.56) (-0.77) (-3.50) (-2.39) (0.27) (-3.24) (-1.71) (0.04) 
                 
-0.38 -0.32** -0.34 0.02 -0.23** -0.21 -0.44* -0.26* -0.33 -0.74* 0.50* -0.37* 0.15 -0.03 -0.25 
Sij,t (-1.45) (-1.84) (-1.26) (0.06) (-1.84) (-1.44) (-2.45) (-2.31) (-1.09) (-5.98) (2.67) (-1.96) (0.54) (-0.29) (-1.21) 
0.51* 0.12 0.44* 0.87 0.03 0.38* 0.55* 0.63* 0.53* 0.53* 0.21** -0.49 0.17 0.55* 0.95* 
T
r
a
d
e
 
E
q
.
 
FIij,t (3.27) (0.47) (4.05) (1.61) (0.22) (3.02) (4.58) (6.12) (5.38) (5.29) (1.80) (-0.81) (0.58) (8.32) (9.31) 
                 
2.27* 0.09 -0.33 0.14 -0.10 -0.42 -0.38 1.06* 0.69 0.36* 0.89* 0.62 0.62 1.54* -2.03 
F
I
 
TIij,t (4.05) (0.09) (-0.62) (0.34) (-0.18) (-0.48) (-0.62) (2.32) (0.23) (2.57) (2.66) (0.79) (1.43) (5.95) (-0.35) 
                 
-3.51* -2.37* 0.30 -0.06 -0.91 -0.85 0.03 -3.38* -1.08 -0.38 1.08 -3.65* 0.36 -0.66 0.27 
TIij,t (-2.27) (-4.66) (0.52) (-0.26) (-1.28) (-1.43) (0.01) (-3.89) (-0.23) (-0.90) (1.36) (-1.98) (0.55) (-0.25) (0.36) 
1.00* 2.14* 0.30 -0.25 0.68 1.16* -4.99* 2.35* -2.22 1.16* -0.11 -2.95 0.89* 0.58 0.00 
S
 
E
q
.
 
FIij,t (3.33) (4.11) (1.07) (-1.36) (1.57) (2.03) (-1.99) (4.09) (-0.37) (4.08) (-0.29) (-1.41) (3.04) (0.60) (0.00) 
Notes: t-ratios are in parentheses. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 10% levels respectively. 3SLS is estimated for each country followed by equation (7-5) to 
(7-8). All instrumental variables results are not reported here. 
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Again after considering the indirect effects, we have a look the overall effects. Both trade 
intensity and financial integration shows very close magnitude of coefficients between 
direct impact and overall impact and the average differences of magnitude only are 0.08 
and 0.10. However, the specialisation has quite different magnitude, e.g. Australia, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK have 
positive over all effect on the business cycles. 
 
7.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter we extend the determinants of the business cycles to trade intensity, 
specialisation and financial integration. A large theoretical and empirical literature is 
referred to in choosing the sets of instruments necessary to achieve identification. 
Simultaneity, implicit in most theories, is also revealing empirically. Thus we estimate a 
system of simultaneous equations to disentangle the complex interactions between these 
variables and the business cycle synchronisation. 
The data was obtained from a group of 15 OECD countries over the sample period 1984 
to 2003. Random effects three-stage least square estimation is adopted for both aggregate 
and individual countries analysis. The main results are as follows: the overall effect of the 
trade on the business cycle synchronisation is confirmed to be strong. Patterns of industry 
specialisation have a sizeable direct effect on the business cycle correlation, as two 
economies with a similar economic structure are more correlated with each other. Finally 
the business cycles in financial integrated economies are significantly more asymmetric. 
Also we find some significant indirect interactions. More bilateral trade results in more 
similar industry structure then leads to closer business cycles, however, closer financial 
integration results in countries becoming more specialised and then leads to more 
idiosyncratic business cycles. We also find that closer financial integration leads to more 
bilateral trade at the same time high trade results in high financial integration as well.  
 186
In individual countries analysis, most countries indicate the consistent results with 
aggregate results, particularly for European countries, however, a few of them, such as 
non-European countries, change the magnitude and significant of coefficients. After we 
extend the determinants of the business cycle correlation, all the countries with 
statistically significant trade intensity are still European countries which is consistent 
with the results in chapter 6. A couple of European countries (Austria, Finland, Sweden 
and the UK) present an insignificant relationship between trade intensity and the business 
cycle correlation. The reasons could be explained by the smaller sample period and 
sample countries. Also we have considered the indirect effects from financial integration 
and industrial specialisation on the business cycle correlation. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusions 
 
8.1 Introduction 
A currency union is a zone consisting of several countries or regions with a single 
currency circulates and a single monetary authority implements monetary policy defined 
at the union level. More than forty years later after the Mundell’s pioneer work of 
Optimum Currency Areas theory, the European Monetary Union founded and the Euro 
was introduced in the eleven countries in 1999 comprising the European single-currency 
area. Euro banknotes and coins have been in circulation since 1 January 2002. Now, the 
Euro is the currency of thirteen European Union countries. Recently, twelve more central 
European countries joined the European Union and possibly join the EMU in future. In 
addition, North American countries have formed NAFTA in 1994; Latin America 
arranged MERCOSUR in 1991 and Andean Pact and Sub-Saharan African developed 
COMESA, SADC and SACU to promote inter-regional trade and economic integration. 
In Asia, the ASEAN was formed in 1967 by five states and extended to ten Southeast 
Asian countries now.  
In deciding how large an OCA should be or whether to join an OCA potential members 
compare the benefits and costs of membership. A single currency eliminates the costs 
from currency conversion and exchange rate uncertainty thus facilitating cross-border 
trade and investment. However, in a currency union countries lose monetary 
independence thus limiting their ability to stabilise the business cycle. Therefore, the 
costs depend upon the degree of business cycle synchronisation between member 
countries. The gains from monetary autonomy are minimized if member countries are 
exposed to symmetric shocks or if asymmetric shocks can be absorbed for example, by 
having flexible labour markets. Following by Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and 
Kenen (1969), literatures cite four criteria called the OCA criteria to evaluate the value of 
switching to a single currency: the degree of trade between countries who adopt a 
common currency; the extent to which different countries experience similar shocks; the 
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degree of labour market mobility in each region and the amount of fiscal transfers 
between regions. The greater any of the four criteria, the more suitable a common 
currency. When most researchers judge the suitability of different regions, such as 
Europe, Asia, and North American, they exam whether these countries satisfy those four 
OCA criteria.  
Frankel and Rose (1998) argue that the optimum currency criteria are endogenous; in 
particular the level of economic integration depends upon the trade intensity between two 
countries. Countries that enter a currency union are likely to experience dramatically 
different business cycles than before. The changes partly depend on the adoption of a 
common monetary policy, but it also could be a result of closer international trade with 
the other members of the union. From a theoretical viewpoint, closer international trade 
could result in either tighter or looser correlations of business cycles. Closer trade ties 
could result in countries becoming more specialised in the goods in which they have 
comparative advantage. The countries might then be more sensitive to industry-specific 
shocks, resulting in more idiosyncratic business cycles. However, if intra-industry trade 
accounts for most bilateral trade, then business cycle may become more similar across 
countries when countries trade more. Countries that are highly integrated with each other, 
with respect to international trade in goods and services, are more likely to constitute an 
optimum currency area. Therefore, this thesis focused on the first two OCA criteria and 
investigated whether more international trade results in highly business cycle correlation. 
We analysed whether this relationship only exists in EMU countries or EU countries or it 
can be applied to all countries in the world. 
 
8.2 Research Methodology 
Both bilateral trade intensity and economic integration are OCA criteria. Literatures 
argue that they are endogenous and the level of economic integration depends upon the 
trade intensity between two countries. Since the impact from trade on business cycle co-
movements is ambiguous in theory, we investigate the relationship between trade 
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intensity and the business cycle co-movement empirically to ascertain the suitability of an 
economy for membership of a currency union.  
The study focuses on two main variables: bilateral trade intensity and business cycle 
correlations using 22 OECD countries plus China and Hong Kong over the period 1959 
to 2003. From this we create observations for 276 country pairs and specify 5 time 
periods to measure average trade intensity and the business cycle correlation: 1959-1967, 
1968-1976, 1977-1985, 1986-1994 and 1995-2003. 
Bilateral trade intensity is measured using total bilateral trade divided by joint nominal 
GDP or divided by total trade. Differences between both measures will raise when at least 
one of the economies has a low level openness. Again, we find higher international trade 
in these 24 countries over time. The trade intensities amongst European countries are 
much higher than those amongst non-European countries. Distance is a very important 
factor for bilateral trade intensity. Countries which are in the same region or are very 
close always have more bilateral trade. For example, Scandinavian countries have higher 
trade intensity with Scandinavian countries than with those other European countries. The 
USA and Canada also present high trade intensity.  
Business cycle correlations are measured using real GDP data expressed in US dollars, 
converted to natural logarithms and de-trended with a Hodrick-Prescott filter or first 
difference. It is apparent that the average GDP correlation for each country vis-à-vis the 
other 23 trading partners has increased over time, particularly for the European countries, 
a factor that could potentially be explained by higher trade intensity between two 
countries.  
The investigation starts from a simple OLS regression which specifies a linear 
relationship between the dependent variable business cycle correlation and the single 
explanatory variable trade intensity and all other determinants are in error term. However, 
pooled OLS is not feasible for two reasons. Firstly, trade intensity could be endogenous. 
In theory, a couple of omitted variables in error term could impact both trade intensity 
and business cycle correlation, such as monetary policies or fixed exchange rate. 
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Countries are likely to peg their currencies deliberately to those of their most important 
trading partners, in order to capture gains associated with greater exchange rate stability. 
This implies that the two countries will operate monetary policy in a similar fashion, 
since pegging is a form of monetary policy coordination that may increase business-cycle 
correlation. In the OLS regression, it is not only the trade of goods and services that cause 
the business cycles to be correlated but rather the operation of economic policies and 
other influences. Therefore the assumption in OLS that TIij,t is uncorrelated with the error 
term may not exist any more and using the OLS may give a bias result. OLS cannot 
identify the separate contribution from trade and the contribution from the common 
policies enacted because of close trading relationship. We therefore select six 
instrumental variables from the gravity model for trade to estimate the trade intensity. 
They are dummy variables of a fixed exchange rate agreement, membership of a free 
trade agreement, a common language and adjacency of two partners, and also the distance 
between the capital cities of the two countries and the product of GDP per capita. From a 
couple of tests, we find they have high quality and are good instruments for trade 
intensity. Then the estimated trade intensity explains the business cycle correlation in the 
second step.  
Pooled OLS estimation also ignores potentially important unobservable country-pair 
specific effects. We therefore use a panel data model. Both fixed and random effects 
estimation that allows for endogenous regressors are used to estimate the relationship in 
aggregate sample. A Hausman test compares the two-stage FE and RE models here and 
finds that the FE model is more feasible. It is not immediately apparent whether this 
difference is due to the number of instruments selected or, as normally assumed, to the 
fact individual effects are correlated with trade intensity. Therefore, a Hausman statistics 
is re-computed to compare the fixed effects with the random effects estimates using only 
time-variant instruments. 
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8.3 Main Findings 
The estimates using OLS, FE and RE assuming that trade intensity is weakly exogenous 
show a statistically significant and positive relationship between the business cycle 
correlation and trade intensity. The magnitude of 0.10 for slope estimates suggests that 
the business cycle correlation would rise by 0.069 following a doubling of trade intensity, 
from its mean value of 0.0063. From econometric tests, we find that country-pair specific 
effects are statistically significant thus justifying the use of panel methods, though they 
do not change the magnitudes of β  in both FE and RE. The β  estimates from RE with 
full instruments suggest a stronger relationship between the business cycle correlation 
and trade intensity than that reported in OLS, FE and RE. The business cycle correlation 
is expected to rise 0.18 if trade intensity were to double. The time-invariant instrumental 
variables are dropped in two-stage FE model, but the β  even larger though it is derived 
using only three instruments. The improvement of magnitude of slopes from OLS or 
panel estimation to two-stage least squares or panel two-stage least squares estimation 
can be mainly explained by the instrumental variables. The trade intensity equation 
presents that all instrumental variables are important determinants of trade intensity and 
are correctly signed with reasonable magnitudes. We find that including either distance or 
product of GDP per capita as instruments increase the slope of estimated trade intensity 
much, and the literature present that both of these instruments are classic regressors in the 
gravity model.  
Comparing with literature, the impact on business cycle synchronisation from trade 
intensity is larger in our study than that usually reported. Frankel and Rose (1998) report 
a slope estimate of 0.048 using the same measure of trade intensity and the business cycle 
correlation as this study, though the time period, and number of countries differs. Clark 
and van Wincoop (2001) report a slope estimate for trade intensity of 0.09 using data on 
14 EU countries from 1963 to 1997. Imbs (2004) reports a β  estimate of 0.079 for a 
panel of 24 developing and industrialised countries over the period 1960 to 2000. The 
increase in magnitude can be explained by the extended group of countries and sample 
period and also the panel data estimation technique, rather than a pooled instrumental 
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variable estimation method. The selecting different instrumental variables in the first step 
also are the potential reason. 
Furthermore, the sensitivity analyses confirm the robustness of the relationship between 
trade intensity and business cycle. Firstly, we employ alternative measures of business 
cycle correlation. Industrial production, total employment and unemployment rate are 
selected as different economic activities to measure the business cycle correlation. We 
take natural logarithms for industrial production and total employment but not for the 
unemployment rate and de-trend them so as to isolate cyclical components of economic 
time series conforming to a certain definition of business cycle by HP filter and fourth-
differences. All of them still report the significant and positive relationship though the 
magnitude of slopes varied across economic activities.  
Secondly, whether the relationship between trade intensity and the business cycle 
correlation varied across sub-periods is tested by estimating a cross section regression 
with country-pair data. The slope estimate is not statistically significant for the first time 
period but magnitude increases progressively over time up until the 1986-94 period when 
the maximum marginal effect occurs. This result also confirms our statistical analysis in 
chapter 3 that countries are now undertaking a greater amount of bi-lateral trade and are 
becoming more economically integrated in terms of business cycle comovements.  
Finally, we include the time dummy in two-stage FE estimation; include potential 
omitted variables such as time trend, the dummy of the same trade partner; split the 
whole sample into two periods, and none of them change our results. Therefore, all these 
evidences present that the greater economic convergence is strongly influenced by rises 
in bilateral trade. 
However, our detailed investigation indicates that it is not appropriate for all of the 
countries to form a monetary union. Variation in the sign and magnitude of the 
relationship could take place across countries or geographical regions, particularly given 
the importance of gravity variables in the determination of trade intensity. In individual 
countries analysis, we find that in all but 4 cases the relationship between trade intensity 
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and business cycle is found to be positive however, it is only statistically significant for 
the 17 European countries in the sample plus China, where the t-ratio for the slope 
estimate just exceeds the 5% critical value. The average slope estimate for the European 
countries is 0.495, with a standard deviation of 0.34. Seven of the estimates are in the 
range 0.15 to 0.30. This result is perhaps not surprising given the geographical proximity 
of the European countries and a greater number of institutional agreements are in 
European countries which facilitate trade then converge economic.  
There are a couple of potential reasons to explain why the significant relationship only 
exists in European countries (plus China). A significant proportion of total trade takes 
place between Asia-Pacific countries in our sample with Asian countries but not with 
European countries and NAFTA. Therefore we extend their partners to 28 including 5 
extra Asian partners and find the higher magnitude of slope estimate for China and Hong 
Kong. Regional factors could be so important that trade with the European countries is 
not particularly important for the NAFTA and Asian-Pacific economies. We find a 
significant relationship in Europe and Asia-Pacific regions but not in the NAFTA 
members. 
Another reason for the observed differences could be that the European countries have a 
greater number of institutional agreements that facilitate trade and therefore economic 
convergence indirectly. The third country effects also could be important in Europe. 
Their business cycles are highly correlated since they have more similar trade patterns 
compared to the non-European countries and therefore are more likely to be affected by 
demand shocks from common third country economies. We also find it does affect 
business cycle correlation empirically using our original data. Therefore, the case for the 
European countries forming a monetary union is stronger compared to the other 
economies in the sample. Furthermore, we find a stronger relationship between trade 
intensity and business cycle correlation in European countries only with their European 
trading partners. 
In theory, bilateral trade could result in more or less similar industry structure depending 
on inter or intra-industry trade. Therefore, trade intensity could affect business cycle 
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correlation through specialisation. In addition, both bilateral trades in goods or in assets 
could result in business cycle synchronisation. As an additional investigation, we extend 
the determinants of business cycle correlation to trade intensity, industry specialisation, 
and financial integration. Both trade intensity and business cycle correlations are 
measured the same as before. The industry specialisation is measured by industry sectoral 
real value added and financial integration is measured by the ratio of bilateral FDI 
position between a country-pair to total aggregate FDI position. The data are obtained 
from a group of 15 OECD countries over the period 1984 to 2003. Because of the FDI 
data limitation, the sample countries decrease to 15 and the sample period becomes 
shorter either. To consider the country-pair specific effects and to disentangle the 
complex interactions between trade intensity, specialisation financial integration, and 
business cycle correlation, random effects three-stage least squares estimation is used 
here. 
After considering both the direct and indirect effects, the impact of trade intensity 
remains positive and statistically significant. Also the patterns of industry specialisation 
have a sizeable effect on business cycle correlation as two economies with a similar 
economic structure are more correlated with each other and business cycle in financial 
integrated economies are significantly more asymmetric. Also we find that higher trade 
intensity results in a more similar industry structure which then leads to closer business 
cycles. Closer financial integration results in countries becoming more specialised and 
then leads to more idiosyncratic business cycles.  
 
8.4 Policy Implications and Further Researches 
As we discussed in previous chapters, a currency union is not the same as an optimal 
currency area. Any two countries in the world could form a currency union, for example, 
UK and Japan; however, they may be not an OCA. The OCA is the criteria of forming a 
currency union. In deciding whether to join a currency union, policy makers need to 
compare the benefits and costs of membership. The elimination of costs from currency 
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conversion and exchange rate uncertainty will facilitate cross-border trade and investment. 
However, in a currency union countries lose monetary independence thus limiting their 
ability to stabilise the business cycle. Based on OCA theory, four OCA criteria are used 
to decide whether a country should join a currency union. The greater any of the four 
criteria between the countries, the more suitable a common currency.  
However, after join a currency union, the bilateral trade between country-pairs could 
increase much and the economies are likely to change dramatically. Frankel and Rose 
suggest that OCA criteria are endogenous, in particular the level of economic integration 
depends upon the trade intensity between two countries. Therefore policy makers cannot 
decide to join a currency union by criteria directly and the investigation of the 
relationship between the business cycle correlation and trade intensity is important. 
We find a strong statistically significant and positive relationship between trade intensity 
and business cycle correlation in 24 countries across 1959 to 2003 and prove this 
relationship is robust by sensitivity analyses. Our detailed investigation shows that the 
business cycle correlation depends only upon trade intensity for the 17 European 
countries in the sample plus China, where the estimated coefficient is marginally 
statistically significant. Therefore trade amongst the European countries has had most 
beneficial effect on business cycle co-movements. At the same time, we also find high 
bilateral trade and synchronised business cycle amongst European countries in chapter 3. 
Therefore, the case for the European countries forming a monetary union is stronger 
compared to the other economies in the sample. This result is perhaps not surprising 
given the geographical proximity of the European countries. This finding is consistent 
with the OCA theory that countries with higher bilateral trade and closer business cycle 
correlations with other members are more suitable to join the Monetary Union.  
Outside continental Europe our results raise doubts about the suitability of other currency 
unions being formed, for example based around the US dollar for the NAFTA economies 
or a Japanese Yen zone for the Asia-Pacific countries. However, it is hard to draw a 
conclusion for NAFTA or Asian countries based on above evidences since there are a 
couple of limitations for them. This is also one of this study’s limitations. Our 24 sample 
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countries mainly focus on OECD countries and 16 of them are European countries. We 
include China, Hong Kong and Mexico because they are important bilateral trade partners 
for these European countries and the USA. Thus this aggregate countries and individual 
countries results are suitable for OECD countries, particularly for European countries, but 
they are not as good as for NAFTA and Asian countries, even we have included all three 
NAFTA members.  
We could focus on the sample of Asian countries, such as ASEAN+383, East Asia 
countries84 or Asia-Pacific countries because they have relative high bilateral trade and 
close culture background given the geographical proximity. A couple of papers have 
investigated the Asian countries. For example, Crosby (2003) studies 13 Asia-Pacific 
countries, and Kumakura (2006) investigates the 12 Asian countries and both of them 
implement the pooled estimation. Shin and Wang (2005) select 12 Asian countries and 
focus on the case of Korea with other Asian countries to analyse the relationship between 
trade integration and business cycle co-movements. They adopt fixed effects estimation, 
but do not allow for the possibility that trade intensity is endogenous. Hence we could 
apply the methodology to these groups of countries considering both unobservable 
country-pair specific effects and endogeneity of trade intensity. Also we could include a 
large amount of countries in our sample to investigate the general aggregate relationship 
between the bilateral trade intensity and the business cycle correlation, and not only focus 
on the OECD countries. Another further investigation could be done. We could focus on 
one economy but include most of its important trade partners. 
As we discussed in chapter 2, in theory, more bilateral trade could result in closer 
business cycle correlation, and countries with a greater extent of trade or more similar 
shocks and cycles are more suitable for a common currency. However, the structure of 
these economies is likely to change dramatically as a result of monetary union. EMU is a 
very good example. Since the Euro was introduced in the eleven countries in 1999 and 
Euro banknotes and coins have been in circulation since 1 January 2002. We could 
                                                 
83 Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, 
plus three: China (include Hong Kong and Tai Wan but can be considered as two regions), Japan, and 
South Korea. 
84 China (include Hong Kong and Tai Wan), Japan, North Korea and South Korea.  
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compare the extent of trade and the similarity of the shocks and cycles before 2002 and 
after 2002 for EMU members and exam whether they receive more benefits after joining 
EMU. For example we could compare whether the relationship between bilateral trade 
intensity and the business cycle correlation change in 1996-2001 and in 2002-2007. 
Nevertheless, we have not enough data so far, since the business cycle co-movements 
need relative long period data. The maximum data at the moment are eight years.  
It is also worthwhile to investigate the new EU members. In 2004, ten more central 
European countries joined EU and in 2007 Romania and Bulgaria joined EU as well. 
They should face the same question as EMU countries as they abolish national currencies 
and adopt the Euro. We could apply this model to these countries as well as other EU 
members to estimate the relationship between trade intensity and business cycle 
correlations aggregately or individually.  
After extending to three determinants of the correlation of business cycle, the sample 
countries and period become even smaller which only focus on 15 OECD countries over 
20 years. Then the temporal dimension is only 20 years and cross-section dimension is 
only 105. Usually, consistent estimators require large T and/or N. For this reason, the 
individual country estimations could be biased, since regressions have to estimate a lot of 
parameters with very few observations. However, it is difficult to find out the optimal 
single empirical analogue to the theoretical concept for financial integration. We could 
try to use other alternative series to measure the financial integration, such as interest rate 
across large sample countries for a long period.  
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Appendix I Top 20 Trade Partners (Billions US $) 
  Australia      Austria      Belgium    
1 Japan  410 Germany  850 Germany  670
2 United States  330 Italy  190 France  540
3 United Kingdom  110 Switzerland  110 Netherlands  490
4 New Zealand  110 France  95 United Kingdom  270
5 China  110 United States  86 Italy  150
6 Korea  100 Hungary  73 United States  150
7 Germany  86 United Kingdom  73 Switzerland  62
8 Singapore  76 Netherlands  66 Spain  60
9 Indonesia  52 Japan  46 Sweden  56
10 Italy  51 Czech Republic  37 Japan  54
11 China, Hong Kong 50 Spain  37 Israel  33
12 Malaysia  48 Sweden  32 India  30
13 France  41 Bel-Lux 27 Austria  27
14 Canada  35 Poland  27 Denmark  24
15 Thailand  34 China  20 Saudi Arabia  22
16 Saudi Arabia  26 Slovenia  20 Finland  21
17 Papua New Guinea  26 Russia  19 Norway  21
18 Netherlands  25 Slovak Republic  18 Ireland  18
19 India  24 Denmark  16 Portugal  17
20 Sweden  21  Belgium  16  Canada  15
 
Appendix I  Continued 
  Canada    China (Mainland)    China (HongKong)  
1 United States  5300  Japan  990  China  1900
2 Japan  320 China, HongKong 880 United States  810
3 United Kingdom  160 United States  810 Japan  540
4 China  120 Korea  310 Singapore  200
5 Germany  120 Germany  250 Germany  180
6 Mexico  100 Singapore  130 Korea  180
7 France  78 United Kingdom  100 United Kingdom  160
8 Korea  74 Russia  94 France  77
9 Italy  63 Australia  93 Malaysia  76
10 Norway  41 Italy  89 Italy  73
11 Netherlands  40 France  87 Thailand  67
12 China, Hong Kong 35 Malaysia  86 Netherlands  65
13 Brazil  33 Netherlands  86 Australia  63
14 Australia  32 Canada  81 Canada  58
15 Venezuela,Rep.Bol. 26 Indonesia  66 Switzerland  53
16 Switzerland  26 Thailand  66 Philippines  49
17 Sweden  24 Brazil  41 India  41
18 Malaysia  23 Philippines  35 Indonesia  38
19 Bel-Lux 20 Saudi Arabia  33 China,P.R.:Macao 28
20 Thailand  19  Spain  32  Spain  25
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Appendix I  Continued 
 Denmark    Finland   France  
1 Germany  330  Germany  170  Germany  1700
2 Sweden  190 Sweden  140 Italy  1000
3 United Kingdom  140 United Kingdom  110 United Kingdom  860
4 Norway  88 United States  80 United States  750
5 Netherlands  87 Russia  56 Spain  660
6 United States  86 France  55 Netherlands  530
7 France  85 Netherlands  50 Bel-Lux 490
8 Italy  64 Italy  42 Switzerland 320
9 Japan 50 Denmark 41 Belgium 270
10 Finland 44 Japan 40 Japan 240
11 Switzerland 26 Norway 39 Sweden 140
12 Spain 26 Spain 22 China 130
13 Bel-Lux 24 China 20 Portugal 130
14 Poland 22 Estonia 19 Algeria 110
15 China 20 Switzerland 18 Saudi Arabia 110
16 Austria  16 Bel-Lux 16 Norway 96
17 Ireland 14 Poland 14 Ireland 93
18 Belgium 13 Austria 14 Austria 92
19 Greenland 12 Belgium 10 Morocco 85
20 Russia 11  Australia 10  Denmark 84
 
Appendix I  Continued 
 Germany  Greece  Ireland 
1 France 1900  Germany 110  United Kingdom 450
2 Netherlands 1400 Italy 91 United States 210
3 United States  1400 France  47 Germany  150
4 Italy  1300 United Kingdom  38 France 94
5 United Kingdom 1300 Netherlands 35 Netherlands 72
6 Austria 810 United States 29 Japan 54
7 Switzerland 780 Japan 23 Italy 46
8 Bel-Lux 660 Spain 18 Belgium 40
9 Japan 600 Saudi Arabia 16 Spain 28
10 Spain 560 Russia 15 Switzerland 25
11 Sweden 380 Bel-Lux 11 Sweden 21
12 China 320 Korea 11 Bel-Lux 20
13 Denmark  310 Bulgaria  11 Singapore  19
14 Poland 290 Iran, I.R. of 10 Norway 15
15 Belgium 280 Switzerland 10 Denmark 14
16 Czech Republic  230 Turkey  10 Canada 12
17 Norway 230 Sweden 9 Malaysia 12
18 Hungary 210 Libya 9 Korea 11
19 Russia 210 China 8 China 9
20 Turkey 190  Cyprus 7  Finland 9
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Appendix I  Continued 
 Italy   Japan  Mexico  
1 Germany  1400  United States  3400  United States  2600
2 France  1000 China  1000 Japan  110
3 United States  540 Korea  700 Germany 85
4 United Kingdom 480 Germany 550 Canada 70
5 Spain 340 China, Hong Kong 440 Spain 50
6 Netherlands 340 Australia 420 China 37
7 Switzerland 310 Indonesia 410 France 36
8 Austria 180 Singapore 370 Brazil 34
9 Bel-Lux 170 Malaysia 360 Korea 33
10 Japan  160 United Kingdom  350 United Kingdom  28
11 Libya  120 Saudi Arabia  350 Italy 27
12 China  110 Thailand  350 Switzerland 15
13 Greece 100 Canada 300 Malaysia 14
14 Russia 96 United Arab Emirates 260 Chile 14
15 Sweden 94 France 220 Argentina 11
16 Saudi Arabia 92 Netherlands 190 Singapore 11
17 Belgium 88 Philippines 190 Netherlands 11
18 Turkey 83 Italy 160 Venezuela, Rep. Bol. 11
19 Algeria 81 Switzerland 120 Sweden 9
20 Brazil  73  Mexico  100  Colombia  9
 
Appendix I  Continued 
 Netherlands   New Zealand   Norway  
1 Germany 1500  Australia 96  United Kingdom 240
2 United Kingdom 590 United States 70 Germany 190
3 France 550 Japan 68 Sweden 180
4 Bel-Lux 450 United Kingdom 30 Netherlands 99
5 United States 410 Germany 17 United States 97
6 Italy 290 China 16 France 91
7 Belgium  250 Korea  13 Denmark  80
8 Spain  150 Italy  9 Japan 41
9 Japan 150 Malaysia 8 Italy 41
10 Sweden  130 Canada 8 Finland 40
11 Switzerland 94 Singapore 8 Canada 38
12 China  83 France  7 Spain 20
13 Denmark 82 China, Hong Kong 7 Bel-Lux 19
14 Norway 76 Saudi Arabia 7 Belgium 16
15 Austria 68 Indonesia 6 China 16
16 Ireland 63 Thailand 5 Ireland 14
17 Saudi Arabia 57 Netherlands 5 Switzerland 13
18 Finland 56 Sweden 4 Portugal 11
19 Russia 48 Philippines 3 Korea 11
20 Brazil 45  Fiji 3  Russia 9
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Appendix I  Continued 
 Portugal   Spain   Sweden  
1 Spain  180  France  640  Germany  380
2 Germany  150 Germany  520 United Kingdom  240
3 France  110 Italy  330 United States 210
4 United Kingdom 81 United Kingdom 280 Norway 200
5 Italy 60 United States 210 Finland 150
6 Netherlands  46 Portugal  180 Netherlands  140
7 United States  42 Netherlands  150 France 130
8 Japan 17 Japan 83 Denmark 93
9 Sweden  17 Belgium  59 Italy 91
10 Bel-Lux 17 Bel-Lux 58 Japan 75
11 Switzerland  14 China  52 Bel-Lux 54
12 Belgium 12 Switzerland 51 Spain 48
13 Norway 11 Mexico 50 Switzerland 44
14 Brazil 11 Sweden 46 Belgium 33
15 Denmark 10 Algeria 41 China 32
16 Nigeria 9 Saudi Arabia 39 Austria 30
17 Angola  9 Brazil  34 Poland  28
18 Saudi Arabia  8 Austria  33 Canada  22
19 Austria  8 Libya  30 Ireland  21
20 Finland  7  Morocco  30  China, Hong Kong 20
 
Appendix I  Continued 
 Switzerland   United Kingdom   United States  
1 Germany  760  Germany  1200  Canada  5200
2 France  290 United States  1200 Japan  3300
3 Italy  260 France  860 Mexico  2400
4 United States  240 Netherlands  680 Germany  1300
5 United Kingdom  170 Italy  450 China  1200
6 Austria  110 Ireland  440 United Kingdom  1200
7 Netherlands  110 Japan  350 Korea  840
8 Japan  100 Spain  290 France  690
9 Spain  55 Bel-Lux 250 Italy  530
10 Bel-Lux 50 Sweden  240 Singapore  510
11 China, Hong Kong 48 Switzerland  230 Netherlands  460
12 Sweden  43 Norway  210 China, Hong Kong 420
13 China  28 China, Hong Kong 180 Brazil  410
14 Denmark  28 Canada  160 Malaysia  400
15 Ireland  27 Belgium  160 Saudi Arabia  360
16 Belgium  21 Denmark  130 Venezuela, Rep.  330
17 Saudi Arabia  20 Finland  110 Australia  300
18 Russia  20 Australia  100 Switzerland  280
19 Israel  20 China  100 Thailand  270
20 Singapore  19  Saudi Arabia  100  Philippines  240
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Appendix II The 2-digit ISIC manufacturing level 
codes 
ISIC code Category 
31 Food, Beverages and tobacco 
32 Textile, wearing apparel, and leather industies 
33 Wood and wood produces, including furniture 
34 Paper and paper products, printing and publishing 
35 Chemicals and chemical petroleum, coal, rubber and plastic products 
36 Non-metallic mineral products, except products of petroleum and coal 
37 Basic metal industries 
38 Fabricated metal products, machinery, and equipment 
39 Other manufactured products 
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Appendix III Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test and Wu-
Hausman Test 
Denote by cβˆ  the estimator that is consistent under both the null and the alternative 
hypotheses, and by eβˆ  the estimator that is fully efficient under the null but inconsistent 
if the null is not true. The Hausman (1978) specification test takes the quadratic form: 
)ˆˆ()ˆˆ( ecec DnH ββββ −′−= −  where ( ))ˆ()ˆ( ec VVD ββ −=    (A-1) 
and where )ˆ(βV  denotes a consistent estimate of the asymptotic variance of β , and the 
operator − denotes a generalized inverse.  
A Hausman statistic for a test of endogeneity in an IV regression is formed by choosing 
OLS as the efficient estimator eβˆ  and IV as the inefficient but consistent estimator cβˆ . 
The test statistic is distributed as 2χ  with K1 degrees of freedom, this being the number 
of regressors being tested for endogeneity. The test is perhaps best interpreted not as a 
test for the endogeneity or exogeneity of regressors per se, but rather as a test of the 
consequence of employing different estimation methods on the same equation. Under the 
null hypothesis that OLS is an appropriate estimation technique, only efficiency should 
be lost by turning to IV; the point estimates should be qualitatively unaffected. 
The Hausman statistic comes in several flavors, depending on which estimates of the 
asymptotic variances are used. An obvious possibility would be to use )ˆ( IVV β  and 
)ˆ( OLSV β  as generated by standard IV and OLS estimation. This is actually rarely done 
because, although asymptotically valid, it has the drawback of possibly generating a 
negative Hausman statistic in finite samples. Avoiding this problem is straightforward. 
The standard asymptotic covariances for IV and OLS are  
12 )(ˆ)ˆ( −′= PzXXV IVIV σβ      12 )(ˆ)ˆ( −′= XXV OLSIV σβ    (A-2) 
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Where we define the full set of instruments as Z and let Pz represent the "projection 
matrix" Z*inv(Z'Z)*Z'. Under the null, both the IV and the OLS estimates of the error 
variance are consistent estimators of σ , and either can be used to form the Hausman 
statistic. If a common estimate of σ  is used, then the generalized inverse of D is 
guaranteed to exist and a positive test statistic is guaranteed. If the Hausman statistic is 
formed using the OLS estimate of the error variance, then the D matrix in Equation (19) 
becomes  
( ) ( )( )112ˆ −− ′−′= XXPzXXD OLSσ    (A-3) 
This version of the endogeneity test was first proposed by Durbin (1954) and separately 
by Wu (1973) (his T4 statistic) and Hausman (1978). If the Hausman statistic is formed 
using the IV estimate of the error variance, then the D matrix becomes 
( ) ( )( )112ˆ −− ′−′= XXPzXXD IVσ     (A-4) 
This version of the statistic was proposed by separately by Wu (1973) (his T3 statistic) 
and Hausman (1978). 
Another asymptotically equivalent flavor of the DWH test is available for standard IV 
estimation under conditional homoskedasticity. This is the test statistic introduced by Wu 
(1973) (his T2) (Wu-Hausman statistic), and separately shown by Hausman (1978) to be 
calculated straightforwardly through the use of auxiliary regressions. Consider a 
simplified version of our basic model with a single endogenous regressor x1: 
uXxy ++= 2211 ββ      (A-5) 
with 22 ZX ≡  assumed exogenous (including the constant, if one is specified) and with 
excluded instruments Z1 as usual. The auxiliary regression approach involves estimating 
the reduced form (first-stage) regression for x1: 
vZvXZx +Γ=+Γ+Γ= 22111     (A-6) 
We are concerned with testing that ux ⊥1 . Since by assumption each z in Z is 
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uncorrelated with u, the first stage regression implies that this condition is equivalent to a 
test of uv ⊥ . Exogeneity of the z's implies that uˆ  the residuals from OLS estimation of 
the first-stage regression will be a consistent estimator of u. Thus, we augment 
Equation 23 with uˆ  and reestimate it with OLS. A t-test of the significance of uˆ  in this 
auxiliary regression is then a direct test of the null hypothesis in this context, that θ =0: 
εθββ +++= uXxy ˆ2211     (A-7) 
The Wu-Hausman test may be readily generalized to multiple endogenous variables, 
since it merely requires the estimation of the first-stage regression for each of the 
endogenous variables, and augmentation of the original model with their residual series. 
The test statistic then becomes an F-test, with numerator degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of included endogenous variables. One advantage of the Wu-Hausman F-statistic 
over the other DWH tests for IV vs. OLS is that with certain normality assumptions, it is 
a finite sample test exactly distributed as F (see Wu (1973) and Nakamura and Nakamura 
(1981)). Wu (1974)'s Monte Carlo studies also suggest that this statistic is to be preferred 
to the statistic using just 2IVσ . 
An inconvenient complication here is that an ordinary F-test for the significance of θ  
will not be valid, because the unrestricted sum of squares needed for the denominator is 
wrong, and obtaining the correct SSR requires further steps (see Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1993), chapter 7). Only in the special case where the efficient estimator is 
OLS will an ordinary F-test yield the correct test statistic. The auxiliary regression 
approach to obtaining the Wu-Hausman statistic described above has the further 
disadvantage of being computationally expensive and practically cumbersome when there 
are more than a few endogenous variables to be tested, because a residual series must be 
constructed separately for every endogenous variable being tested. We have taken a 
different and simpler approach to programming the Wu-Hausman statistic. The Durbin 
flavor of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic equation 21 can be written as 
Durbin DWH: 
nUSSR
QK B /
)(
*
1
2 =χ     (A-8) 
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and the Wu-Hausman F-statistic can be written 
Wu-Hausman: 
)/()(
/),(
1
*
1
*
11
B
B
BB KKnQUSSR
KQKKnKF −−−=−−   (A-9) 
where Q* is the difference between the restricted and unrestricted sums of squares by the 
equation 25, and USSR is the sum of squared residuals from the efficient estimate of the 
model. We can see from Equations (26) and (27) that the Wu-Hausman F-statistic can be 
easily calculated from the same quantities needed for the DWH statistic. This means that 
the Wu-Hausman F-statistic in Equation (27) does not need to be calculated using the 
traditional auxiliary regression method, with all the first-stage regressions and generation 
of residual series as described above. Instead, it can be calculated using only three 
additional regressions: one to estimate the restricted/efficient model, and two artificial 
regressions to obtain the two Sargan (1958) statistics. More precisely, we can write 
Durbin DWH: 
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′−′=−−  (A-11) 
where euˆ  and cuˆ  refer to the residuals from the restricted/efficient and unrestricted/ 
consistent estimations respectively, and PZ,X1B is the projection matrix of the instruments 
Z augmented by the regressors X1B whose endogeneity is being tested. 
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Appendix IV Panel Unit Root Tests 
Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) (LLC thereafter) argued that individual unit root tests have 
limited power against alternative hypotheses with highly persistent deviations from 
equilibrium. Therefore they suggest a more powerful panel unit root test than performing 
individual unit roots tests for each cross-section. The null hypothesis is that each 
individual time series contains a unit root against the alternative that each time series is 
stationary. The maintained hypothesis is that: 
1,2,3m      dyyy itmtmi
p
L
LitiLtiit
i =++Δ+=Δ ∑
=
−− εαθρ
1
1,   (A-12) 
With dmt indicating the vector of deterministic variables and miα  the corresponding vector 
of coefficients for model m=1,2,3. Since the lag order pi is unknown, LLC suggest a 
three-step procedure to implement their test. Firstly, they perform separate augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regressions for each cross-section: 
1,2,3m      dyyy itmtmi
p
L
LitiLtiiit
i =++Δ+=Δ ∑
=
−− εαθρ
1
1,   (A-13) 
The lag order pi is permitted to vary across individuals. For given T, choose a maximum 
lag order pmax and then use the t-statistic of  iLθˆ  to determine if a smaller lag order is 
preferred. When pi is determined, two auxiliary regressions are run to get orthogonalized 
residuals: 
Run ityΔ  on ),...,1( iLit pLy =Δ −  and dmt to get residuals iteˆ  
Run 1−Δ ity  on ),...,1( iLit pLy =Δ −  and dmt to get residuals 1ˆ −itv  
Standardize these residuals to control for different variances across i, iitit ee εσˆ/ˆ~ =  and 
iitit vv εσˆ/ˆ~ 1 =− . The iεσˆ  is the standard error from each ADF regression for i=1,…,N. Then 
estimate the ratio of long-run and short-run standard deviations. Under the null 
hypothesis of a unit root, the long-run variance of (A-12) can be estimated by  
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Where ))1/((1 +−= KLw LK  and K  is a truncation lag that can be data-dependent. 
K must be obtained in a manner that ensures the consistency of 2ˆ yiσ . For each cross-
section i, the ratio of the long-run standard deviation to the innovation standard deviation 
is estimated by iyiis εσσ ˆ/ˆˆ =  and the average standard deviation is that divided by N. At 
last they compute the panel test statistics. Run the pooled regression: 
ittiit ve ερ ~ˆ~ 1, += −      (A-15) 
Based on TN ~  observations where 1~ −−= pTT . T~  is the average number of 
observations per individual in panel with ∑
=
=
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/ . p  is the average lag order of 
individual ADF regressions. The conventional t-statistic for 0:0 =ρH  is )ˆ(ˆ
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Compute the adjusted t-statistic: 
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ρ
−−=  
Where * ~Tmμ  and * ~Tmσ  are the mean and standard deviation adjustment provided by LLC. 
They show that *ρt  is asymptotically distributed as N (0,1). The Monte Carlo simulations 
performed by LLC indicate that the normal distribution provides a good approximation to 
the empirical distribution of the test statistic, even in relatively small sample. Also that 
the panel unit root test provides dramatic improvements in power over separate unit root 
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tests for each cross-section. The limitations of LLC is the test crucially depends upon the 
independence assumption across cross-sections and is not applicable if cross-sectional 
correlation is present. And the assumption that all cross-sections have or do not have a 
unit root is restrictive. To panel sample size, LLC suggest using their panel unit root test 
for panels of moderate size with N between 10 and 250 and T between 25 and 250. 
However, for very large T they argue that individual unit root time series tests will be 
sufficiently powerful to apply for each cross-section. Also for very large N and very 
small T, they recommend the usual panel data procedure. Our data contain 276 country 
pairs which are close to their range but the period is quite small which is only 5.  
The LLC test is restrictive in the sense that it requires ρ  to be homogeneous across i. Im, 
Pesaran and Shin (IPS, 2003) allow for a heterogeneous coefficient of yi,t-1 and propose 
an alternative testing procedure based on averaging individual unit root test statistics. IPS 
suggest an average of the ADF tests when uit is serially correlated with different serial 
correlation properties across cross-sectional units. The null hypothesis is that each series 
in the panel contains a unit root, i.e., 0:0 =iH ρ for all i and the alternative hypothesis 
allows for some (but not all) of the individual series to have unit roots: 
⎩⎨
⎧
+==
=<
NNi for 
N1,2,...,i     for 
H
1i
1i
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0
:1 ρ
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It requires the fraction of the individual time series that are stationary to be nonzero. This 
condition is necessary for the consistency of the panel unit root test. The IPS t-bar 
statistic is defended as the average of the individual ADF statistic as: 
∑
=
=
N
i
i
t
N
t
1
1
ρ  
Where 
i
tρ  is the individual t-statistic for testing 0:0 =iH ρ  for all i. In case the lag order 
is always zero, IPS provide simulated critical values for t  for different number of cross-
sections N, series length T and DF regressions containing intercepts only or intercepts 
and linear trends. In the general case where the lag order may be nonzero for some cross-
 210
sections, IPS show that a properly standardized t  has an asymptotic N(0,1) distribution. 
For a fixed N, 
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IPS assume that iTt  are IID and have finite mean and variance. Then 
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The values of ]0[ =iiTtE ρ  and ]0[var =iiTt ρ  have been computed by IPS via 
simulations for different values of T and pi’s. In Monte Carlo experiments, they show that 
if a large enough lag order is selected for underlying ADF regressions, then the small 
sample performance of the t-bar test is reasonably satisfactory and generally better than 
the LLC test.  
Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001) proposed a Fisher-type test: 
∑
=
−=
N
i
ipP
1
ln2  
Which combines the p-values from unit root tests for each cross-section i to test for unit 
root in panel data. Note that ipln2 has a 
2χ  distribution with 2 degrees of freedom. This 
means that P is distributed as 2χ  with 2N degrees of freedom as ∞→iT . Maddala and 
Wu (1999) argued that the IPS and Fisher tests relax the restrictive assumption of the 
LLC test that iρ  is the same under the alternative. Both the IPS and Fisher tests combine 
information based on individual unit root tests. However, the Fisher test has the 
advantage over the IPS test in that it does not require a balanced panel. Also, the Fisher 
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test can use different lag lengths in the individual ADF regressions and can be applied to 
any other unit root tests. The disadvantage is that the p-values have to be derived by 
Monte Carlo simulations. Maddala and Wu (1999) find that the Fisher test with 
bootstrap-based critical values performs the best and is the preferred choice for testing 
nonstationary as the null and also in testing for cointegration in panels. 
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